Commentary

Volume Sixty-eight, Number Five, November 1979

The Andrew Young Affair
Carl Gershman

Dictatorships & Double Standards
Jeane Kirkpatrick

Art vs. the Arts
Ronald Berman

The Trouble with Reform Judaism
Julius Weinberg

Solar Energy: A False Hope
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Israelis in Exile
Drora Kass & Seymour Martin Lipset

MUSIC: Glenn Gould's Dissent
Samuel Lipman

BOOKS: Chester E. Finn, Jr. / Hyam Maccoby / James A. Nuechterlein / Terry Eastland / Joseph Shattan

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

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Commentary

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

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

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

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Letters from Readers

Zimbabwe Rhodesia

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Bayard Rustin's article, "The War Against Zimbabwe" [July], is a reasoned and provocative analysis of a complex issue which has been characterized by much misplaced emotional posturing. In detailing the factors leading to the Zimbabwean internal settlement and the successful April elections, Mr. Rustin appropriately distinguishes between the substance of what occurred (i.e., the democratic transfer of power to the black majority) and the admittedly imperfect process which has been the focus of sustained criticism.

Mr. Rustin raises a most significant question curiously overlooked in the debate about Zimbabwe Rhodesia's future; namely, the political system under which effective majority rule will manifest itself. He specifically rejects the contention that the guerrilla Patriotic Front's participation in a coalition government is a *necessary* condition for a stable constitutional order, or that their exclusion (largely self-imposed) suggests a cynical attempt to maintain white control at the expense of supposedly representative nationalist forces. In fact, he describes the Front as a "paper political alliance" incapable of even reconciling its differences. The Front's accession to power probably would trigger an even bloodier civil war to establish political control.

As such, Mr. Rustin's argument effectively condemns the arrogance and hypocrisy with which our present policy toward Zimbabwe Rhodesia is infused. In commenting upon Zimbabwe Rhodesia's international pariah status, despite its popularly elected government, and the support for the Patriotic Front in the United Nations and other international bodies, he notes:

> It is especially interesting that the excommunication of Zimbabwe has been decreed in the name of racial self-determination, but in total disregard of that country's black majority; and that the Patriotic Front is favored in the name of majority rule, but in total disregard of that group's anti-democratic outlook.

Given the United States' own history of excluding blacks from the political mainstream, it smacks of self-righteousness when we prescribe, among other things, the proportion of white representation in the Zimbabwean parliament. Little effort has been made by some observers to understand the practical and moral justification of the Muzorewa government's position *as understood by Zimbabwe Rhodesians themselves*. The West is obsessed with structural imperfections in the constitution and election and appears wedded to accommodating the views of African front-line states.

Bayard Rustin's trenchant study strengthens the growing awareness that our present policy conveniently ignores the significance of the transformation taking place in Zimbabwe Rhodesia. Paradoxically, we risk the very survival of representative democracy based on majority rule which is our proclaimed goal.

[Senator] RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Bayard Rustin's article is one of the finest pieces on the subject I have seen, and I read virtually everything written on Zimbabwe Rhodesia. My interest goes back to the early 1960's when I began research toward a doctoral dissertation in Rhodesian history, which I completed in 1972. . . .

I share Mr. Rustin's conclusions, and only wish that his voice would be heard by President Carter. . . .

ANTHONY P. DIPERNA
Commack, New York

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Bayard Rustin's . . . remarkable article, "The War Against Zimbabwe," should be read by everyone concerned with American foreign policy. The stakes are much higher than the fate and future of a small and seemingly unimportant country.

Mr. Rustin was an on-the-spot observer during the recent election in that country and traveled widely throughout it as a kind of poll-watcher during the several days in which the election took place. On the basis of his observations he came to the considered conclusion that the election, in which the bal-

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loting was secret, was free of intimidation and that Bishop Muzorewa is the democratically elected Prime Minister of Zimbabwe Rhodesia. Yet even before the results were in, the policy-makers in the State Department were ready with the pronouncement that nothing had changed, that it was still "Ian Smith's government," and that Bishop Muzorewa was simply a stooge for Ian Smith. Now one can assume two things. The first is that Mr. Rustin is quite competent to judge who is and who is not a white man's stooge. The second is that the policy-makers in the State Department know perfectly well that Mr. Rustin, whose views had already been made known before the appearance of this article, is telling the truth. Why else would they go to the absurd length of trying to minimize Bishop Muzorewa's electoral strength by adding to the votes of the opposition the numbers of those who did not vote at all (31 per cent)? As Mr. Rustin points out, the use of this same technique for interpreting an election would have "proved" that Jimmy Carter was elected President with a mandate of 27 per cent of the American electorate! . . .

The crucial question is, why are these Americans so desperately and willfully determined not to be proved wrong, even if this were to require the destruction . . . of a country against the interests both of its own inhabitants and the United States? What is the basis of this fanaticism? As plausible as it may seem to think so, this attitude does not in fact derive from a pro-Marxist standpoint, notwithstanding the excuses these people are prepared to make for what is going on in Angola and Mozambique. What is at work, rather, is the oldest syndrome in race relations, namely, the use by the white of the black as an emotional pawn, and it works in the following way. First, whites are moved by moral indignation to become the spokesmen for blacks who are politically oppressed and utterly lacking any voice for the affirmation of their interests. At this initial stage, the aims are of necessity vague and sweeping—for example, "liberation"—for the oppression is so pervasive that there seems to be no prospect whatever for practical amelioration. . . . Thus in this phase the white spokesmen and the voiceless blacks are in agreement.

The situation, however, can change for the better in an unpredicted way. If it does, the blacks who are directly affected by the change at once lose interest in the vague aims of the past, which are then seen as mere slogans, and turn with practical concern to specific goals. . . . These goals can include a willingness and desire to enter, in a wholly new spirit, into accommodations with their erstwhile oppressors who before the change would not have sat down at the same table with them.

At this point the grounds exist for the most painful rift between the blacks, who now have a voice, and those whites who were formerly their spokesmen. The blacks, who have their *own* interests to consider, want to live in the present and future. They are willing to forgive and forget and "get on with it." The white spokesmen, on the other hand, have no interests at all to consider but only their passions of moral indignation which require a demonstrative act of revenge against the blacks' former oppressors. And to get this revenge they are perfectly willing to advocate policies entailing the utter destruction of the blacks! . . . At this point the blacks have become simply a pawn in an emotional vendetta. If blacks decide that they want neither revenge nor their own destruction, they are flatly dismissed as "unrepresentative," "Uncle Toms," "sell-outs," etc.

This is an old story which goes back to the Civil War. As soon as Lincoln became a political force in America, the black leader Frederick Douglass saw that the situation had fundamentally changed. The Union could be seen in a new light as sound and worth preserving. He did not, of course, cease to be an abolitionist, but he saw . . . that the old policy of wanting the North to secede from the "morally contaminated" Union, which was advocated by the white abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison, was politically insane because it would abandon the slaves to the total control of the slaveholders in the South. Douglass, in what was a personally agonizing decision for him, broke with his old benefactor over this issue. Garrison reacted with coldness to Douglass's decision to strike an independent line which was focused on the interests of the blacks rather than on the moral feelings of the whites. . . .

As for Zimbabwe, the white "spokesmen" for the blacks are angry with Bishop Muzorewa essentially because he does not want revenge against Ian Smith and the whites Smith represents. They are right. He does not want revenge. He wants the whites to stay. He needs their skills and he also thinks they have a right to stay in the country which belongs to all its citizens, black and white alike. The politics of revenge would drive out the whites. To prevent this, Muzorewa has been perfectly willing to agree to give the whites certain guarantees . . . which are temporary and which may be absolutely necessary in the immediate circumstances. Evidently many other blacks in Zimbabwe agree with him. After all, Bishop Muzorewa, had he wanted to, could have played the same card as Nkomo or Mugabe did; his popularity within Zimbabwe today may be due precisely to his refusal to do this.

The situation seems to be somewhat complicated by the hostility of the most "militant" members of the Organization of African States to Bishop Muzorewa. But . . . they too are using the blacks in Zimbabwe as pawns to blackmail the West by trying to make it feel guilty for supporting a "racist" and "undemocratic" regime. One could mention in passing that the rulers of Nigeria and quite a number of other countries in Africa are hardly in a position to give lectures about constitutional democracy.

The real moral of the story, however, is the strangeness of demanding democratic change in Zimbabwe while arrogantly dismissing what the people of that country, black and white, themselves have to say about their own interests. Evidently, the whites in the State Department are more elitist than the whites in Salisbury.

HOWARD BROTZ
McMaster University
Hamilton, Ontario

BAYARD RUSTIN writes:

I want to thank Senator Schweiker and Anthony P. DiPerna for their comments on my article. I also want to commend Howard Brotz for his analysis of the Zimbabwean situation and for the very relevant parallel he draws between the moral absolutism of William Lloyd Garrison and the practical humanitarianism of Frederick Douglass. I have long

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

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felt that the tendency of some white radicals to use blacks as revolutionary proxies must be resisted if democratic reform is to succeed. Regarding Zimbabwe Rhodesia, I think it is necessary to lay aside old prejudices and take a fresh look at the possibilities for a peaceful settlement that offers the prospect of interracial democracy.

Weber & the Court

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

The *Weber* decision is, I fear, a much more serious defeat for the principle of nondiscrimination than Carl Cohen's generally excellent critique suggests ["Justice Debased: The Weber Decision," September]. Members of the Supreme Court, even those who do not read COMMENTARY and thus may have missed Mr. Cohen's earlier *tour de force*, "Why Racial Preference Is Illegal and Immoral" [June], cannot be wholly ignorant of the ethical objections to racial quotas. Yet the *Weber* majority deigns to mention none of them and therefore answers none of them. Five Justices seemingly shared the conviction that "affirmative action" in the form of racial quotas and preferences is self-evidently just or, if not just, then a socially necessary expedient. Only such beliefs can explain the miscarriage of law that occurred in *Weber*: the Humpty Dumpty defiance of plain statutory language, the misrepresentation of an uncommonly clear legislative record.

Even Chief Justice Burger, one of the two dissenters, confined his criticism to the technical deficiencies of the Court's interpretation, as distinguished from the injustice of the outcome. Indeed, he granted that the majority's misreading of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 achieved "a desirable result," "a result I would be inclined to vote for were I a Member of Congress considering a proposed amendment of Title VII." (The Chief Justice somewhat inconsistently joined in the Rehnquist dissent, which concluded with a denunciation of the *numerus clausus* in either benign or hostile form, but one has to suppose that the purest expression of a judge's views is his own separately-authored opinion.)

Though he did not say so, Mr. Cohen must have found Justice Blackmun's separate concurring opinion especially appalling. Readers of Mr. Cohen's first article will recall his strongly argued view that a racial preference is morally acceptable only insofar as it affords restitution to identifiable victims of specific acts of racial discrimination. In the *Weber* situation, as Mr. Cohen pointed out, "[n]ot one of the black employees who were offered on-the-job training opportunities . . . had been subject to any prior employment discrimination by Kaiser." Justice Blackmun transmuted this moral flaw into an apologia for the Kaiser plan. Blacks who might have been real victims of past discrimination by Kaiser Aluminum, Blackmun noted, "had never sued and so had no established representative." By its resort to coarse, unselective affirmative action, Kaiser—we are informed by Blackmun—"is able to avoid identifying victims of past discrimination, and so avoids claims for back pay that would inevitably follow a response limited to such victims." Finessing the just but costlier claim of injured individuals is, in the opinion of a member of the nation's highest tribunal, the "practical and equitable [!]" foundation for private racial quotas.

Mr. Cohen, retracing Rehnquist's "scathing and detailed" dissent, shows how the Court falsified the "intent" of the 1964 Congress. What he does not say, however, is that the *Weber* decision quite accurately expresses the current political orthodoxy. Yes, Hubert Humphrey gave emphatic assurances as floor leader of the civil-rights bill that the law would forbid discrimination in favor of minorities as well as discrimination against them. Yes, Senator Muskie made similar statements. Ditto Senators Clark, Case, Mansfield, *et al.* And yes, John Lindsay made the same representations on the House side. But that was then, and this is now. Has anyone heard Senator Muskie grousing about the *Weber* decision? If he were alive today, would Hubert Humphrey be against any "voluntary affirmative-action plan"?

With the federal government, business, labor, civil-rights groups, the ACLU, and most editorial opinion aligned in defense of affirmative-action quotas and with only a rag-tag of *amicus* support on Weber's side, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court chose to conduct a seance and commune with the ectoplasmic "spirit" of Title VII. And here I take issue with Mr. Cohen's guardedly optimistic conclusions. In theory he is correct in suggesting that "it remains open to Congress to register its true intent so clearly that even this [Supreme Court] majority could not fail to perceive it." But if the 1979 Congress has a "true intent" in the matter, an intent that somehow could be separated from the strong instinct of politicians to stay out of controversies that involve competing moral fervors, I suspect it would be in favor of fair-share quotas purporting to be transitional in nature, i.e., your standard affirmative-action plan.

The post-*Weber* battles will continue to be fought in the courts, not in the political branches, and the outlook is not good. As *Bakke* revealed, there are four predictable votes for quotas. It needs only the vote of Justice Powell or Stevens or (as in *Weber*) Justice Stewart to form a pro-quota majority in a given case. The self-proclaimed "narrowness" of Justice Brennan's *Weber* opinion ("We emphasize at the outset the narrowness of our inquiry. . . . The only question before us is the narrow statutory issue of whether Title VII *forbids* private employers and unions from voluntarily agreeing upon bona-fide affirmative-action plans that accord racial preferences in the manner and for the purpose provided in the Kaiser-USWA plan") may have been the price for Stewart's vote, but I must disagree with Mr. Cohen again to the extent that he finds in these passages a promise of wiser decisions to come.

MAURICE KELMAN
Wayne State University
Law School
Detroit, Michigan

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Carl Cohen's article makes it plain that the only way to defend the interpretation given Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the *Weber* decision is to insist that the purpose of a law must override its language and its intention alike. But that is not an altogether unappealing or absolutely insupportable contention, especially when it is called, as it is, preferring the living spirit of the law to its dead letter. The prevailing opinion in *Weber*, however, lacks a full and true understanding of the purpose of the law it expounds. No one who re-

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
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members the events and mood of 1964 can doubt that the congressional majority would have held that the highest purpose of the Civil Rights Act was to "establish justice." Justice required impartial treatment of individuals, i.e., it required color-blind employment practices. Bringing blacks into the economic situation would follow, it was thought, as a necessary consequence of color-blindness. But color-blindness was even more valued for its own sake; it was fair. So the *Weber* majority, denying that justice is the impartial treatment of individuals, is not only contrary to the letter of the 1964 Act but hostile to its spirit.

Mr. Cohen draws some consolation from the apparent narrowness of the decision. For one thing, it is not a case involving the Constitution—not explicitly. But although both the majority of the Court and the minority, each for its own reasons, are unwilling to point it out, the decision has a constitutional dimension. For the Court must think that its interpretation of Title VII is consonant with the Equal Protection Clause, that the phrase "No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws" allows the legislature to permit employers to discriminate in favor of blacks while forbidding them from discriminating in favor of whites. It is impossible to conceive of the Court upholding the constitutionality of a law that expressly authorized an employer to discriminate in the opposite direction. But the Court's concept of justice strikes at the heart of equal protection. Thus in the *Weber* decision the lawlessness of the manner comports with the lawlessness of the matter.

All the more reason then to hope, with Mr. Cohen, that Congress will rally itself to "more emphatic legislative insistence upon the equal protection of the laws."

R. S. HILL

Marietta College
Marietta, Ohio

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

We are much indebted to Carl Cohen for the wisdom, moral vision, and intellectual clarity of both his articles on *Weber*.

Most of my academic colleagues who oppose racial preferences do so because of their great concern for competence and academic standards. This country can afford a

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good deal of incompetence but we cannot afford to weaken our commitment to racial and ethnic equality before the law. Prohibitions against racial discrimination cannot coexist with officially sanctioned schemes of preference to persons because of their ethnic affiliation. As Mr. Cohen so ably points out, no euphemisms can conceal the fact that what was offered to the nation as law to end racial discrimination is now being used to require or permit it.

Improved attainment (assuming such an outcome) is of doubtful benefit to a minority group if that advancement involves the erosion of hard-won standards of fairness and undermines public confidence in the rationality and evenhandedness of the judicial system.

ELEANOR P. WOLF
Wayne State University
Detroit, Michigan

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Many years ago Arthur Krock accounted for the Supreme Court's finding that professional baseball was a sport but professional boxing was a business. The Court's members, he wrote, had been raised on the sandlots of America and not in Stillman's gym.

I was reminded of this on reading Carl Cohen's "Justice Debased: The Weber Decision." A majority of the present Court will not tolerate blatant racial discrimination against an applicant to medical school, but will allow it in on-the-job training programs in industrial employment. These judges can evidently envision their children or the children of their social acquaintances applying to medical school. But industrial apprenticeship is apparently as remote from their experience as was Stillman's gym from that of their predecessors.

RICHARD F. SCHIER
Franklin and Marshall College
Lancaster, Pennsylvania

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

In connection with Carl Cohen's article, perhaps it is appropriate to quote remarks made by Abraham Lincoln on the *Dred Scott* case, the politically pernicious decision of the Supreme Court in 1857 that had far-reaching consequences, most of which were the opposite of what the members of the Court sought. Lincoln said in part:

> We do not propose that when Dred Scott has been decided to be a slave by the court, we, as a mob, will decide him to be free. We do not propose that, when any other one, or one thousand, shall be decided by that court to be slaves, we will in any violent way disturb the rights of property so settled; but we nevertheless do oppose that decision as a political rule which shall be binding on the voter . . . , which shall be binding on the members of Congress or the President to favor no measure that does not actually concur with the principles of that decision. We do not propose to be bound by it as a political rule in that way, because we think it lays the foundation not merely of enlarging and spreading out what we consider an evil, but it lays the foundation for spreading that evil into the states themselves. We propose so resisting it as to have it reversed if we can, and a new judicial rule established upon this subject. . . .
>
> What are the uses of decisions of courts? . . . First—they decide upon the question before the court. They decide in this case that Dred Scott is a slave. Nobody resists that. Not only that, but they say to everybody else, that persons standing just as Dred Scott stands are as he is. That is, they say that when a question comes up upon another person it will be so decided again, unless the court decides in another way, unless the court overrules its decision. Well, we mean to do what we can to have the court decide the other way. That is one thing we mean to do.

Given the tortured judicial reasoning in the *Weber* decision and its political implications, why . . . has there been so little public reaction?

WILLIAM E. JOHNSTON, JR.
California State Polytechnic University
Pomona, California

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Carl Cohen deserves praise for an outstandingly lucid statement of the case *against* discrimination and the case *for* merit. The Supreme Court in ruling against Weber was,

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

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

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

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W. R. SEARS

San Mateo, California

SALT

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . I found Edward N. Luttwak's critique in "Ten Questions about SALT II" [August] not only informative but . . . particularly succinct and exhaustive in the manner in which he cuts through official obfuscation and equivocation. . . .

For my part, the question has never been, what kind of arms agreement can the U.S. reach with the Soviet Union, but rather, why are we speaking with Moscow at all—and particularly on the subject of arms? Official policy on this matter more or less states that unless the U.S. and the Soviet Union agree on something, both countries will spend exorbitant sums on an unlimited arms race and so increase the possibility of nuclear war. But while both countries already have enough weaponry to destroy each other several times over, in a strategic context I see no logic or reason in reducing *our* ability to pay the Soviets back in their coin. It has been our ability to do just that in the past that has served as some kind of restraint on the scope of Soviet incursions throughout the rest of the world. . . .

EDWARD CLINE

Forest Hills, New York

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Edward N. Luttwak's discussion of the implications of the proposed SALT treaty provides a penetrating look at the entire issue of strategic-nuclear-weapons policy. But the article only touches upon what is one of the least mentioned but most important issues concerning the proposed treaty, namely, how the agreement would affect our NATO allies. . . .

The Soviets hold the power, in the form of their intermediate-range ballistic missiles, to obliterate the population centers of Western Europe at a stroke. . . . The only deterrent Europe possesses is the U.S. nuclear "umbrella," a shield which grows more and more tattered with the passing of time.

In the past, American nuclear superiority meant that the Europeans could feel fairly well assured that the Soviets would not launch a massive strike. But the advent of American strategic "sufficiency" meant that our NATO allies were not really guaranteed anything. An essential balance can be effective in protecting New York or Chicago, but it leaves London and Paris wondering what the American response would be if they were attacked. The answer is clear. Against an equally powerful Soviet Union, the United States would not respond to an attack on our NATO allies as if it were a nuclear attack on the U.S. proper. Now, with even the rough equivalency of the balance threatening to fade away, the nations of Western Europe face the risk of standing alone and naked in the face of Soviet power. . . .

For the Western alliance to have any credibility at all, this situation must be remedied. While the U.S. is not going to launch a total nuclear strike in response to a Soviet nuclear attack on Western Europe, some sort of valid response must be available. All indications are that the weapon which would be best suited for such a role is one which will suffer greatly at the hands of the SALT treaty, the long-range cruise missile.

Due to its great accuracy and its consequent ability to carry out a precision mission armed with only a small, perhaps even conventional, warhead, the cruise missile is a relatively discreet strategic weapon which, if properly targeted, could well provide the perfect weapon for the U.S. to respond to a Soviet nuclear attack on Europe without necessarily provoking a Soviet strike against the U.S. . . . . Yet, as Mr. Luttwak points out, the provisions of SALT would severely limit the effectiveness of the cruise missile. . . .

But the specifics of the treaty as it applies to the cruise missile are only part of an overall pattern, the lessening of the American nuclear link to Europe. . . . If the Western alliance is to have any meaning at all, the nuclear link across the Atlantic must be kept vital and active. But if the U.S. continues to toss away its best strategic alternatives, this link will slowly vanish in the wind.

STUART K. SCHWARTZMAN

Brooklyn, New York

Joseph Heller & Woody Allen

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Pearl K. Bell's review of Joseph Heller's *Good as Gold* [Fiction, "Heller and Malamud, Then & Now," June] is one of the finest I have ever read. It's about time for the highly overrated Heller to be deflated. His book is not even poor caricature. It's bad slapstick—trite, vulgar, and unimaginative. . . .

ARTHUR WEISS

New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I was thoroughly delighted with Richard Grenier's astute critique of Woody Allen's recent film, *Manhattan* [Movies, "Woody Allen in the Limelight," July]. I found the look of the film affected and the plot self-indulgent. Woody Allen is seduced by the very "life style" he pretends to deprecate. I liked him better before he became a genius.

DANA-LYNN MACK

New York City

Clarification

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

The September issue contains a number of letters from readers commenting on an article by Samuel McCracken concerning nuclear power ["The Harrisburg Syndrome," June]. In one of these, from Mike A. Males of Helena, Montana, my name has been used as an improper reference. Mr. Males states that I am ". . . now with the UCS [Union of Concerned Scientists] . . . ," and that I have produced a correlation between ". . . nuclear cost increases and the number of orders processed by regulators and industry. . . ." Neither of these statements is correct. I am now in my sixteenth year at the Rand Corporation, in Santa Monica, and have never been associated in any way with UCS. I have published several widely used studies of the capital costs of light-water-reactor power plants, including statistical correlations, and have shown that the constant dollar costs of these plants have been increasing steadily. But I have never produced anything that could be interpreted to be the correlation that Mr. Males ascribes to me.

WILLIAM E. MOOZ

The Rand Corporation

Santa Monica, California

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

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The Andrew Young Affair

Carl Gershman

No episode in contemporary American history has been marked by a greater outpouring of animosity against Jews than the events which followed Andrew Young's resignation as United States Ambassador to the United Nations. The black American leaders who rallied to Young's side portrayed him as the victim of a concerted Jewish campaign to oust him from his post as a result of his meeting with Zehdi Terzi of the Palestine Liberation Organization (a meeting which violated an American agreement with Israel not to deal with the PLO until it recognized Israel's right to exist and accepted Security Council Resolution 242). During the course of the affair, charges were leveled against Jews which went well beyond the specific claim that they were responsible for Young's resignation. They were accused, among other things, of obstructing black economic and social progress through their opposition to racial quotas and affirmative-action programs. They were also accused of opposing human rights for Palestinians, and of holding a dual loyalty in their commitment to Israel which led them to support a foreign policy that jeopardized vital American interests, including the need to retain access to Arab oil supplies.

All these charges had a common thread, which was that Jews were victimizing others. The injustice they had perpetrated against Andrew Young, it was suggested, was merely symptomatic of the harm they were causing to blacks generally, to Palestinians, and to America itself. Clearly the time had come for Jews to mend their ways—to be less arrogant in exercising their power, which had grown inordinate, to stop protecting their special privileges at the expense of the poor, to show more sympathy for the plight of the Palestinians, and to stop placing their own narrow interests before the interests of the country as a whole.

In response to these attacks, Jewish leaders rejected the charges made against them, particularly the charge that they had demanded Young's resignation. At the same time, they reaffirmed their commitment to the black-Jewish alliance, a relationship which they generally seemed convinced would survive the misunderstanding and bad feeling generated by the Young affair. But beneath this public attitude of confidence and conciliation, Jews were gripped by feelings of bewilderment and foreboding. They knew they had not been responsible for Young's resignation, and yet they were being blamed for it. Why? And what could explain the seemingly gratuitous campaign of hostility which evoked echoes of the anti-Semitism of periods long past and in countries far removed from America's democratic experience? In the days following Young's resignation, "black-Jewish relations" were the subject of numerous declarations, editorials, articles, and discussions, but there still seemed to be no way to account for the perplexing and dismaying inversion of reality that had taken place: For here was a situation where Jews, knowing that they were the victims of an alarming attack, even if the motive for the attack remained obscure, were being labeled the aggressors; while their assailants, even as they issued menacing threats, claimed to be the injured party whose grievances cried out for redress.

The charge that the American Jewish community was responsible for Young's resignation last August 15 is not supported by any available evidence. American Jewish leaders, to be sure, expressed alarm at Young's meeting with Terzi, fearing that it represented new evidence of a shift in U.S. policy toward eventual recognition of the PLO. But with just one exception, they refrained from calling for his resignation because, as one of them explained, "he was Andy Young, because he was black and we realized the significance of that." Nowhere in the various accounts Young has given of his resignation has he claimed that this was not true, let alone that Jewish (or, for that matter, Israeli) pressure influenced his decision.

The view that his resignation "was a regrettable consequence of the double standard by which this nation judges its black leaders"—a charge made in a statement adopted unanimously by 200 black leaders meeting under the auspices of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peo-

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ple—appears ludicrous. The only concrete evidence offered to substantiate this charge was the fact that the State Department had not reprimanded the U.S. Ambassador to Austria for the contacts *he* had had with the PLO. But the two situations were hardly comparable since, unlike Young, the Ambassador to Austria had not withheld information from the State Department, or engaged in substantive talks with the PLO, or provoked a confrontation with Israel, or deceived the public by giving a partial account of his behavior.

Of course there *was* a double standard applied to Young, but far from discriminating against him, it gave him license, because of his race, to behave more independently than other diplomats—a license he indulged throughout his tenure as UN Ambassador. Had Young been judged "as an official of the U.S. government—not as a black man," a standard urged by black Congressman Walter E. Fauntroy, he would not have had to resign, since he would have been dismissed, most likely long before this latest controversy over the PLO.

WHY then did Young resign? His own explanation is that he did so "because it will free me to do some things that I want to do." For every time he had spoken his mind in the past, he said, there were dozens of occasions when he had kept silent to avoid compromising the administration. "Now," he added, "I won't have that level of restraint. And I assure you I have been restrained."

On no issue had he felt more restrained than on the question of U.S. policy in the Middle East. He had, he said, a "fundamental disagreement" with official U.S. policy in this area, "one that I sought to run from for two and a half years." He was firmly convinced, for example, that the U.S. should no longer allow itself to be bound by the 1975 agreement barring direct talks with the PLO as long as it refused to recognize Israel's existence. He called this policy "ridiculous" and charged that it actually contributed to PLO violence by closing off a nonviolent "means of allowing them to express their grievances or affirm their rights."

But if we are to judge from what Young said in the wake of his resignation, he was interested in much more than just opening up communication with the PLO. What he really wanted, he made clear, was a new American policy toward Israel.

In the past, according to Young, Israel enjoyed U.S. support because its creation was seen "as an answer to the Holocaust," and also because the American people believed the Israelis were "right to fight for their survival." But now Israel has become "an expansionist power" engaged in "terroristic" raids on Lebanon. And it has also "become the oppressor" in relation to the Palestinians. American blacks have been particularly sensitive to this change, he said, for while they had once been "convinced that the Jews were the oppressed people," they "now believe that the Palestinians are oppressed and will act accordingly."

Not only were the Israelis "losing their moral advantage," in Young's view, but they were also pursuing policies which threatened the interests of the United States. Without a change in Israel's policies, he felt, the violence in the Middle East would continue and the Arabs would eventually withhold oil exports to the U.S., a move that would cause "economic dislocations in the United States of America which will have serious reverberations in the constituency that I think I represent in the Democratic party," namely, the blacks. For this reason, Young said, "I will continue to oppose the fact that Israel can take decisions concerning the national interests of the United States."

It was to advance this view of the Middle East conflict that Young decided to meet with Terzi in the first place, thereby setting in motion the chain of events that led to his resignation. As he explained to the New York *Times*, his decision to meet with the PLO representative grew out of his concern that past U.S. commitments to Israel had been made to cope with traditional military threats, but were not adequate to protect the U.S. against the kind of economic warfare being waged by the Arab states. In fact, he resolved to meet with Terzi only after being informed that Kuwait might apply economic leverage against the U.S. unless something were done to solve the Palestinian problem. In Young's view, therefore, the meeting had extraordinary importance. "I was about to make the PLO take a great step toward recognizing Israel," he said in an interview with the French weekly *Le Nouvel Observateur*. It was this momentous prospect, he added, that upset the Israelis, since "they do not want peace with the PLO. They want to destroy them."

Considering that Young felt the meeting with Terzi was so politically important, it is very hard to believe his claim, made on *Face the Nation*, that he did not inform the State Department about it because "I didn't want to have any impact on this policy." And this is not the only inconsistency in Young's defense of his actions. He claimed that he gave a truthful account of the Terzi meeting to Israel's UN Ambassador Yehuda Blum in order to warn him "that any big public issue out of this would create a constituency for the Palestinians, as a result of people in this country who support me coming to my defense." But the choice he offered Israel—which was between acquiescing in the violation of an agreement which Israel considered vital to its security and risking a pro-PLO backlash among American blacks if Israel protested this violation—was, in effect, a threat. If he had had any sincere desire to avert such a backlash, he would not have resigned, for it was his resignation—and not Israel's protest—that touched off the outcry among blacks. Nor would

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he have gone about afterward charging that Moshe Dayan was the one who had leaked the story of his meeting with Terzi to *Newsweek*, an allegation that was inflammatory in addition to being totally unsubstantiated.

Similarly, it requires considerable credulity to accept Young's statement, on *Face the Nation*, that he could have kept his job had he wanted to, but that this would "have torn up the Democratic party," a reference to the black-Jewish split, and would also have made himself "the center of the issue." He indicated that he had wanted to avoid both of these eventualities. But as we know, and as was obvious at the time he made these statements, it was precisely Young's resignation that unleashed the furies of blacks against the Jews; and it was also his resignation which turned him into a martyred hero to many blacks and propelled him, at least temporarily, into a position of unchallenged preeminence among black American leaders, a place not occupied by any black leader since the death of Martin Luther King, Jr.

Considering that at every critical point in this unfolding drama—the meetings with Terzi and Blum and the resignation—Young acted freely, decisively, and as it would also appear, purposefully, his statement (made in the course of his valedictory remarks to the UN Security Council) that "I feel like I'm an innocent bystander being swept along by the forces of history" was nothing less than astonishing. But the impression of Young as an innocent victim was reinforced by the atmosphere of hysteria that was created when black leaders rushed headlong to his defense, charging that he had been forced to resign under Jewish pressure. And it was allowed to stand unchallenged by President Carter, who waited nearly six weeks—by which time the furor had died down—before announcing that "Any claims or allegations that American Jewish leaders or anyone else urged me to ask Andy for his resignation are absolutely and totally false."

ACCUSATIONS against the Jews were in the air almost as soon as the resignation was announced. The annual meeting of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Young's old organization, happened to be in session at the time, and it provided the forum for the initial anti-Jewish recriminations. Reverend Wyatt Tee Walker, the SCLC's liaison to the UN, announced that "The perception on the street is that the Jews did this to Andy Young." Jesse Jackson attributed the resignation to a "capitulation" to pressure from "our former allies, the American Jewish community." "The Klan didn't move on Andy," Jackson said, adding that blacks must now concern themselves with Jewish attitudes as well as with those of the Ku Klux Klan and the American Nazi party.

During the following days, the charge that Jews were responsible for Young's resignation was repeated over and over again. The Op-Ed Page of the New York *Times* ran an article by a black assistant professor of law claiming that Young's resignation "brings into sharp focus the immense power of the Israeli lobby in this country." The *Afro-American*, a Washington weekly, declared that it agreed with those who attributed "the exit of Young to Jewish pressure." Reverend Herbert Daughtry's Black United Front denounced "the Zionist racist pressure" which allegedly brought Young down and then staged a demonstration in front of the Israeli consulate in New York.

Inevitably, these accusations were accompanied by overt expressions of anti-Semitism. Jesse Jackson, speaking on the *MacNeil/Lehrer Report* the day after the resignation, blamed "Jewish promoters" for sponsoring a fight in South Africa which he opposed, and in a meeting with Jewish leaders, representatives of SCLC blamed "Jewish banks" for exploiting blacks in South Africa. The *Village Voice* rushed into print with a lead essay charging that "black writers cannot get published" and black characters and experiences are never portrayed on prime-time television and in the most popular movies and novels, because "American Jews dominate the image-shaping industries of our era." Thelma Thomas Daley, the president of a national sorority which is predominantly black, told the group's annual convention in New Orleans that as a result of the "affront" by Jews in the Young affair, "we question whether their loyalties are first to the state of Israel or to the United States." The charge of "duality of citizenship interests" was repeated in a letter to the New York *Times* by Gloster B. Current, a former top official of the NAACP.

While some black leaders were greatly distressed by the turn which events had taken, many welcomed the anti-Jewish reaction to Young's resignation, regarding it, in the words of Representative Parren Mitchell, as "a golden opportunity to discuss the whole package of black-Jewish differences." These differences, according to Jesse Jackson, grew out of a number of factors, among them the "confrontations between blacks and Jewish landlords, blacks and Jewish merchants," as well as the feeling that Jews, while willing to "share decency" with blacks during the civil-rights movement, became opponents "once we began to push for our share of universal slots in institutions."

For Roger Wilkins, a reporter for the New York *Times*, the root of the black anger against the Jews was something at once more profound and infuriating. At a memorial meeting in New York for Stanley D. Levison, a close associate of Young and the late Dr. King, he noted that "blacks erupted because some Jews didn't respect the intellect of blacks." In their criticism of Young's actions, according to Wilkins, these Jews were telling blacks, "We will define what your rights are,

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what your interests are, how fast you will go, who you are." According to this view, blacks had simply thrown off the yoke of Jewish paternalism in their bitter reaction to Young's resignation.*

These issues and feelings came to a head at the meeting of 200 black leaders whom the NAACP had called together to examine how "the successful demand for the resignation" of Young had "further damaged an already unhappy relationship" between Jews and blacks. Their statement, which the psychologist Kenneth B. Clark called "our declaration of independence" and which received a standing ovation when it was read to the assembled black leaders by Julian Bond, criticized Jewish organizations and intellectuals as "apologists for the racial status quo" and attacked Israel for what was called its "trade and military alliance" with South Africa and "Southern Rhodesia." It also noted that the responsibility for resolving black-Jewish differences "cannot be placed disproportionately on the backs of already overburdened blacks," and that "Jews must show more sensitivity and be prepared for more consultation before taking positions contrary to the best interests of the black community."

Young himself did not discourage the anti-Jewish reaction to his resignation; in fact, he encouraged it. When asked on *Face the Nation* how the issue of blacks and Jews had anything at all to do with his resignation, he responded not by saying it was a false issue—as he would have done had he had the least desire to quell the attacks against the Jews—but by talking of black-Jewish differences over racial quotas and over attitudes toward the Middle East. In an interview with the New York *Times*, he was more pointed in his criticism of Jews, observing that they had "made all the decisions in the [black-Jewish] coalition" and had adopted an attitude of "paternalism when black were totally helpless and dependent." And in a subsequent interview, by way of proving that blacks were not anti-Semitic, he observed "that in spite of everything which has happened there has not been a single act of anti-Jewish violence," the implication being that Jews had done something terrible enough to provoke such violence and had been spared only as a result of black restraint.

BUT Young's primary role in the wake of his resignation was not to incite an anti-Jewish reaction among blacks. There were others, as we have seen, who eagerly undertook this task. Instead, he used his influence, as one of his close associates told the Washington *Post*, to "refocus the anger from people defending him to discussing the issue of the PLO and the Israelis." Such "refocusing" was necessary since "the constituency for the Palestinians" that Young had predicted would emerge from a controversy over his meeting with Terzi was really not "for the Palestinians" so much as it was for Young and against the Jews. It was also such "refocusing" that made the Young affair so *politically* significant. For if it was a "benchmark" after which "things will never be the same again," as Mayor Richard G. Hatcher of Gary, Indiana said, this was not only because the degree of hostility which blacks expressed toward Jews was unprecedented. It was also because this hostility was harnessed to a political goal, which was to effect a decisive break between blacks and Jews over the issue of Israel and the PLO.

Before the Young affair, most "mainstream" black leaders avoided any association with the PLO and, in fact, were sponsors of Bayard Rustin's Black Americans to Support Israel Committee (BASIC). This stand made good sense to black leaders, both as an expression of support for liberal democracy and as a demonstration of their commitment to the political alliance they maintained with the Jewish community. Moreover, there was no compelling reason *not* to have this position. No evidence existed of any groundswell of support among blacks for a different position, nor had any political rationale been put forth (aside from the Third World ideology of black nationalists, who were not part of the civil-rights coalition) to justify a change in terms of an appeal to black self-interest or principle.

This is not to say that there was no support at all for the PLO among blacks. Several fringe groups, such as the Black United Front of Reverend Daughtry and the Black Theology Project of Mohammed Kenyatta, were vociferously pro-PLO and anti-Zionist. The 1.2-million-member Progressive Baptist Convention, led by Reverend William Augustus Jones (who has frequently accused moderate black leaders of being bought off by Jews), passed a resolution endorsing a Palestinian state almost a year ago. And the Black Muslims, now called the World Community of Islam, had long been ardent supporters of the Arab cause. But until the Young affair, Jesse Jackson's Operation PUSH and the SCLC were the only civil-rights groups that had taken a stand in favor of the PLO, and without any noticeable impact among blacks.

* What a supposedly non-paternalistic attitude of Jews toward blacks would look like was suggested by some of the speakers at the Levison memorial meeting. Levison, who the FBI claimed was a Communist influence on Dr. King, a charge Levison denied, represented "the essence of a loving relationship between blacks and Jews," according to Roger Wilkins. Eleanor Holmes Norton commented that Levison's "work was in the best tradition of Judaism." But the only "Jewish" tradition in which Levison stood was the leftist tradition of what Isaac Deutscher once called "the non-Jewish Jew." Coretta Scott King acknowledged this in the course of praising Levison for being "not a Jew or a white" but "colorless, a white man with a black heart." Were Jews to require a similar relinquishment of identity by blacks as a condition for a "loving" relationship, they would be accused of something a good deal worse than paternalism.

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In July, for example, Jackson called for recognition by the U.S. of "the just demands of the dispossessed Palestinian people," and the international affairs director of PUSH, Jack O'Dell, headed a delegation that visited PLO camps in Lebanon and met with Yasir Arafat. But these actions were completely overshadowed by Jackson's subsequent tour of South Africa. Similarly, the SCLC's president emeritus, Reverend Ralph David Abernathy, joined with the pro-PLO Palestine Human Rights Campaign (PHRC) last February in asking President Carter to appoint a commission to investigate charges of torture by Israeli authorities on the West Bank, and in May he co-sponsored a PHRC conference on the "human rights of the dispersed and occupied Palestinian people." But during this period the SCLC's main energies were devoted to its ongoing battle with the Ku Klux Klan, an effort which the SCLC president, Reverend Joseph Lowery, hoped might revive the group's sagging political and financial condition.

EVEN after Young resigned, most black Americans did not embrace the views on the Middle East conflict held by PUSH and SCLC, or, for that matter, by Young himself. A Gallup Poll conducted two weeks after Young's resignation showed that a larger percentage of black Americans was sympathetic to Israel (26 per cent) than to the Arab nations (15 per cent), and that only 5 per cent of blacks even considered the Middle East to be among the most important concerns facing the U.S. today. But much more relevant than the outlook of the "silent majority" of blacks were the anger and publicity generated by the politically articulate ministers, publicists, politicians, and professionals in charging that Young had been martyred by the Jews, and that the economic well-being of every black American was being jeopardized by the policies of the Israeli government. This was sufficient to allow the PUSH-SCLC leadership to seize the initiative among black organizations and, together with Young, to define a new "black perspective" on the Middle East.

The key element in this new perspective was the contention that the United States should recognize the PLO and that American blacks must be involved in pressing for that objective. Two important black leaders, Bayard Rustin of the A. Philip Randolph Institute and Vernon Jordan of the Urban League, dissented from this point of view. But otherwise it went unopposed. The NAACP's executive director, Benjamin L. Hooks, said his organization "would urge the State Department to talk with the PLO," while Jesse Jackson, in keeping with his more hyperbolic style, declared that it would be "an international absurdity and a crime against the civilized world" for the U.S. not to do so. TransAfrica, the black foreign-affairs lobby which the NAACP's board chairman Margaret Bush Wilson said was "strongly supported by almost all domestic black groups," including her own, called for the creation of a Palestinian state and announced that Israel's actions since 1967 had "eroded the basis for our respect and acceptance." Representative John Conyers brought greetings from the Congressional Black Caucus to a national conference of the PHRC devoted to developing strategies for building a pro-PLO constituency in the U.S.; Conyers told the PHRC that "the Black Caucus will be meeting with you from this point on." The National Association of Black Journalists, meeting in Washington, observed the new practice of showing support for the PLO by establishing a telephone hookup with the PLO's Terzi in New York and by having two West Bank Palestinian mayors address their gathering.

Of all the black groups, none took up the cause of the PLO more avidly than SCLC. An SCLC delegation met with Terzi only days after Young resigned, a meeting which the Washington *Post* called "the most important show of support for the Palestinian cause" by a U.S. group in recent memory. Not long thereafter, Lowery led an SCLC delegation to Beirut in what he said was a "divinely mandated" attempt to spread the gospel of nonviolence. This resulted in the spectacle of eleven disciples of Martin Luther King singing "We Shall Overcome" with Yasir Arafat. Congressman Fauntroy, apparently unaware that Lebanon has been wracked by one of the bloodiest civil wars in modern history and that the PLO practices terrorism, observed that the Lebanese Muslim and PLO military commanders who met with the SCLC group were "men of peace" who "we have no reason to think . . . are opposed to nonviolence." Since Israel, unlike its enemies, *was* "opposed to nonviolence," Fauntroy announced that the SCLC group would return to America to lobby against military assistance to the Jewish state.

Jackson, not to be outdone, arrived in the Middle East almost as soon as the SCLC group had left, predicting that his visit would bring a "major breakthrough" for peace. Plunging into the tense Arab-Israeli dispute, he exhorted Palestinians on the West Bank to copy the U.S. civil-rights movement in their struggle for an independent state and criticized "the persecution complex" of Jews that "makes them overreact to their own suffering" (which was, he noted,hardly unique, since "60 million blacks" by his rough guess were exterminated during slavery). He also warned America against "backing into another Vietnam war," and offered himself as a mediator between the PLO and the United States. Jackson claimed to be even-handed in his approach, but this message did not get through either to the PLO supporters on the West Bank, who chanted "Jackson! Arafat!" while carrying him aloft on their shoulders, or to the Jerusalem *Post*, which found evidence of "moral

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rot" in Jackson's call for surrender by the U.S. to pressure by Arab oil producers.

Jackson's tour resulted in considerable publicity for himself and the PLO, but did not produce even a gesture by the PLO indicating a possible interest in renouncing terrorism or recognizing Israel. Jackson announced dramatically that the PLO was declaring a cease-fire in Lebanon, but the cease-fire had already been agreed to weeks earlier and a PLO spokesman, upon being questioned as to what had changed, smiled and said that "We will now respect it more." Moreover, for all the support and sympathy Jackson heaped on the PLO, he left, according to a report in the New York *Times*, "a negative impression" on a number of Palestinians themselves. "He didn't do his homework, and he got his geography mixed," said Salim Tamari, a professor at Bir Zeit University on the West Bank. The *Times* reported that Jackson "apparently thought the Jordan River divided Israel from Lebanon, and spoke several times about stopping the violence on 'both sides' of the Jordan. In fact, the Israeli-Jordanian border is peaceful now."

Despite the failure of the PLO to move toward either a renunciation of terrorism or the recognition of Israel, and despite his own demonstrated ignorance of the politics of the conflict, Jackson announced he would campaign for U.S. recognition of the PLO and against U.S. military aid to Israel.

Young, who had prepared the way with his resignation for all this black involvement on the side of the PLO, was warmly applauded by 5,000 guests at a dinner of the Congressional Black Caucus when he attacked Israel for its "constant bombing of Palestinians in Lebanon." Blacks, he said, have "always supported the underdog" which was now the PLO, whose terrorism grew out of the "despair and desperation" of people who lack "any worldwide support for the legitimacy of their cause." In addition to urging his audience not to ignore the Middle East situation on the false assumption that it was "white folks' business," Young also pointed out that blacks would have to become involved in foreign policy generally, since no issue of immediate concern to them, such as unemployment, could be dealt with "in the strictly domestic context."

With this end in view, he announced his intention to form a new organization which would seek to develop "a new foreign-policy constituency . . . made up of minorities and poor people." This organization, he said on *Issues and Answers*, would "be involved with American businesses abroad," presumably in African and other non-Western countries. It would also be "intensely political," involving itself in political campaigns and in the "fight for ideas in America." Indeed, he did not rule out that this fight could become extremely bitter. If there developed "a moral crisis comparable to the situation in Vietnam," he said, "I would have no hesitation to do everything in my power to mobilize not only blacks and Hispanics, but also the labor unions, the churches, university students, to rally this nation around a new agenda. If that required going to the streets, we know how to do that better than we know anything else."

YOUNG has described the outlook which would guide such activities as "essentially a black perspective." As he has made eminently clear over the past three years, this embraces much more than the notion that in the Middle East the Palestinians are the "oppressed people" and Israel is the "oppressor." During the period following his resignation, when all attention was focused on his Middle East views, he pronounced judgment on many other questions. He said, for example, that the United States should immediately establish diplomatic relations with Vietnam regardless of Hanoi's policy toward refugees, its invasion of Cambodia, or any other consideration; that the U.S., in fact, is responsible for the refugee problem in Indochina because of our refusal to recognize Vietnam and because of our bombing of food-producing areas during the war; that the decision to increase military spending and build the MX missile system is wrong; that we should end the economic embargo of Cuba immediately, rather than delay in the hope of persuading Castro to withdraw Cuban troops from Africa; and that the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba is a "totally irrelevant political issue" that has "nothing to do with the security of this nation."

This amounts to a "black perspective" only if by "black" one means the political and ideological capitulation by the United States to the Soviet Union on one issue after another. It is really "black" only in the sense that it shares the general ideological orientation of the so-called nonaligned movement which met in Havana last September. Such a perspective would not be fully identified with this orientation, however, were it not clearly in favor of the PLO, whose cause is fervently championed by the movement of the so-called nonaligned. Indeed, as the Havana conference showed, though it was obvious long before, opposition to Zionism (now condemned not only as racism but as "a crime against humanity"!) is not an incidental ideological appendage to the world view of this movement but is absolutely integral to it. It is, as Conor Cruise O'Brien wrote recently, one of the foci around which the driving forces in Third World countries today "accumulate in sullen masses of racial and religious hostility," and which make these countries so easy for the Soviet Union to manipulate.

In a similar vein, the anti-Semitism that erupted following Young's resignation was not an incidental occurrence, the result of some unfortunate misunderstanding over who said what to whom. On

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the contrary, it was the political equivalent among American blacks, at least among that segment of American blacks which is today the most ideologically dynamic, of anti-Zionism in the Third World. It was the focus around which the "sullen masses" of racial hostility could accumulate, enabling some black leaders to precipitate a rupture with an earlier democratic orientation and to move a significant segment of the black leadership toward an ideological and political alignment with Third World radicalism.

For Young, the concept of aligning American blacks with radical forces in the Third World is not a new idea. Though he was never drawn to the Black Panther party, he identified with its notion that the non-Western world is in thrall to the white West and must be liberated; and that American blacks can play a decisive role in that liberation. He expressed this point of view in 1970 in an ABC news program on the Black Panthers:

> *Young*: Western technology and Western militarism has [*sic*] so interfered with the right of the possibility of, say, democracy in Latin America, or real freedom in Africa and Asia, that it may take the destruction of Western civilization—and this, of course, is Panther ideology—that it may take the destruction of Western civilization to allow the rest of the world to really emerge as a free and brotherly society, and if the white West is incapable of brotherhood with colored peoples, then *this small body of colored peoples, black people within the white West, may be the revolutionary vanguard* that God has ordained to destroy the whole thing. [Emphasis added.]
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> *ABC*: Would you support the destruction of Western civilization if you were convinced that the rest of the world would thereby be liberated?
>
> *Young*: I probably would.

As it turned out, this concept of a black "vanguard" in America, linked by race and ideology with radical movements of the non-Western world, was carried forward not by the Black Panthers, whose nihilism quickly spent itself, but by Andrew Young. And as it also turned out, there were much more practical means available for attempting to "liberate" the non-Western world, and in the process subdue the West, than revolution. It was discovered, for example, that a black "vanguard" in America could serve the same purpose more effectively simply by becoming an internal pressure group for political surrender to economic blackmail by Arab and other non-Western oil producers. Young, Jackson, and other black leaders have couched their arguments in favor of U.S. capitulation to Arab economic pressure in terms of black economic self-interest. But this "vital" interest was not insisted upon until after Young's resignation—which is to say, until the move to consummate the political turn toward the PLO.

In the case of Africa, Young has made no effort to conceal the fact that the "economic self-interest" argument is politically inspired. Speaking at a meeting of TransAfrica last May, he said that he was not concerned about a recent Senate vote favoring the lifting of sanctions against Zimbabwe Rhodesia since, in his view, U.S. African policy would eventually have to succumb to pressure from our Nigerian oil suppliers, especially in light of the long gas lines in this country. "We are talking now," he said, "about the kinds of realities that I think white folk can understand." He added that the pressure of such "realities" would have to be supplemented by efforts to "educate the Congress," a role he assigned to American blacks who are "ethnically related to Africa" and "sensitive to the racial dynamics of each and every vote."

Such political considerations have also determined Young's attitude toward U.S. business investment in the Third World. In 1971, for example, he spoke at the annual Gulf shareholders meeting in support of a motion, brought by a group working to end the corporation's involvement in Portuguese Africa, to add himself, the American Communist Angela Davis, the MPLA leader Agostinho Neto, another African "liberation" leader, and two others to Gulf's board of directors. Once the MPLA took over in Angola, though, he reversed his attitude toward Gulf's involvement there, not only defending it but also defending the role of Cuban troops in "protecting our economic interest" in that country. As he explained to the TransAfrica group last May, "a lot of the old rhetoric against the multinationals doesn't apply" any longer.

In fact, as Young has indicated, one of the principal activities of his new foreign-policy organization will be involvement with American businesses investing in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World. During his recent trade mission to Africa, his last undertaking as UN Ambassador, Young was the key intermediary in securing a $340-million contract for the Pullman-Kellogg company of Houston for the construction of a fertilizer plant in Nigeria. His ideological counterparts in the Third World would have an interest in enabling him to play such a role in the future, since this would gain him important business allies for his other political activities in America.

This is not the only way that non-Western radicals can strengthen the "vanguard" by favoring it in their relations with the U.S. One reason the PLO agreed, following Young's resignation, to postpone a Security Council resolution on the Palestinian issue was that, as Yasir Arafat put it, "We cannot let the circumstances push Young, the great man, to a veto." Such support for Young by a foreign leader ordinarily hostile to the U.S. is frequently cited as evidence that he has improved American relations with the Third World. But

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while it may help Young's image in this country by allowing him to appear to be an effective diplomat, the evidence is sorely lacking that the U.S. position in the Third World has improved as a result. If the degree of anti-American and pro-Soviet feeling displayed at the Havana conference of the so-called non-aligned countries is any indication, these countries are on the whole more hostile to America today, and more closely aligned with the Soviet Union, than was the case before we had the benefit of Young's diplomacy.

It is, of course, entirely within the American political tradition for ethnic minorities to take a special interest in U.S. relations with foreign countries with which they are "ethnically related." American Jewish support for Israel is an obvious case in point. But this tradition, generally speaking, has entailed identification with America as a great reservoir of democracy. Moreover, where the foreign country in question has not been democratic, an example being Poland, the corresponding American ethnic group, as an expression of concern for the well-being of the people in that country, has opposed the dictatorial regime.

But Young's "black perspective" is informed by no such democratic outlook. According to this perspective, America is not a democratic country whose political system is preferable, say, to the dictatorship in the Soviet Union—at the time of the Shcharansky trial, Young noted tellingly that America, too, has political prisoners. Nor do those who share this perspective identify with the interests of the *peoples* in Africa, as distinct from the interests of the ruling elites. There was no outcry among American black leaders over the excesses of Amin, Bokassa, or Masie; nor any rejoicing when they were overthrown. Nor is any protest made over the fact that Cuban troops are propping up a totalitarian regime in Angola, killing thousands of black Africans who are resisting this regime, and transporting others to Cuba where they are subjected to forced labor and ideological indoctrination. On the contrary, the Cuban intervention is called by Young a force for "stability" in Africa.

Nowhere is the hypocrisy of this "black perspective" more evident than in the support now being demonstrated by Young and other black leaders for the Arab cause. One might think that it would be a matter of some interest to American blacks that "Arabs have played the major role in the world slave trade and one of the major parts in the use and exploitation of slaves" (to quote the conclusion reached by John Laffin in a recent human-rights study published by the Foundation for the Study of Plural Societies in The Hague). But even if the new black allies of the PLO choose to overlook the past, there is the present that must be accounted for. No single group of countries has done greater damage to the living standard of black Africans (and of black Americans, too, for that matter) than the members of what a Kenyan journalist recently termed "the neck-strangling club called OPEC." Within the Organization of African Unity, he added, the Arab countries "do everything possible to make us support their cause of backing the Palestinians. But apparently when they meet in their other club—OPEC—they tend to forget our brotherhood."

Nor is economic extortion the only threat which the Arab countries pose to black Africa. The military intervention earlier this year by Libya and the PLO in support of Idi Amin's crumbling dictatorship was deeply resented by black Africans, who saw it as evidence of a concerted Arab drive to increase Muslim influence in Christian black Africa. The Zambian *Daily Mail* denounced Qaddafi for believing that "the only people who deserve freedom and human dignity are Muslims," and also for belonging "to a clan of bloodthirsty slave-trading Arabs who had not the slightest respect for other human beings." Yet it was this same Qaddafi who was given "the decoration of Martin Luther King" in September by a black American delegation visiting Libya, and who is also one of the chief supporters of the "oppressed" PLO with which American blacks are supposed to identify.

While Young claims that his "black perspective" is shaped by the "racial dynamics" of political issues, it is actually more closely related to their ideological dynamics. His affinities in Africa are less with Senegal, Kenya, and the Ivory Coast, and more with Angola, Nigeria, and Tanzania: that is, with those countries that are the more hostile to the United States. The same standard applies in the Middle East, even though Young and others argue that Israel must be opposed because its policies do not serve American interests. James Baldwin, in an article defending Young, was frank enough to say openly that Israel stands condemned because "it was created for the salvation of the Western interests" and continues to serve those interests. That is not why Israel was created, but it is certainly true that Israel identifies with the democratic West and is prepared to resist the Soviet-backed forces in the Middle East. And it is for this reason that Israel is opposed by Young.

That a point of view favoring anti-American forces abroad should so widely be accepted as pro-American is an indication of the extent to which the psychology of appeasement has taken root in this country in recent years. There are many influential Americans who believe, or want to believe, that "restraint" is the mark of confidence and strength, that submissiveness is the better part of prudence, and that our enemies are our friends or, at the very least, pose no immediate threat to our interests. In this politi-

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cal climate, Young's "black perspective" has a definite appeal, as reflected in the President's remark, made shortly after the resignation, that he hoped Young's "commitment to social justice and human rights" would "continue to guide us in the months and years to come."

The failure to subject Young's "black perspective" to critical examination is also the result of the racial climate in the country, in particular the kind of liberal racism which exempts "black" ideas from scrutiny according to universal moral, intellectual, and political standards. What the Young affair demonstrated is the extent to which this attitude has been internalized by blacks, who erupt with anger if their position is criticized, as if intellectual approval were still another one of the entitlements of race. Young is entirely correct in saying that there is "a fight for ideas in America," and no one is questioning the right of blacks to be part of it. At issue is not the right of blacks under the First Amendment to speak out on foreign policy, as Walter Fauntroy has claimed, but the nature of the views they hold.

IN THIS fight for ideas, Jews will find themselves —inevitably—on the opposing side to those blacks who identify with the thinking of Andrew Young. The reason goes beyond the differences the two groups now have over the PLO. These differences, indeed, reflect a more fundamental disagreement over America's world role. For implicit in Young's commitment to the debilitation of America's power and—if we are to take seriously his threat to "go into the streets" in the event of a "moral crisis" in foreign policy—to the paralysis of its will to act, is the determination to render America incapable of defending Israel or any other ally, or even itself. Jews will have no choice but to resist this point of view, and not just out of a commitment to Israel. The chances for Jewish survival in a world dominated by the Soviet Union and its "nonaligned" allies may not be entirely foreclosed, but survival under these conditions is not a cheerful prospect to contemplate.

The Jewish position in America is already more vulnerable as a result of the Young affair, since anti-Semitism is now more acceptable than at any time since the Holocaust. But this does not mean that Jews will not have allies in their "fight for ideas," even black allies, for most Americans are not prepared to submit either to Soviet hegemony or Arab blackmail. Though the Young affair appeared to be about black-Jewish relations, it was actually about democracy and its enemies. And it is out of a commitment to democracy—the same democratic commitment that led Jews and others to support the civil-rights movement—that it is necessary to oppose, and oppose resolutely, the political tendency which Andrew Young now leads.

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Dictatorships and Double Standards

Jeane Kirkpatrick

THE failure of the Carter administration's foreign policy is now clear to everyone except its architects, and even they must entertain private doubts, from time to time, about a policy whose crowning achievement has been to lay the groundwork for a transfer of the Panama Canal from the United States to a swaggering Latin dictator of Castroite bent. In the thirty-odd months since the inauguration of Jimmy Carter as President there has occurred a dramatic Soviet military build-up, matched by the stagnation of American armed forces, and a dramatic extension of Soviet influence in the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, Southern Africa, and the Caribbean, matched by a declining American position in all these areas. The U.S. has never tried so hard and failed so utterly to make and keep friends in the Third World.

As if this were not bad enough, in the current year the United States has suffered two other major blows—in Iran and Nicaragua—of large and strategic significance. In each country, the Carter administration not only failed to prevent the undesired outcome, it actively collaborated in the replacement of moderate autocrats friendly to American interests with less friendly autocrats of extremist persuasion. It is too soon to be certain about what kind of regime will ultimately emerge in either Iran or Nicaragua, but accumulating evidence suggests that things are as likely to get worse as to get better in both countries. The Sandinistas in Nicaragua appear to be as skillful in consolidating power as the Ayatollah Khomeini is inept, and leaders of both revolutions display an intolerance and arrogance that do not bode well for the peaceful sharing of power or the establishment of constitutional governments, especially since those leaders have made clear that they have no intention of seeking either.

It is at least possible that the SALT debate may stimulate new scrutiny of the nation's strategic position and defense policy, but there are no signs that anyone is giving serious attention to this nation's role in Iranian and Nicaraguan developments—despite clear warnings that the U.S. is confronted with similar situations and options in El Salvador, Guatemala, Morocco, Zaire, and elsewhere. Yet no problem of American foreign policy is more urgent than that of formulating a morally and strategically acceptable, and politically realistic, program for dealing with non-democratic governments who are threatened by Soviet-sponsored subversion. In the absence of such a policy, we can expect that the same reflexes that guided Washington in Iran and Nicaragua will be permitted to determine American actions from Korea to Mexico—with the same disastrous effects on the U.S. strategic position. (That the administration has not called its policies in Iran and Nicaragua a failure—and probably does not consider them such—complicates the problem without changing its nature.)

There were, of course, significant differences in the relations between the United States and each of these countries during the past two or three decades. Oil, size, and proximity to the Soviet Union gave Iran greater economic and strategic import than any Central American "republic," and closer relations were cultivated with the Shah, his counselors, and family than with President Somoza, his advisers, and family. Relations with the Shah were probably also enhanced by our approval of his manifest determination to modernize Iran regardless of the effects of modernization on traditional social and cultural patterns (including those which enhanced his own authority and legitimacy). And, of course, the Shah was much better looking and altogether more dashing than Somoza; his private life was much more romantic, more interesting to the media, popular and otherwise. Therefore, more Americans were more aware of the Shah than of the equally tenacious Somoza.

But even though Iran was rich, blessed with a product the U.S. and its allies needed badly, and led by a handsome king, while Nicaragua was poor and rocked along under a long-tenure president of less striking aspect, there were many similarities between the two countries and our relations with them. Both these small nations were led by men who had not been selected by free elections, who recognized no duty to submit themselves to searching tests of popular acceptability. Both did tolerate limited opposition, including opposition newspapers and political parties, but both were also confronted by radical, violent op-

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ponents bent on social and political revolution. Both rulers, therefore, sometimes invoked martial law to arrest, imprison, exile, and occasionally, it was alleged, torture their opponents. Both relied for public order on police forces whose personnel were said to be too harsh, too arbitrary, and too powerful. Each had what the American press termed "private armies," which is to say, armies pledging their allegiance to the ruler rather than the "constitution" or the "nation" or some other impersonal entity.

In short, both Somoza and the Shah were, in central ways, traditional rulers of semi-traditional societies. Although the Shah very badly wanted to create a technologically modern and powerful nation and Somoza tried hard to introduce modern agricultural methods, neither sought to reform his society in the light of any abstract idea of social justice or political virtue. Neither attempted to alter significantly the distribution of goods, status, or power (though the democratization of education and skills that accompanied modernization in Iran did result in some redistribution of money and power there).

Both Somoza and the Shah enjoyed long tenure, large personal fortunes (much of which were no doubt appropriated from general revenues), and good relations with the United States. The Shah and Somoza were not only anti-Communist, they were positively friendly to the U.S., sending their sons and others to be educated in our universities, voting with us in the United Nations, and regularly supporting American interests and positions even when these entailed personal and political cost. The embassies of both governments were active in Washington social life, and were frequented by powerful Americans who occupied major roles in this nation's diplomatic, military, and political life. And the Shah and Somoza themselves were both welcome in Washington, and had many American friends.

THOUGH each of the rulers was from time to time criticized by American officials for violating civil and human rights, the fact that the people of Iran and Nicaragua only intermittently enjoyed the rights accorded to citizens in the Western democracies did not prevent successive administrations from granting—with the necessary approval of successive Congresses—both military and economic aid. In the case of both Iran and Nicaragua, tangible and intangible tokens of U.S. support continued until the regime became the object of a major attack by forces explicitly hostile to the United States.

But once an attack was launched by opponents bent on destruction, everything changed. The rise of serious, violent opposition in Iran and Nicaragua set in motion a succession of events which bore a suggestive resemblance to one another and a suggestive similarity to our behavior in China before the fall of Chiang Kai-shek, in Cuba before the triumph of Castro, in certain crucial periods of the Vietnamese war, and, more recently, in Angola. In each of these countries, the American effort to impose liberalization and democratization on a government confronted with violent internal opposition not only failed, but actually assisted the coming to power of new regimes in which ordinary people enjoy fewer freedoms and less personal security than under the previous autocracy—regimes, moreover, hostile to American interests and policies.

The pattern is familiar enough: an established autocracy with a record of friendship with the U.S. is attacked by insurgents, some of whose leaders have long ties to the Communist movement, and most of whose arms are of Soviet, Chinese, or Czechoslovak origin. The "Marxist" presence is ignored and/or minimized by American officials and by the elite media on the ground that U.S. support for the dictator gives the rebels little choice but to seek aid "elsewhere." Violence spreads and American officials wonder aloud about the viability of a regime that "lacks the support of its own people." The absence of an opposition party is deplored and civil-rights violations are reviewed. Liberal columnists question the morality of continuing aid to a "rightist dictatorship" and provide assurances concerning the essential moderation of some insurgent leaders who "hope" for some sign that the U.S. will remember its own revolutionary origins. Requests for help from the beleaguered autocrat go unheeded, and the argument is increasingly voiced that ties should be established with rebel leaders "before it is too late." The President, delaying U.S. aid, appoints a special emissary who confirms the deterioration of the government position and its diminished capacity to control the situation and recommends various measures for "strengthening" and "liberalizing" the regime, all of which involve diluting its power.

The emissary's recommendations are presented in the context of a growing clamor for American disengagement on grounds that continued involvement confirms our status as an agent of imperialism, racism, and reaction; is inconsistent with support for human rights; alienates us from the "forces of democracy"; and threatens to put the U.S. once more on the side of history's "losers." This chorus is supplemented daily by interviews with returning missionaries and "reasonable" rebels.

As the situation worsens, the President assures the world that the U.S. desires only that the "people choose their own form of government"; he blocks delivery of all arms to the government and undertakes negotiations to establish a "broadly based" coalition headed by a "moderate" critic of the regime who, once elevated, will move quickly to seek a "political" settlement to the conflict. Should the incumbent autocrat prove resistant to American demands that he step aside, he will be

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readily overwhelmed by the military strength of his opponents, whose patrons will have continued to provide sophisticated arms and advisers at the same time the U.S. cuts off military sales. Should the incumbent be so demoralized as to agree to yield power, he will be replaced by a "moderate" of American selection. Only after the insurgents have refused the proffered political solution and anarchy has spread throughout the nation will it be noticed that the new head of government has no significant following, no experience at governing, and no talent for leadership. By then, military commanders, no longer bound by loyalty to the chief of state, will depose the faltering "moderate" in favor of a fanatic of their own choosing.

In either case, the U.S. will have been led by its own misunderstanding of the situation to assist actively in deposing an erstwhile friend and ally and installing a government hostile to American interests and policies in the world. At best we will have lost access to friendly territory. At worst the Soviets will have gained a new base. And everywhere our friends will have noted that the U.S. cannot be counted on in times of difficulty and our enemies will have observed that American support provides no security against the forward march of history.

NO PARTICULAR crisis conforms exactly with the sequence of events described above; there are always variations on the theme. In Iran, for example, the Carter administration—and the President himself—offered the ruler support for a longer time, though by December 1978 the President was acknowledging that he did not know if the Shah would survive, adding that the U.S. would not get "directly involved." Neither did the U.S. ever call publicly for the Shah's resignation. However, the President's special emissary, George Ball, "reportedly concluded that the Shah cannot hope to maintain total power and must now bargain with a moderate segment of the opposition . . ." and was "known to have discussed various alternatives that would effectively ease the Shah out of total power" (Washington *Post*, December 15, 1978). There is, furthermore, not much doubt that the U.S. assisted the Shah's departure and helped arrange the succession of Bakhtiar. In Iran, the Carter administration's commitment to nonintervention proved stronger than strategic considerations or national pride. What the rest of the world regarded as a stinging American defeat, the U.S. government saw as a matter to be settled by Iranians. "We personally prefer that the Shah maintain a major role in the government," the President acknowledged, "but that is a decision for the Iranian people to make."

Events in Nicaragua also departed from the scenario presented above both because the Cuban and Soviet roles were clearer and because U.S. officials were more intensely and publicly working against Somoza. After the Somoza regime had defeated the first wave of Sandinista violence, the U.S. ceased aid, imposed sanctions, and took other steps which undermined the status and the credibility of the government in domestic and foreign affairs. Between the murder of ABC correspondent Bill Stewart by a National Guardsman in early June and the Sandinista victory in late July, the U.S. State Department assigned a new ambassador who refused to submit his credentials to Somoza even though Somoza was still chief of state, and called for replacing the government with a "broadly based provisional government that would include representatives of Sandinista guerillas." Americans were assured by Assistant Secretary of State Viron Vaky that "Nicaraguans and our democratic friends in Latin America have no intention of seeing Nicaragua turned into a second Cuba," even though the State Department knew that the top Sandinista leaders had close personal ties and were in continuing contact with Havana, and, more specifically, that a Cuban secret-police official, Julian Lopez, was frequently present in the Sandinista headquarters and that Cuban military advisers were present in Sandinista ranks.

In a manner uncharacteristic of the Carter administration, which generally seems willing to negotiate anything with anyone anywhere, the U.S. government adopted an oddly uncompromising posture in dealing with Somoza. "No end to the crisis is possible," said Vaky, "that does not start with the departure of Somoza from power and the end of his regime. No negotiation, mediation, or compromise can be achieved any longer with a Somoza government. The solution can only begin with a sharp break from the past." Trying hard, we not only banned all American arms sales to the government of Nicaragua but pressured Israel, Guatemala, and others to do likewise—all in the name of insuring a "democratic" outcome. Finally, as the Sandinista leaders consolidated control over weapons and communications, banned opposition, and took off for Cuba, President Carter warned us against attributing this "evolutionary change" to "Cuban machinations" and assured the world that the U.S. desired only to "let the people of Nicaragua choose their own form of government."

YET despite all the variations, the Carter administration brought to the crises in Iran and Nicaragua several common assumptions each of which played a major role in hastening the victory of even more repressive dictatorships than had been in place before. These were, first, the belief that there existed at the moment of crisis a democratic alternative to the incumbent government: second, the belief that the continuation of the status quo was not possible; third, the belief that any change, including the establishment of a government headed by self-styled Marxist revolutionaries, was preferable to the present government. Each of these beliefs was (and is) widely shared in

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the liberal community generally. Not one of them can withstand close scrutiny.

ALTHOUGH most governments in the world are, as they always have been, autocracies of one kind or another, no idea holds greater sway in the mind of educated Americans than the belief that it is possible to democratize governments, anytime, anywhere, under any circumstances. This notion is belied by an enormous body of evidence based on the experience of dozens of countries which have attempted with more or less (usually less) success to move from autocratic to democratic government. Many of the wisest political scientists of this and previous centuries agree that democratic institutions are especially difficult to establish and maintain—because they make heavy demands on all portions of a population and because they depend on complex social, cultural, and economic conditions.

Two or three decades ago, when Marxism enjoyed its greatest prestige among American intellectuals, it was the economic prerequisites of democracy that were emphasized by social scientists. Democracy, they argued, could function only in relatively rich societies with an advanced economy, a substantial middle class, and a literate population, but it could be expected to emerge more or less automatically whenever these conditions prevailed. Today, this picture seems grossly oversimplified. While it surely helps to have an economy strong enough to provide decent levels of well-being for all, and "open" enough to provide mobility and encourage achievement, a pluralistic society and the right kind of political culture—and time—are even more essential.

In his essay on *Representative Government*, John Stuart Mill identified three fundamental conditions which the Carter administration would do well to ponder. These are: "One, that the people should be willing to receive it [representative government]; two, that they should be willing and able to do what is necessary for its preservation; three, that they should be willing and able to fulfill the duties and discharge the functions which it imposes on them."

Fulfilling the duties and discharging the functions of representative government make heavy demands on leaders and citizens, demands for participation and restraint, for consensus and compromise. It is not necessary for all citizens to be avidly interested in politics or well-informed about public affairs—although far more widespread interest and mobilization are needed than in autocracies. What *is* necessary is that a substantial number of citizens think of themselves as participants in society's decision-making and not simply as subjects bound by its laws. Moreover, leaders of all major sectors of the society must agree to pursue power only by legal means, must eschew (at least in principle) violence, theft, and fraud, and must accept defeat when necessary. They must also be skilled at finding and creating common ground among diverse points of view and interests, and correlatively willing to compromise on all but the most basic values.

In addition to an appropriate political culture, democratic government requires institutions strong enough to channel and contain conflict. Voluntary, non-official institutions are needed to articulate and aggregate diverse interests and opinions present in the society. Otherwise, the formal governmental institutions will not be able to translate popular demands into public policy.

In the relatively few places where they exist, democratic governments have come into being slowly, after extended prior experience with more limited forms of participation during which leaders have reluctantly grown accustomed to tolerating dissent and opposition, opponents have accepted the notion that they may defeat but not destroy incumbents, and people have become aware of government's effects on their lives and of their own possible effects on government. Decades, if not centuries, are normally required for people to acquire the necessary disciplines and habits. In Britain, the road from the Magna Carta to the Act of Settlement, to the great Reform Bills of 1832, 1867, and 1885, took seven centuries to traverse. American history gives no better grounds for believing that democracy comes easily, quickly, or for the asking. A war of independence, an unsuccessful constitution, a civil war, a long process of gradual enfranchisement marked our progress toward constitutional democratic government. The French path was still more difficult. Terror, dictatorship, monarchy, instability, and incompetence followed on the revolution that was to usher in a millennium of brotherhood. Only in the 20th century did the democratic principle finally gain wide acceptance in France and not until after World War II were the principles of order and democracy, popular sovereignty and authority, finally reconciled in institutions strong enough to contain conflicting currents of public opinion.

Although there is no instance of a revolutionary "socialist" or Communist society being democratized, right-wing autocracies do sometimes evolve into democracies—given time, propitious economic, social, and political circumstances, talented leaders, and a strong indigenous demand for representative government. Something of the kind is in progress on the Iberian peninsula and the first steps have been taken in Brazil. Something similar could conceivably have also occurred in Iran and Nicaragua if contestation and participation had been more gradually expanded.

But it seems clear that the architects of contemporary American foreign policy have little idea of how to go about encouraging the liberalization of an autocracy. In neither Nicaragua nor Iran did they realize that the only likely result of an effort to replace an incumbent autocrat with one of his moderate critics or a "broad-based coalition"

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would be to sap the foundations of the existing regime without moving the nation any closer to democracy. Yet this outcome was entirely predictable. Authority in traditional autocracies is transmitted through personal relations: from the ruler to his close associates (relatives, household members, personal friends) and from them to people to whom the associates are related by personal ties resembling their own relation to the ruler. The fabric of authority unravels quickly when the power and status of the man at the top are undermined or eliminated. The longer the autocrat has held power, and the more pervasive his personal influence, the more dependent a nation's institutions will be on him. Without him, the organized life of the society will collapse, like an arch from which the keystone has been removed. The blend of qualities that bound the Iranian army to the Shah or the national guard to Somoza is typical of the relationships—personal, hierarchical, non-transferable—that support a traditional autocracy. The speed with which armies collapse, bureaucracies abdicate, and social structures dissolve once the autocrat is removed frequently surprises American policy-makers and journalists accustomed to public institutions based on universalistic norms rather than particularistic relations.

THE failure to understand these relations is one source of the failure of U.S. policy in this and previous administrations. There are others. In Iran and Nicaragua (as previously in Vietnam, Cuba, and China) Washington overestimated the political diversity of the opposition—especially the strength of "moderates" and "democrats" in the opposition movement; underestimated the strength and intransigence of radicals in the movement; and misestimated the nature and extent of American influence on both the government and the opposition.

Confusion concerning the character of the opposition, especially its intransigence and will to power, leads regularly to downplaying the amount of force required to counteract its violence. In neither Iran nor Nicaragua did the U.S. adequately appreciate the government's problem in maintaining order in a society confronted with an ideologically extreme opposition. Yet the presence of such groups was well known. The State Department's 1977 report on human rights described an Iran confronted

> with a small number of extreme rightist and leftist terrorists operating within the country. There is evidence that they have received substantial foreign support and training . . . [and] have been responsible for the murder of Iranian government officials and Americans. . . .

The same report characterized Somoza's opponents in the following terms:

> A guerrilla organization known as the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) seeks the violent overthrow of the government, and has received limited support from Cuba. The FSLN carried out an operation in Managua in December 1974, killing four people, taking several officials hostage, . . . since then, it continues to challenge civil authority in certain isolated regions.

In 1978, the State Department's report said that Sandinista violence was continuing—after the state of siege had been lifted by the Somoza government.

When U.S. policy-makers and large portions of the liberal press interpret insurgency as evidence of widespread popular discontent and a will to democracy, the scene is set for disaster. For if civil strife reflects a popular demand for democracy, it follows that a "liberalized" government will be more acceptable to "public opinion."

Thus, in the hope of strengthening a government, U.S. policy-makers are led, mistake after mistake, to impose measures almost certain to weaken its authority. Hurried efforts to force complex and unfamiliar political practices on societies lacking the requisite political culture, tradition, and social structures not only fail to produce desired outcomes; if they are undertaken at a time when the traditional regime is under attack, they actually facilitate the job of the insurgents.

Vietnam presumably taught us that the United States could not serve as the world's policeman; it should also have taught us the dangers of trying to be the world's midwife to democracy when the birth is scheduled to take place under conditions of guerrilla war.

IF THE administration's actions in Iran and Nicaragua reflect the pervasive and mistaken assumption that one can easily locate and impose democratic alternatives to incumbent autocracies, they also reflect the equally pervasive and equally flawed belief that change *per se* in such autocracies is inevitable, desirable, and in the American interest. It is this belief which induces the Carter administration to participate actively in the toppling of non-Communist autocracies while remaining passive in the face of Communist expansion.

At the time the Carter administration came into office it was widely reported that the President had assembled a team who shared a new approach to foreign policy and a new conception of the national interest. The principal elements of this new approach were said to be two: the conviction that the cold war was over, and the conviction that, this being the case, the U.S. should give priority to North-South problems and help less developed nations achieve their own destiny.

More is involved in these changes than originally meets the eye. For, unlikely as it may seem, the foreign policy of the Carter administration is guided by a relatively full-blown philosophy of history which includes, as philosophies of history

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always do, a theory of social change, or, as it is currently called, a doctrine of modernization. Like most other philosophies of history that have appeared in the West since the 18th century, the Carter administration's doctrine predicts progress (in the form of modernization for all societies) and a happy ending (in the form of a world community of developed, autonomous nations).

The administration's approach to foreign affairs was clearly foreshadowed in Zbigniew Brzezinski's 1970 book on the U.S. role in the "technetronic era," *Between Two Ages*. In that book, Brzezinski showed that he had the imagination to look beyond the cold war to a brave new world of global politics and interdependence. To deal with that new world a new approach was said to be "evolving," which Brzezinski designated "rational humanism." In the new approach, the "preoccupation" with "national supremacy" would give way to "global" perspectives, and international problems would be viewed as "human issues" rather than as "political confrontations." The traditional intellectual framework for dealing with foreign policy would have to be scrapped:

> Today, the old framework of international politics . . . with their spheres of influence, military alliances between nation states, the fiction of sovereignty, doctrinal conflicts arising from 19th-century crisis—is clearly no longer compatible with reality.*

Only the "delayed development" of the Soviet Union, "an archaic religious community that experiences modernity existentially but not quite yet normatively," prevented wider realization of the fact that the end of ideology was already here. For the U.S., Brzezinski recommended "a great deal of patience," a more detached attitude toward world revolutionary processes, and a less anxious preoccupation with the Soviet Union. Instead of engaging in ancient diplomatic pastimes, we should make "a broader effort to contain the global tendencies toward chaos," while assisting the processes of change that will move the world toward the "community of developed nations."

The central concern of Brzezinski's book, as of the Carter administration's foreign policy, is with the modernization of the Third World. From the beginning, the administration has manifested a special, intense interest in the problems of the so-called Third World. But instead of viewing international developments in terms of the American national interest, as national interest is historically conceived, the architects of administration policy have viewed them in terms of a contemporary version of the same idea of progress that has traumatized Western imaginations since the Enlightenment.

In its current form, the concept of modernization involves more than industrialization, more than "political development" (whatever that is). It is used instead to designate ". . . the process through which a traditional or pre-technological society passes as it is transformed into a society characterized by machine technology, rational and secular attitudes, and highly differentiated social structures." Condorcet, Comte, Hegel, Marx, and Weber are all present in this view of history as the working out of the idea of modernity.

The crucial elements of the modernization concept have been clearly explicated by Samuel P. Huntington (who, despite a period at the National Security Council, was assuredly not the architect of the administration's policy). The modernization paradigm, Huntington has observed, postulates an ongoing process of change: complex, because it involves all dimensions of human life in society; systemic, because its elements interact in predictable, necessary ways; global, because all societies will, necessarily, pass through the transition from traditional to modern; lengthy, because time is required to modernize economic and social organization, character, and culture; phased, because each modernizing society must pass through essentially the same stages; homogenizing, because it tends toward the convergence and interdependence of societies; irreversible, because the direction of change is "given" in the relation of the elements of the process; progressive, in the sense that it is desirable, and in the long run provides significant benefits to the affiliated people.

ALTHOUGH the modernization paradigm has proved a sometimes useful as well as influential tool in social science, it has become the object of searching critiques that have challenged one after another of its central assumptions. Its shortcomings as an analytical tool pale, however, when compared to its inadequacies as a framework for thinking about foreign policy, where its principal effects are to encourage the view that events are manifestations of deep historical forces which cannot be controlled and that the best any government can do is to serve as a "midwife" to history, helping events to move where they are already headed.

This perspective on contemporary events is optimistic in the sense that it foresees continuing human progress; deterministic in the sense that it perceives events as fixed by processes over which persons and policies can have but little influ-

* Concerning Latin America, Brzezinski observed: "Latin American nationalism, more and more radical as it widens its popular base, will be directed with increasing animosity against the United States unless the United States rapidly shifts its own posture. Accordingly, it would be wise for the United States to make an explicit move to abandon the Monroe Doctrine and to concede that in the new global age geographic or hemispheric contiguity no longer need be politically decisive. Nothing could be healthier for Pan-American relations than for the United States to place them on the same level as its relations with the rest of the world, confining itself to emphasis on cultural-political affinities (as it does with Western Europe) and economic-social obligations (as it does with less developed countries)."

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ence; moralistic in the sense that it perceives history and U.S. policy as having moral ends; cosmopolitan in the sense that it attempts to view the world not from the perspective of American interests or intentions but from the perspective of the modernizing nation and the "end" of history. It identifies modernization with both revolution and morality, and U.S. policy with all three.

The idea that it is "forces" rather than people which shape events recurs each time an administration spokesman articulates or explains policy. The President, for example, assured us in February of this year:

> The revolution in Iran is a product of deep social, political, religious, and economic factors growing out of the history of Iran itself.

And of Asia he said:

> At this moment there is turmoil or change in various countries from one end of the Indian Ocean to the other; some turmoil as in Indochina is the product of age-old enmities, inflamed by rivalries for influence by conflicting forces. Stability in some other countries is being shaken by the process of modernization, the search for national significance, or the desire to fulfill legitimate human hopes and human aspirations.

Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, commenting on "instability" in Iran and the Horn of Africa, states:

> We, of course, recognize that fundamental changes are taking place across this area of western Asia and northeastern Africa—economic modernization, social change, a revival of religion, resurgent nationalism, demands for broader popular participation in the political process. These changes are generated by forces within each country.

Or here is Anthony Lake, chief of the State Department's Policy Planning staff, on South Africa:

> Change will come in South Africa. The welfare of the people there, and American interests, will be profoundly affected by the way in which it comes. The question is whether it will be peaceful or not.

Brzezinski makes the point still clearer. Speaking as chief of the National Security Council, he has assured us that the struggles for power in Asia and Africa are really only incidents along the route to modernization:

> . . . all the developing countries in the arc from northeast Asia to southern Africa continue to search for viable forms of government capable of managing the process of modernization.

No matter that the invasions, coups, civil wars, and political struggles of less violent kinds that one sees all around do not *seem* to be incidents in a global personnel search for someone to manage the modernization process. Neither Brzezinski nor anyone else seems bothered by the fact that the political participants in that arc from northeast Asia to southern Africa do not *know* that they are "searching for viable forms of government capable of managing the process of modernization." The motives and intentions of real persons are no more relevant to the modernization paradigm than they are to the Marxist view of history. Viewed from this level of abstraction, it is the "forces" rather than the people that count.

So what if the "deep historical forces" at work in such diverse places as Iran, the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia, Central America, and the United Nations look a lot like Russians or Cubans? Having moved past what the President calls our "inordinate fear of Communism," identified by him with the cold war, we should, we are told, now be capable of distinguishing Soviet and Cuban "machinations," which anyway exist mainly in the minds of cold warriors and others guilty of oversimplifying the world, from evolutionary changes, which seem to be the only kind that actually occur.

What can a U.S. President faced with such complicated, inexorable, impersonal processes *do*? The answer, offered again and again by the President and his top officials, is, not much. Since events are not caused by human decisions, they cannot be stopped or altered by them. Brzezinski, for example, has said: "We recognize that the world is changing under the influence of forces no government can control. . . ." And Cyrus Vance has cautioned: "The fact is that we can no more stop change than Canute could still the waters."

THE Carter administration's essentially deterministic and apolitical view of contemporary events discourages an active American response and encourages passivity. The American inability to influence events in Iran became the President's theme song:

> Those who argue that the U.S. should *or could* intervene directly to thwart [the revolution in Iran] are wrong about the realities of Iran. . . . We have encouraged *to the limited extent of our own ability* the public support for the Bakhtiar government. . . . How long [the Shah] will be out of Iran, we have no way to determine. Future events and his own desires will determine that. . . . It is impossible for anyone to anticipate all future political events. . . . Even if we had been able to anticipate events that were going to take place in Iran or in other countries, obviously our ability to determine those events is very limited [emphasis added].

Vance made the same point:

> In Iran our policy throughout the current crisis has been based on the fact that only Iranians can resolve the fundamental political issues which they now confront.

Where once upon a time an American President

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might have sent Marines to assure the protection of American strategic interests, there is no room for force in this world of progress and self-determination. Force, the President told us at Notre Dame, does not work; that is the lesson he extracted from Vietnam. It offers only "superficial" solutions. Concerning Iran, he said:

> Certainly we have no desire or ability to intrude massive forces into Iran or any other country to determine the outcome of domestic political issues. This is something that we have no intention of ever doing in another country. We've tried this once in Vietnam. It didn't work, as you well know.

There was nothing unique about Iran. In Nicaragua, the climate and language were different but the "historical forces" and the U.S. response were the same. Military intervention was out of the question. Assistant Secretary of State Viron Vaky described as "unthinkable" the "use of U.S. military power to intervene in the internal affairs of another American republic." Vance provided parallel assurances for Africa, asserting that we would not try to match Cuban and Soviet activities there.

WHAT *is* the function of foreign policy under these conditions? It is to understand the processes of change and then, like Marxists, to align ourselves with history, hoping to contribute a bit of stability along the way. And this, administration spokesmen assure us, is precisely what we are doing. The Carter administration has defined the U.S. national interest in the Third World as identical with the putative end of the modernization process. Vance put this with characteristic candor in a recent statement when he explained that U.S. policy vis-à-vis the Third World is "grounded in the conviction that we best serve our interest there by supporting the efforts of developing nations to advance their economic well-being and preserve their political independence." Our "commitment to the promotion of constructive change worldwide" (Brzezinski's words) has been vouchsafed in every conceivable context.

But there is a problem. The conceivable contexts turn out to be mainly those in which non-Communist autocracies are under pressure from revolutionary guerrillas. Since Moscow is the aggressive, expansionist power today, it is more often than not insurgents, encouraged and armed by the Soviet Union, who challenge the status quo. The American commitment to "change" in the abstract ends up by aligning us tacitly with Soviet clients and irresponsible extremists like the Ayatollah Khomeini or, in the end, Yasir Arafat.

So far, assisting "change" has not led the Carter administration to undertake the destabilization of a *Communist* country. The principles of self-determination and nonintervention are thus both selectively applied. We seem to accept the status quo in Communist nations (in the name of "diversity" and national autonomy), but not in nations ruled by "right-wing" dictators or white oligarchies. Concerning China, for example, Brzezinski has observed: "We recognize that the PRC and we have different ideologies and economic and political systems. . . . We harbor neither the hope nor the desire that through extensive contacts with China we can remake that nation into the American image. Indeed, we accept our differences." Of Southeast Asia, the President noted in February:

> Our interest is to promote peace and the withdrawal of outside forces and not to become embroiled in the conflict among Asian nations. And, in general, our interest is to promote the health and the development of individual societies, not to a pattern cut exactly like ours in the United States but tailored rather to the hopes and the needs and desires of the peoples involved.

But the administration's position shifts sharply when South Africa is discussed. For example, Anthony Lake asserted in late 1978:

> . . . We have indicated to South Africa the fact that if it does not make significant progress toward racial equality, its relations with the international community, including the United States, are bound to deteriorate.
>
> Over the years, we have tried through a series of progressive steps to demonstrate that the U.S. cannot and will not be associated with the continued practice of apartheid.

As to Nicaragua, Hodding Carter III said in February 1979:

> The unwillingness of the Nicaraguan government to accept the [OAS] group's proposal, the resulting prospects for renewal and polarization, and the human-rights situation in Nicaragua . . . unavoidably affect the kind of relationships we can maintain with that government. . . .

And Carter commented on Latin American autocracies:

> My government will not be deterred from protecting human rights, including economic and social rights, in whatever ways we can. We prefer to take actions that are positive, but where nations persist in serious violations of human rights, we will continue to demonstrate that there are costs to the flagrant disregard of international standards.

SOMETHING very odd is going on here. How does an administration that desires to let people work out their own destinies get involved in determined efforts at reform in South Africa, Zaire, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and elsewhere? How can an administration committed to nonintervention in Cambodia and Vietnam announce that it "will not be deterred" from righting wrongs in South Africa? What should be made of an administration that sees the U.S. inter-

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est as identical with economic modernization and political independence and yet heedlessly endangers the political independence of Taiwan, a country whose success in economic modernization and egalitarian distribution of wealth is unequaled in Asia? The contrast is as striking as that between the administration's frenzied speed in recognizing the new dictatorship in Nicaragua and its continuing refusal to recognize the elected government of Zimbabwe Rhodesia, or its refusal to maintain any presence in Zimbabwe Rhodesia while staffing a U.S. Information Office in Cuba. Not only are there ideology and a double standard at work here, the ideology neither fits nor explains reality, and the double standard involves the administration in the wholesale contradiction of its own principles.

Inconsistencies are a familiar part of politics in most societies. Usually, however, governments behave hypocritically when their principles conflict with the national interest. What makes the inconsistencies of the Carter administration noteworthy are, first, the administration's moralism—which renders it especially vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy; and, second, the administration's predilection for policies that violate the strategic and economic interests of the United States. The administration's conception of national interest borders on doublethink: it finds friendly powers to be guilty representatives of the status quo and views the triumph of unfriendly groups as beneficial to America's "true interests."

This logic is quite obviously reinforced by the prejudices and preferences of many administration officials. Traditional autocracies are, in general and in their very nature, deeply offensive to modern American sensibilities. The notion that public affairs should be ordered on the basis of kinship, friendship, and other personal relations rather than on the basis of objective "rational" standards violates our conception of justice and efficiency. The preference for stability rather than change is also disturbing to Americans whose whole national experience rests on the principles of change, growth, and progress. The extremes of wealth and poverty characteristic of traditional societies also offend us, the more so since the poor are usually *very* poor and bound to their squalor by a hereditary allocation of role. Moreover, the relative lack of concern of rich, comfortable rulers for the poverty, ignorance, and disease of "their" people is likely to be interpreted by Americans as moral dereliction pure and simple. The truth is that Americans can hardly bear such societies and such rulers. Confronted with them, our vaunted cultural relativism evaporates and we become as censorious as Cotton Mather confronting sin in New England.

But if the politics of traditional and semi-traditional autocracy is nearly antithetical to our own —at both the symbolic and the operational level —the rhetoric of progressive revolutionaries sounds much better to us; their symbols are much more acceptable. One reason that some modern Americans prefer "socialist" to traditional autocracies is that the former have embraced modernity and have adopted modern modes and perspectives, including an instrumental, manipulative, functional orientation toward most social, cultural, and personal affairs; a profession of universalistic norms; an emphasis on reason, science, education, and progress; a deemphasis of the sacred; and "rational," bureaucratic organizations. They speak our language.

Because socialism of the Soviet/Chinese/Cuban variety is an ideology rooted in a version of the same values that sparked the Enlightenment and the democratic revolutions of the 18th century; because it is modern and not traditional; because it postulates goals that appeal to Christian as well as to secular values (brotherhood of man, elimintion of power as a mode of human relations), it is highly congenial to many Americans at the symbolic level. Marxist revolutionaries speak the language of a hopeful future while traditional autocrats speak the language of an unattractive past. Because left-wing revolutionaries invoke the symbols and values of democracy—emphasizing eglitarianism rather than hierarchy and privilege, liberty rather than order, activity rather than passivity—they are again and again accepted as partisans in the cause of freedom and democracy.

NOWHERE is the affinity of liberalism, Christianity, and Marxist socialism more apparent than among liberals who are "duped" time after time into supporting "liberators" who turn out to be totalitarians, and among Left-leaning clerics whose attraction to a secular style of "redemptive community" is stronger than their outrage at the hostility of socialist regimes to religion. In Jimmy Carter—egalitarian, optimist, liberal, Christian—the tendency to be repelled by frankly non-democratic rulers and hierarchical societies is almost as strong as the tendency to be attracted to the idea of popular revolution, liberation, and progress. Carter is, *par excellence*, the kind of liberal most likely to confound revolution with idealism, change with progress, optimism with virtue.

Where concern about "socialist encirclement," Soviet expansion, and traditional conceptions of the national interest inoculated his predecessors against such easy equations, Carter's doctrine of national interest and modernization encourages support for all change that takes place in the name of "the people," regardless of its "superficial" Marxist or anti-American content. Any lingering doubt about whether the U.S. should, in case of conflict, support a "tested friend" such as the Shah or a friendly power such as Zimbabwe Rhodesia against an opponent who despises us is resolved by reference to our "true," our "long-range" interests.

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Stephen Rosenfeld of the Washington *Post* described the commitment of the Carter administration to this sort of "progressive liberalism":

> The Carter administration came to power, after all, committed precisely to reducing the centrality of strategic competition with Moscow in American foreign policy, and to extending the United States' association with what it was prepared to accept as legitimate wave-of-the-future popular movements around the world—first of all with the victorious movement in Vietnam.
>
> . . . Indochina was supposed to be the state on which Americans could demonstrate their "post-Vietnam" intent to come to terms with the progressive popular element that Kissinger, the villain, had denied.

In other words, the Carter administration, Rosenfeld tells us, came to power resolved not to assess international developments in the light of "cold-war" perspectives but to accept at face value the claim of revolutionary groups to represent "popular" aspirations and "progressive" forces —regardless of the ties of these revolutionaries to the Soviet Union. To this end, overtures were made looking to the "normalization" of relations with Vietnam, Cuba, and the Chinese People's Republic, and steps were taken to cool relations with South Korea, South Africa, Nicaragua, the Philippines, and others. These moves followed naturally from the conviction that the U.S. had, as our enemies held, been on the wrong side of history in supporting the status quo and opposing revolution.

One might have thought that this perspective would have been undermined by events in Southeast Asia since the triumph of "progressive" forces there over the "agents of reaction." To cite Rosenfeld again:

> In this adminstration's time, Vietnam has been transformed for much of American public opinion, from a country wronged by the U.S. to one revealing a brutal essence of its own.
>
> This has been a quiet but major trauma to the Carter people (as to all liberals) scarring their self-confidence and their claim on public trust alike.

Presumably, however, the barbarity of the "progressive" governments in Cambodia and Vietnam has been less traumatic for the President and his chief advisers than for Rosenfeld, since there is little evidence of changed predispositions at crucial levels of the White House and the State Department. The President continues to behave as before —not like a man who abhors autocrats but like one who abhors only right-wing autocrats.

In fact, high officials in the Carter administration understand better than they seem to the aggressive, expansionist character of contemporary Soviet behavior in Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, Central America, and the Caribbean. But although the Soviet/Cuban role in Grenada, Nicaragua, and El Salvador (plus the transfer of MIG-23's to Cuba) had already prompted resumption of surveillance of Cuba (which in turn confirmed the presence of a Soviet combat brigade), the President's eagerness not to "heat up" the climate of public opinion remains stronger than his commitment to speak the truth to the American people. His statement on Nicaragua clearly reflects these priorities:

> It's a mistake for Americans to assume or to claim that every time an evolutionary change takes place in this hemisphere that somehow it's a result of secret, massive Cuban intervention. The fact in Nicaragua is that the Somoza regime lost the confidence of the people. To bring about an orderly transition there, our effort was to let the people of Nicaragua ultimately make the decision on who would be their leader—what form of government they should have.

This statement, which presumably represents the President's best thinking on the matter, is illuminating. Carter's effort to dismiss concern about military events in this specific country as a manifestation of a national proclivity for seeing "Cuban machinations" under every bed constitutes a shocking effort to falsify reality. There was no question in Nicaragua of "evolutionary change" or of attributing such change to Castro's agents. There was only a question about the appropriate U.S. response to a military struggle in a country whose location gives it strategic importance out of proportion to its size or strength.

But that is not all. The rest of the President's statement graphically illustrates the blinding power of ideology on his interpretation of events. When he says that "the Somoza regime lost the confidence of the people," the President implies that the regime had previously rested on the confidence of "the people," but that the situation had now changed. In fact, the Somoza regime had never rested on popular will (but instead on manipulation, force, and habit), and was not being ousted by it. It was instead succumbing to arms and soldiers. However, the assumption that the armed conflict of Sandinistas and Somozistas was the military equivalent of a national referendum enabled the President to imagine that it could be, and should be, settled by the people of Nicaragua. For this pious sentiment even to seem true the President would have had to be unaware that insurgents were receiving a great many arms from other non-Nicaraguans; and that the U.S. had played a significant role in disarming the Somoza regime.

The President's mistakes and distortions are all fashionable ones. His assumptions are those of people who want badly to be on the progressive side in conflicts between "rightist" autocracy and "leftist" challenges, and to prefer the latter, almost regardless of the probable consequences.

To be sure, neither the President, nor Vance, nor Brzezinski *desires* the proliferation of Soviet-

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supported regimes. Each has asserted his disapproval of Soviet "interference" in the modernization process. But each, nevertheless, remains willing to "destabilize" friendly or neutral autocracies without any assurance that they will not be replaced by reactionary totalitarian theocracies, totalitarian Soviet client states, or worst of all, by murderous fanatics of the Pol Pot variety.

The foreign policy of the Carter administration fails not for lack of good intentions but for lack of realism about the nature of traditional versus revolutionary autocracies and the relation of each to the American national interest. Only intellectual fashion and the tyranny of Right/Left thinking prevent intelligent men of good will from perceiving the *facts* that traditional authoritarian governments are less repressive than revolutionary autocracies, that they are more susceptible of liberalization, and that they are more compatible with U.S. interests. The evidence on all these points is clear enough.

SURELY it is now beyond reasonable doubt that the present governments of Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos are much more repressive than those of the despised previous rulers; that the government of the People's Republic of China is more repressive than that of Taiwan, that North Korea is more repressive than South Korea, and so forth. This is the most important lesson of Vietnam and Cambodia. It is not new but it is a gruesome reminder of harsh facts.

From time to time a truly bestial ruler can come to power in either type of autocracy—Idi Amin, Papa Doc Duvalier, Joseph Stalin, Pol Pot are examples—but neither type regularly produces such moral monsters (though democracy regularly prevents their accession to power). There are, however, *systemic* differences between traditional and revolutionary autocracies that have a predictable effect on their degree of repressiveness. Generally speaking, traditional autocrats tolerate social inequities, brutality, and poverty while revolutionary autocracies create them.

Traditional autocrats leave in place existing allocations of wealth, power, status, and other resources which in most traditional societies favor an affluent few and maintain masses in poverty. But they worship traditional gods and observe traditional taboos. They do not disturb the habitual rhythms of work and leisure, habitual places of residence, habitual patterns of family and personal relations. Because the miseries of traditional life are familiar, they are bearable to ordinary people who, growing up in the society, learn to cope, as children born to untouchables in India acquire the skills and attitudes necessary for survival in the miserable roles they are destined to fill. Such societies create no refugees.

Precisely the opposite is true of revolutionary Communist regimes. They create refugees by the million because they claim jurisdiction over the whole life of the society and make demands for change that so violate internalized values and habits that inhabitants flee by the tens of thousands in the remarkable expectation that their attitudes, values, and goals will "fit" better in a foreign country than in their native land.

The former deputy chairman of Vietnam's National Assembly from 1976 to his defection early in August 1979, Hoang Van Hoan, described recently the impact of Vietnam's ongoing revolution on that country's more than one million Chinese inhabitants:

> They have been expelled from places they have lived in for generations. They have been dispossessed of virtually all possessions—their lands, their houses. They have been driven into areas called new economic zones, but they have not been given any aid.
>
> How can they eke out a living in such conditions reclaiming new land? They gradually die for a number of reasons—diseases, the hard life. They also die of humiliation.

It is not only the Chinese who have suffered in Southeast Asia since the "liberation," and it is not only in Vietnam that the Chinese suffer. By the end of 1978 more than six million refugees had fled countries ruled by Marxist governments. In spite of walls, fences, guns, and sharks, the steady stream of people fleeing revolutionary utopias continues.

There is a damning contrast between the number of refugees created by Marxist regimes and those created by other autocracies: more than a million Cubans have left their homeland since Castro's rise (one refugee for every nine inhabitants) as compared to about 35,000 each from Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. In Africa more than five times as many refugees have fled Guinea and Guinea Bissau as have left Zimbabwe Rhodesia, suggesting that civil war and racial discrimination are easier for most people to bear than Marxist-style liberation.

Moreover, the history of this century provides no grounds for expecting that radical totalitarian regimes will transform themselves. At the moment there is a far greater likelihood of progressive liberalization and democratization in the governments of Brazil, Argentina, and Chile than in the government of Cuba; in Taiwan than in the People's Republic of China; in South Korea than in North Korea; in Zaire than in Angola; and so forth.

Since many traditional autocracies permit limited contestation and participation, it is not impossible that U.S. policy could effectively encourage this process of liberalization and democratization, provided that the effort is not made at a time when the incumbent government is fighting for its life against violent adversaries, and that proposed reforms are aimed at producing gradual change rather than perfect democracy overnight. To ac-

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complish this, policy-makers are needed who understand how actual democracies have actually come into being. History is a better guide than good intentions.

A realistic policy which aims at protecting our own interest and assisting the capacities for self-determination of less developed nations will need to face the unpleasant fact that, if victorious, violent insurgency headed by Marxist revolutionaries is unlikely to lead to anything but totalitarian tyranny. Armed intellectuals citing Marx and supported by Soviet-bloc arms and advisers will almost surely not turn out to be agrarian reformers, or simple nationalists, or democratic socialists. However incomprehensible it may be to some, Marxist revolutionaries are not contemporary embodiments of the Americans who wrote the Declaration of Independence, and they will not be content with establishing a broad-based coalition in which they have only one voice among many.

IT MAY NOT always be easy to distinguish between democratic and totalitarian agents of change, but it is also not too difficult. Authentic democratic revolutionaries aim at securing governments based on the consent of the governed and believe that ordinary men are capable of using freedom, knowing their own interest, choosing rulers. They do not, like the current leaders in Nicaragua, assume that it will be necessary to postpone elections for three to five years during which time they can "cure" the false consciousness of almost everyone.

If, moreover, revolutionary leaders describe the United States as the scourge of the 20th century, the enemy of freedom-loving people, the perpetrator of imperialism, racism, colonialism, genocide, war, then they are not authentic democrats or, to put it mildly, friends. Groups which define themselves as enemies should be treated as enemies. The United States is not in fact a racist, colonial power, it does not practice genocide, it does not threaten world peace with expansionist activities. In the last decade especially we have practiced remarkable forbearance everywhere and undertaken the "unilateral restraints on defense spending" recommended by Brzezinski as appropriate for the technetronic era. We have also moved further, faster, in eliminating domestic racism than any multiracial society in the world or in history.

For these reasons and more, a posture of continuous self-abasement and apology vis-à-vis the Third World is neither morally necessary nor politically appropriate. No more is it necessary or appropriate to support vocal enemies of the United States because they invoke the rhetoric of popular liberation. It is not even necessary or appropriate for our leaders to forswear unilaterally the use of military force to counter military force. Liberal idealism need not be identical with masochism, and need not be incompatible with the defense of freedom and the national interest.

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Art vs. the Arts

Ronald Berman

IBSEN, who was one of the heroes of modernism, endowed it with a passionate belief in artistic sensibility and social purpose. The artist was defined by his opposition to middle-class society. The theme of *An Enemy of the People* became that of our century: "The majority *never* has right on its side. Never, I say! That is one of these social lies against which an independent, intelligent man must wage war." It was a theme that suited the modernist movement, which was made up so largely of exiles. And it reflected historical circumstances as well, for poets, painters, and novelists worked in opposition to the values of the majority.

There has been a spectacular change at our own end of the 20th century. Art is now defined in terms of middle-class values and aspirations: it is the pursuit of the majority. Current dogma, selected almost at random from the media, from publications of arts institutions and of government, assumes that art is socially useful. It asserts that art should be universally accessible. It argues that distinctions of quality are invidious, a theme which makes possible the relationship between art and politics. In the view of its institutional patrons, art serves a mass electorate. It provides "experience" and "activity" for that electorate. This view prefers to leave to history Ibsen's conviction that art opposes social values. It finds equally disquieting the Freudian suggestion that art proceeds from impulses which are the opposite of civic.

If art has become bourgeois, the artist has not. The enemy of the people is now not so much against the majority as he is against social order; or at least against the kind of social order we have. The artist thinks of himself as a political revolutionary. The function of his art is to express a position on public issues and to serve ideas. Also, to embody a particular kind of alienation, and to show that the aesthetic object is less important than the personality shaping it. The two sets of ideas are contradictory but not exclusive: the most established of museums will exhibit the blank canvas or empty frame which is a calculated insult to its own existence. By so doing, the institution exhibits its social responsibility (or responsiveness) and the artist his revolutionism. None of the values involved seems to have much to do with the practice of art.

The belief that art is a form of permanent revolution is probably as useless as the idea that it serves social values. In both cases the practice of art serves external ideas, and the object of art comes to represent something other than itself.

That art represents the General Will is a credo of public relations. But it is taken seriously enough, and has effects on artistic thought and activity which are serious enough to change their definition. One of the better sources for the argument that art is a public utility is the *Congressional Record.* Congressional debate on the National Endowment for the Arts has been conducted in a variety of moods since 1965, the year the Endowment was founded, but its common theme has been the public value of institutionalized creativity. Perhaps the most crucial of congressional debates were the authorization hearings held in both House and Senate in 1973, for it was then that support for the arts first decisively defeated its opposition. It was not a matter simply of the roll-call but of the thrust and conclusion of argument: here for the first time adherents of publicly supported art made a case which overwhelmed their opponents. That case was both ideological and political. To support federal patronage was no longer a matter of apologizing for high ideals. The tactics used were no longer those of smuggling in cultural support among other and higher proceedings. At this point in our cultural history a number of things, as in a chemical precipitation, became instantly plain.

Institutionalized art has in the 70's become economically important. That fact was indicated by the heavy representation of municipal lobbies in the wings. Perhaps more important, a cultural shift of major proportions has occurred. It was no longer necessary at hearings or on the floor of the House and Senate to defend art as a minority interest but as the vocation of a large and formidable constituency. Two other things were suggested by the tenor of congressional debate: that art had become identified with values previously confined to education or religion; and that art (or the arts,

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which are very different) had taken on bureaucratic shape and political identity.

In opening the debate in the House of Representatives, John Brademas invoked President Nixon's statement that the arts provided us with "the intangible but essential qualities of grace, beauty, and spiritual fulfillment." The interpretation of that rubric by Congress turned out to be a paradigm of a larger cultural process. On the floor of the House, Congressmen summarized countless arguments and affirmations provided by local and national lobbies for the arts. The main argument was that government should extend its social and educational programs, and that support of the arts and humanities was part of domestic support in general. Contingent arguments were intended to show that, for the arts particularly, there was a direct connection between the appropriation of funds and the resolution of one or more social problems. And nothing could indicate better that art was a political commodity than the recognition that its support pleased important constituencies.

The argument for the support of the arts had little to do with the actual creation of aesthetic objects and even less with scholarship, criticism, or training. Artistic activity was perceived—and defined—as the institutionalized expenditure of funds provided by the federal government. This distribution was hallowed by the intention of providing artistic experience to hospitals, urban ghettos, rural regions, community centers, and various agencies of welfare.

The social functions of art were emphasized in their variety, the debates suggesting that art displaced adolescent violence and anomie, encouraged craftsmanship, discouraged crime, and offered new opportunities for employment. Art was an alternative to drug addiction, an auxiliary to prison rehabilitation, and a solution to the problems of old age. Exposure to art might relieve inner-city tensions and possibly improve the tone of the adversary culture. Most appreciated of all was the effect of art—or the distribution of funds in its name—on regionalism. Hundreds of associations had sprung up under the influence of federal support of the arts, and they were necessarily connected to the economic life of congressional districts.

It was not mentioned but it was generally understood that these associations were composed of two new and important groups. The first was made up of traditional patrons of the arts, and of those who aspired to patronage. They had found that organization into public corporations relieved them of the personal responsibility to contribute funds while it maximized their influence on government policy. Since this group tended to be affluent, educated, and socially conscious, it was involved also in traditional political activities: the trustee of an association sponsoring the arts would typically have a previous connection with fund-raising. He would have experience and weight in civic affairs. But now, instead of taking on the burden of solicitation or of personal contribution, it was possible to exert leverage on the operations of government. To be a member of a State Council on the Arts was to receive substantial amounts of federal funds, and to have a voice in their distribution. Local sponsorship and patronage were extended into the mutual relationship of Congress and a constituency.

The second group was bureaucratic, composed of men and women who found new administrative careers created by the distribution of public funds. The expertise required is not entirely artistic: Dick Netzer, in *The Subsidized Muse*, states that lobbying for additional funds is a primary function of State Council staffs. Both groups, the members and the staff, lobby in another sense, which is to identify the regional support of art with direct social service. As they define what they do, art takes on the shape of domestic assistance to selected constituencies.

DURING the debate, the language of congressional discourse concentrated on numbers and participation. "Thousands of people, and whole communities" were the object of federal subvention. It was consistently stated that the benefits of art were in fact social, and that their civic effect was nowhere better shown than in the diffusion of money and programs among the young, the disadvantaged, and minorities. The remarks of one Congressman give an exceptionally useful sense of art as a social activity. It is a local service directed at an important constituency:

> Iowa has one of the highest percentages of population aged 65 or older. It is therefore particularly fitting that the Iowa Arts Council this year provided assistance to the Iowa State Commission on the Aging for a senior citizen arts festival, an event which proved highly successful and which I hope will be repeated yearly. We have an immense reservoir of training, experience, and talent in older Americans—upon retirement they have increased time to devote to these talents, to their crafts and hobbies. The federal, state, and local programs in the arts should take particular cognizance of their needs and their potentialities.

It was a representative statement; others claimed the same kind of benefit, and made the same assumptions about the ends and means of artistic activity and support.

Political discourse needs to be discounted because it always implies social benefits. But there are in speeches like the above two things that ought not to be explained away as the normal exaggeration of congressional salesmanship. The first is the tactical end of distributing funds to constituencies in the name of art. The second, less political, is more important: it is the redefinition of artistic activity. That redefinition was provided by the various lobbies for art upon which congressional committees rely almost absolutely. The bureaucracy of art—members and staff of State

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Councils, the National Endowment for the Arts, and House and Senate committees—believe that the primary purpose of the support of art is the distribution of funds. They believe in *programs* rather than *grants*. A grant is specifically designed to produce a particular effect; a program means only to be an instrument of equity. Most people prefer programs, because stipulated amounts annually are conveyed to all interested parties, which eliminates application, competition, and uncertainty.

The debates summed up issues connected not only to the support of art but to its practice and definition. The language of social piety tends to disguise a profound problem of interpretation. It is plain that artistic activity is no longer thought of as professional activity. It has in fact become the opposite, a form of middle-class relaxation. The "democratic" assumption is that we are all artists, while the populist assumption underlying it is that activity is its own end. This has a superficial resemblance to the Victorian idea that art exists for its own sake, but is very different. The implication of activity being its own end is that standards are superfluous: art is anything with creative intentions.

I THINK that at least part of the new definition of art becomes clear through its new political identity. It is indispensable to begin consideration of that identity with the difference between art and a term that has come to displace it, "the arts." Art means creativity and refers itself to the history of achieved things from Altamira to the present. "The arts," a phrase which has become an essential part of the vocabulary of policy, is used generally to imply creativity while promoting the ideas of the congressional debate that I have described, and the subsidy of associations, bureaucracies, and institutions. It means the distribution of funds for purposes *felt* to be artistic.

Some of the most praiseworthy efforts of the National Endowment for the Arts have gone into the maintenance of institutions. But a certain moral —and artistic—cost has been involved. I am not speaking simply of the diversion of funds for lobbying or other aspects of political reality. In the fourteen years since the inception of this agency, and after the expenditure of the better part of a billion dollars, we are hard put to name a single work of art worth recollecting that it has made possible. Nor can we associate its support with any great enterprise in training or apprenticeship. Nor can we connect that support with a productive idea affecting the understanding of art either by artists or their audience.

The NEA represents "the arts" rather than art, which is understandable given the fact that it reflects the will of its constituency. And "the arts" stand for the distribution of funds rather than specific accomplishments; the subsidy of associations promoting themselves as well as their purposes; the relationship of the private sector of patronage to government; the use of art for social purposes; the satisfaction of particular constituencies.

Those constituencies are larger than one might think. There are 25,000 members of Actor's Equity and about 15,000 amateur theaters. The Bureau of the Census states that there are now more than a million people who identify themselves as artists by occupation. Artistic identity is having something of a boom. Without being simplistic, one can say that is probably because many vocations, like teaching, have been devalued; especially those dealing with cultural affairs. Competing institutions of culture have declined—religion, for example. And, as social status has become a matter of self-ascription, artistic *character* has become enormously popular. The use of the phrase "creative" has changed in an interesting way: it has been removed from the realm of achievement and applied to another realm entirely. What it means now is an attitude about the self; and it belongs not to aesthetics but to pop psychology.

There has been a natural overflow from the promotion of "the arts." More or less without a stop we are informed by the new class of government patrons that art is a universal good. One of the few activities of government not criticized by the media is its cultural subvention. And, of course, the availability of funds always draws into existence those able to benefit from them.

Yet actual creativity is hard to find. I have asked a deputy chairman of the National Endowment for the Arts why that agency risked so much resentment by refusing to give more than 2 or 3 per cent of its annual budget to individual artists. This policy has made it easy to attack NEA for its subservience to institutions, and for its plodding subsidy of production and performance. The reply was that there are not enough good artists in the United States to justify giving them more than 3 per cent of NEA's annual funds. The million citizens characterizing themselves as artists for the census—joined by many more than a million to whom the arts are less than a vocation but more than a diversion—have creative intentions. But they cannot paint.

The politics of "the arts" is clearly a cycle: funds are distributed to organizations created by the distribution of funds. Netzer's *The Subsidized Muse*, which is the best study of the economics of government patronage, states flatly that State Arts Councils "may be regarded as costly sops for Congressmen determined to spread federal largesse widely and thinly, and as a means of creating a nationwide corps of lobbyists for NEA." There are of course other social purposes: in a piece in COMMENTARY, Samuel Lipman* observes that "arts funding is seen by politically and socially activist groups as providing the means of increased visibility for their causes." Other benefits have been the prestige conferred by artistic purpose; significant

* "Funding the Piper," Music, January 1979.

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numbers of administrative jobs; and the connection more firmly established between arts and good causes.

Support of the social theory of art derives not from the congressional imagination but from the influences shaping it. If art means middle-class associations like State Councils, and ceaseless promotion of activity, then Congress will support that. If art means the diversion of funds to the young, the old, or minorities, then Congress will find that too acceptable. The arts constituency determines finally what the definition of art or of "the arts" will be. And that constituency has in the most determined way exempted artistic activity from critical standards. Art is whatever is done, whether crafts, hobbies, or simply the display of intentions. It is an ennobled form of middle-class entertainment.

Modern art has long been noted for the strenuous attempts of artists to offend the bourgeois imagination. But in the 70's, at least, art behaves as if it were anything but the culmination of the modernist movement. It is a radical product consumed by a distinctly un-radical class. An enormous amount of artistic activity has now been concentrated into performance, production, and other middle-class modes. The models are the Kennedy Center and Wolf Trap Farm, large establishments heavily supported by government, corporations, and foundations, and offering a combination of mass-audience programs and enough adversary culture to stay ahead of the media. The 60's may have radicalized art and its discourse, but the 70's have given it back to the middle class. It is difficult to talk about contemporary art as if it still had anything to do with modernism. Music, drama, dance, and exhibition are now the major modes, while the art of ideas matters far less than it used to. Poetry, for example, is now limited to the academic audience, although in the earlier part of the century it had a much more formative role. The performing arts now dominate and they represent the new role of social art: an auxiliary to daily life provided by the mutual operations of large institutions.

It makes no sense to be ungrateful for performance and production, or for the fortunate survival of civic benevolence. But subsidized events for large audiences tend inevitably to become a kind of cultural welfare. They are designed for the largest common denominator, and frequently translate art into another idiom.

The nervous attitude of art critics toward corporate support of performance is based upon suspicion of the profit motive. There is no denying that the sponsors of mass-audience culture have their own interests in mind. Texaco has stated that its support of the Metropolitan Opera broadcasts is based upon economic facts: the opera audience is loyal and buys Texaco products; a significant proportion of the 400,000 shareholders in the company own stock because of their interest in its cultural activities; the opera audience is "upscale" or composed of those with discretionary income; and the audience is politically sophisticated, receptive to the corporation's side of controversy involving energy, taxation, and regulation. But it is a truism that sponsorship is a matter of self-interest. What is more significant is the relationship between corporate and public ideas about culture.

THE most interesting thing about corporate support for the arts is not the profit motive but something that might be called the cultural imperative. A survey of corporate backing of the performing arts in *Advertising Age* claims that "corporate involvement in social, civic, and cultural activities" is now routine. That support is not related directly to sales; corporations too have visions of social mobility, and derive the same benefits from patronage as traditionally accrue to individuals.

Corporations have perforce a sense of their place in society, and within culture. As we frequently see in televised commercials, corporations no longer exclusively try to make sales. They present interminable displays of their social conscience; of the love and loyalty and services they live to confer. The usual perception is that corporations are trying to sell themselves instead of a product. But even that is not really accurate. Corporations may be trying to sell themselves—and to buy respect—but they are even more insistently trying to articulate what they believe are common values. Their nervous affirmations of clean water for good fishing or new forests for the next generation rest on the understanding that democratic institutions are involuntary social arbiters. If they do not affirm certain ideas they may be accused of opposing them. Corporations undertake to support whatever ideas are popular, vaguely moral, and untroublesome. They may even believe some of these ideas. They can certainly interpret the *Zeitgeist* as well as art critics.

It is necessary to observe, if only parenthetically, that corporations are now at the stage of structural development implying cultural support on a large scale. They employ many people in offices of public affairs which are subordinated to ideas about public relations. There is a good deal of ready money available because the tax code exempts 5 per cent of profits for charitable donations. Corporations have come to resemble State Councils on the Arts, maintaining bureaucracies devoted to the distribution of tax-free funds. They are vulnerable to local pressures, especially in metropolitan areas: corporate officers maintain the same position, and must perform the same largesse, as entrepreneurs did before them. But they can only live up to social expectations by dispensing tax-free corporate donations.

The managerial class has the same mind-set as those who define cultural values in utilitarian terms. Art as a diffuse social activity fits the corporate idea about its own place in democratic society. That kind of art is universal and uncontroversial. It begins with a head start since intellec-

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tuals and the media find it difficult to quarrel with support of "the arts." There are more than political benefits, for executives are assured that they exist culturally. In an age in which cultural issues matter as much as political issues, that is an advantage.

There is an especially revealing passage in the survey of *Advertising Age*:

> There is no doubt, as former CBS president Frank Stanton pointed out to the 25th anniversary conference of the Public Relations Society of America, that the essential values of the public "are most clearly evident, and in some instances evident only, in the arts—in music, the drama, and the dance, in the architecture and design and in the literature of the people and of the times."

When critics of corporate patronage hunt for the profit motive they overlook what Stanton calls "values" and what others have described, according to *Advertising Age,* as the "community" or even the "communion" that the corporation pursues with its customers. The corporation goes so far as to hope for "involvement with a customer as a total human being"—which is somewhere, one supposes, between a theological and a matrimonial relationship. The corporation believes, probably rightly, that the educated middle class has a morally positivist understanding of culture. Art, in that understanding, reflects the orderliness and intelligibility of life. It celebrates social beliefs and reinforces individual self-esteem. And, since it is just about the only aspect of industrial democratic life to have retained ritualistic, mystical, and even holy elements in its character, it is beyond criticism.

Performance is seen by its sponsors as an occasion of social solidarity. It is superego art. We can never be sufficiently reminded that it brings people together, is accessible to every mind and sensibility, has moral and therapeutic benefits, and implies the common taste of a mass middle class.

WITHIN the social definition of "the arts," distinctions are invidious: Warhol matters so long as he is a celebrity; the same can be said of Rubens. Not since the happy ending of *King Lear,* provided by Nahum Tate for the Enlightenment, has the interest of the audience been so solicited. The age of reason preferred a world without tragedy—and so it got philosophy. At the end of Tate's version of *King Lear,* Kent, Gloucester, and the king retire to a monastery while Edgar marries Cordelia. It is a triumph of poetic justice. The implications for us are fairly clear. When production and performance are tailored to a theory of what the public taste demands, good art will not necessarily be rejected, but bad art will certainly become accepted.

The consumption of bad art has been made easier by its sponsors, its production by other factors. There have been a number of theories for artistic decline, especially in painting. The most visible attack on painting recently has been Tom Wolfe's *The Painted Word,* and in that book the blame is put pretty squarely on the devil's work done by criticism. In Wolfe's view—and although the book is outrageously funny, its message is serious—movements or mini-movements like Op and Pop art follow the temptations of ideas. An idea is broached by a critic, and a market created on the spot as artists try to embody it, sell it, and live up to its philosophy. But if anything, the critics of contemporary art (like those of the movies) seem to be better than their material. It is not that ideas are bad, but that contemporary art seems to be dominated by ideas which are second-rate. It might even be said of much of our art that it works without ideas; that it has become technique without a motive.

One of the most interesting of cultural facts to be recognized by government is the separation of art not only from theory but from the discourse of other disciplines. In splitting its patronage between arts and humanities, the federal government has acknowledged the preferences of opposed constituencies. One Endowment deals with books and ideas, with scholarship and research, with the theory and criticism of art—and that is the Humanities Endowment. The Arts Endowment deals only with what is left. What is left includes a good deal, about twenty different activities from dance to folk crafts. It ranges from the subsidy of the housewife who played the piccolo in Leadville, Colorado, immortalized by a Committee on Appropriations as the ultimate object of federal patronage, to the subsidy of the Metropolitan Opera. But what is left needs to be measured against what has been left out.

At least in government, which is not a bad indicator of social preference, the disciplines of thought have been removed from those of "activity." The arts are perceived—and legislatively defined—as the realm of "experience" or of sensation; as a form of entertainment; and as a diffuse activity which is its own end. Government is sometimes all too good an indicator: it reflects in this case the separation of art from sustaining thought, a separation as important as that which has been discerned between science and its opposing cultures.

Within the world of art itself there has been a separation of word and act. Scholarship takes place in universities and deals with the dead. The criticism of art takes place in the media, and is practiced there by those who believe that art and its social context are identical. If there is a universal theme to media coverage of the arts it is that the amount of money distributed to constituencies, institutions, and approved social causes defines ideal "support." As for the practice of the arts, that has become our largest amateur activity.

FOR about a century and a half the professional artist has viewed himself (sometimes rightly) as untutored genius, social

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critic, political savant, existential philosopher, and in half-a-dozen other roles. These have set him off from the rest of bourgeois society and made him its greatest critic. But the quality of enabling ideas has fallen off since Shelley said that poets were the unacknowledged legislators of mankind. Modernism arose, in part, because of artistic hostility to bourgeois values and because of the hostility of those values to art. But the world depicted in the novels of Sinclair Lewis no longer exists. The middle class has long since put up the white flag and embraced the creed of its conquerors. Ibsen would find unrecognizable the new situation in which art is the most honored of all civic activities, and in which the idea of "creativity" is the most honored of all motivations.

The desire of modernism to offend the middle class was subordinate to the production of work which meant more, and contained more, than the reflection of what it hated. Oscar Wilde wrote that only bad artists had ideas or "character": the good ones "exist simply in what they make, and consequently are perfectly uninteresting in what they are." The moral for us is somewhat ambiguous, for it suggests that artists express feelings about bourgeois society in lieu of actual creativity. By now artistic alienation should have run its course, like all other inspirations. But the world of the 70's is still being addressed by art as if it were Victorian; either the sins of the father are being visited upon the third generation, or those of the artist upon his audience.

The visual and dramatic arts have in the last two decades accomplished something self-defeating. They reflect social ends and political arguments so perfectly as to become what they represent. It has been often observed that Dickens invented some of the most stupendous bores in literature. But his description of them was never boring. In fact, his bores are fascinating. The paradox of art is that it must recognize some difference between the model and the work. If it didn't, then there would not need to be any work, only a model. By refusing to distance itself or complete an act of interpretation, art becomes what it loathes. If it remains a pilot-fish of the bourgeoisie, then its movements are restricted to the path of the beast it feeds on.

Resentment, ugliness, and absurdity are major motifs of the art of the 70's. But it is after all self-defeating for painting and drama to have become resentful, ugly, and absurd.

Jacques Barzun in *The Use and Abuse of Art* describes the exhibition of works molded in human excrement; the artist who exhibited himself, framed by plastic testicles, as he reclined in a coffin; and a third who "cut off pieces of his own flesh and photographed them." Daniel Bell in *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* describes the transformation of drama from rhetorical to visual art:

> In the "Destruction in Art" symposium held in the Judson Church in New York in 1968, one of the participants suspended a live white chicken from the ceiling, swung it back and forth, and then snipped off its head with a pair of hedge clippers. He then placed the severed head between his legs, inside his unzippered fly, and proceeded to hammer the insides of a piano with the carcass. At the Cinémathèque in 1968, the German artist Herman Nitsch disemboweled a sheep onstage, poured the entrails and blood over a young girl, and nailed the carcass of the animal to a cross.

Aristotle, who saw a good deal of drama, and said that spectacle was the weakest part of performance, evidently didn't know the half of it.

The late Harold Rosenberg wrote of the German arts festival Documenta 5 that it was momentarily captivated by the current prestige of mental illness. Since madness has been adopted by therapy as a more authentic condition than sanity, and by radical politics as the result of cultural repression, it has become a recurrent theme in painting. The theme of "self-expression" at Documenta 5 took the idea of the self to be that of pop psychology, i.e., a dramatization of ascribed feelings:

> Genuine schizophrenia shaded off into "artistic" or drug-induced imitations in galleries of photographic horrors involving fish heads, genitalia, evisceration, blood-stained religious vestments, and crude crucifixes, plus photographic portraits of the artist gagged, gashed, and split in two.

Art shares in the general illiteracy of intellectuals, and ideas generated by the social disciplines articulate its resentment. To some extent the motives are political: not simply to attack bourgeois taste but to reject and devalue those standards which imply the existence of a legitimate social order. But there is a particular vulnerability in the visual arts that cannot be explained entirely in terms of political beliefs or social resentment.

THE explosion of cultural criticism from Ezra Pound to Lionel Trilling left the visual arts untouched. But the effects on the arts of literacy were profound. Malraux suggests in *The Voices of Silence* that the paintings of the past three centuries cannot compare with what was done before that time; and it might be said, with less exaggeration, that nothing before 1920 can compare with the criticism after it. The number of poets in that period who were intellectually significant for culture at large as well as within their vocation was extremely large. That number included Pound, Eliot, John Crowe Ransom, Robert Penn Warren, and Robert Lowell. As men of letters their only competition can come from the greatest of the Romantic poets. Poetry either resisted ideology, as in the case of W.H. Auden, or transcended it.

From 1920 on it has been characteristic that critics like Trilling could work in fiction, and that poets like Auden could master criticism. But the

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visual arts, and too much of drama, have separated out from the unified movement of modernism, and treated technique and politics as if they were ideas.

The story of the arts is that of two decades. Painters were in the 30's no more inherently vulnerable to the Popular Front than were poets or novelists, but they did not resist it as well. They were bemused by the high status of official culture under Communism, and have indeed never recovered from the attractions of that notion. Artists became identified with the cause, and art was understood to be a technique expressing political belief. Writers had begun to circulate nationally, to infiltrate universities, and to work out their independence, but artists concentrated into a single and much smaller society in which it was difficult to be different. There were no Orwells in the visual arts.

The 60's completed what the 30's had begun. The political failure of radicalism led it to a sustained and successful attack on the cultural realm. Nowhere was the cross-fertilization of political and artistic culture better shown than in the symbols of dissent: guitars, rock music, acid art, and other modes of technique linking expressiveness and dissent. The sensibility of the 60's linked political righteousness to the capacity for emotional response. The combination of the two was often called creativity. It was in the 60's that radicalism confused its style with its accomplishment, and artists confused themselves with the work of art. And, of course, a lot of people confused themselves with artists.

It has been said that modernism contained the seeds of its own destruction, which seems probable enough. But the definition of art as a political ideology or a social attitude was a product not of modernism but of the 60's. The modernists attacked the middle class because art stood for values which the latter seemed not to understand; the burgeoning of artists who hate art derives from other motives. If, as *Advertising Age* reminds us, even corporations realize that "the essential values of the public" are "most clearly evident, and in some cases evident only," in art, then the war on aesthetics becomes politically understandable.

In defense of the artist's resentment of art the claim is routinely made that freedom finally does imply an end not only to objective standards, but to moral or imaginative constraints. Perhaps. But Harold Rosenberg describes an instance which puts that conclusion in some doubt. Jean Toche, who defines his own artistic genre as the composition of manifestoes and protests, has accused the Museum of Modern Art of vandalism because it removed an inscription spray-painted by another "artist" on the *Guernica* of Picasso. Toche was supported in this gesture by over a hundred teachers, critics, and curators who denounced the museum. Which leads one to reflect that it may be difficult to decide what is the *Mona Lisa* of this art form, the sledge-hammering of the *Pietà* or the explosion of the Parthenon.

UNFORTUNATELY for all of us, the visual arts insist on defining themselves in terms which are derivative. Giant excavations or earthworks become a "statement" about the landscape; miles of white sheets strung across the countryside imply the "labor" of all involved in the enterprise. With every step that art takes toward "dialogue" with the times, it moves closer to a position abandoned with great indignation more than a century ago. "Dialogue" is, after all, a kind of synonym for the "communion" which the corporation seeks so passionately and so advisedly with its clientele. It makes no difference that it is recommended to us by the current avant-garde. As a matter of fact, in *Artculture*, Douglas Davis suggests that the "dialogue" of artist and society is essential. We are back to the argument, already old in Plato's *Republic* and even there unconvincing, that art ought to be socially responsible. Its new responsibility is predictable: "The 70's" Davis says, "are a decade in which appalling truths have finally become clear to large masses of people, from the poisonous quality of the air we breathe to the stupendous revelations of corruption that accompanied Nixon's resignation." The function of art is to interpret those truths to us. That seems to be exactly what modernism was trying to kill off when it declared its social independence. By labyrinthine ways a century of frantic contemporaneity has found itself back to square one. The artist thinks of himself as a revolutionary, but addresses himself to approved social truths.

Government has defined the arts as non-intellectual activity for the majority. Sponsors from the private sector think of art as a repository for social values. And artists are guided by ideas or sub-ideas which fit rather nicely alongside these definitions. It is not only that a common danger is posed by the attack on quality and standards: government betraying its impatience with any obstacle to majority participation, and artists asserting that standards are relics of a dead past. The sum of attitudes from opposing sides is that art has no particular value in itself.

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The Trouble with Reform Judaism

Julius Weinberg

THE last few years have marked the one-hundredth anniversary of the institutional origins of Reform Judaism in the United States: the founding of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations in 1873, of Hebrew Union College in 1875, and of the Central Conference of American Rabbis in 1889. It is now possible, in retrospect, to see Reform Judaism on the American scene in historical context—where it has been, what it stands for, and what its evolution signifies in the larger perspective of American Jewish history.

Four major stages can be discerned in the trajectory of American Reform since its inception in the Gilded Age under the twin leadership of a pragmatic-minded centrist, Isaac Mayer Wise, and a social-action extremist, David Einhorn. The first and innovative phase stretched from the end of the Civil War to almost the turn of the century; during this period, Reform—modernist and universalist in theology, antinomian in its attitude toward rabbinic law, and increasingly "Western" in ritual and liturgy—came to represent the religious expression of large numbers of upwardly mobile Central European Jews. A second phase, from the opening of the 20th century to the end of World War II, was marked by the crystallization of practice and belief in what has come to be known as Classical Reform, and by a rising challenge to these views and practices by an ever-growing number of newcomers to the movement, largely first- and second-generation immigrants from Eastern Europe, committed to the preservation of the folkways and ethos of the Russo-Jewish Pale of Settlement and, for many, its Zionist ideology. The third phase took Reform from the end of World War II to the mid-60's, a period in which the movement came to enjoy a harmonious blend of universalism, particularly in the growth of its programs for social action on the larger American scene, and East European *Yiddishkeit*. Finally, there is the current situation, now more than a decade old, in which Reform, once thought to be the most dynamic of American Jewish religious movements, has suffered a number of reverses, particularly a loss of ideological unity and direction. It is this stage of the movement's evolution with which we shall be most directly concerned here.

Two men dominated the activities of Reform Judaism in the United States for a quarter of a century after World War II: Maurice Eisendrath, a Toronto rabbi who headed the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, the lay arm of the movement, and Nelson Glueck, a Cincinnati rabbi and archeologist, who served as president of Hebrew Union College. Eisendrath and Glueck guided the movement beyond the geographical and ideological confines of Cincinnati, Ohio, and the Classical Reform outlook the community and its institutions had previously represented. Under Eisendrath, the offices of the Union were moved to New York City, the heartland of Eastern European Jewry in the United States, and to Washington, D.C., and the perspectives of the movement expanded to include a strong measure of support for the state of Israel, and, by the 1950's, an institutional presence in the Jewish state. Under Glueck, Hebrew Union College shed the anti-Zionist rhetoric of his immediate predecessors and replaced an adherence to the 19th-century school of higher criticism in biblical studies with more up-to-date scholarship and a more "Jewish" approach to the Bible. The postwar era also brought a change in the student body, as first- and second-generation Americans from impecunious families came increasingly to be supplanted by third- and fourth-generation young men—and, later, women—many of whom had been reared in Reform Judaism and were less well-versed in Hebrew, Bible, Talmud, and other subjects of Jewish study than their predecessors.*

In retrospect, Glueck's greatest accomplishment, and that of Eisendrath, was to bring the College and the UAHC abreast of the survivalist temper of American and world Jewry. The religious experience and the programs fashioned by Reform in these years provided a combination of the joys of

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* See Michael A. Meyer, "A Centennial History," in *Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion at One Hundred Years*, edited by Samuel E. Karff, Hebrew Union College Press, 1976.

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ethnicity and Stevensonian liberalism. It was an amalgam that could not survive the late 60's, but while it lasted, it infused Reform with a sense of purpose and vitality. Under its influence, the Zionist issue, once a source of deep division, resolved itself almost entirely. Adults in the movement expressed their commitment to Israel through contributions to the United Jewish Appeal and through tours to Israel; for the young, Israel became an important component of the Sunday- and Hebrew-school curriculum, an instrument of Jewish content that for many youngsters relieved what was otherwise a rather vapid educational and religious experience.

A return to tradition marked rite and ritual in the temples during these decades—the degree and form depending upon the characteristics of the individual congregation, its history and location in the nation, and the age and configuration of its membership. To be sure, not all rituals and observances fared equally well. The Bar Mitzvah, long neglected in Reform temples, returned, although its observance, as well as that of the Bat Mitzvah for girls, could take place at various times —during Friday evening services, on Sabbath morning, or even on Sunday morning. A greater stress on ceremony marked a number of festivals of the year—happy ones that coincided with non-Jewish holidays faring better than unrelated or tragic ones. The Sabbath service in many temples was changed from Sunday to Friday evening or Saturday morning. Festivals directly related to Israel and its role in the history of the Jews were observed in some congregations and in many youth camps. Other observances, such as the *Havdalah* service that marks the end of the Sabbath, appealed to the young and provided a sense of pageantry and ceremony that some felt had been lacking in pre-war American Reform.

Alterations were also made in the postwar years in the Protestant-like texture of Reform worship, although these innovations were constrained by the *Union Prayer Book,* published in a new edition just prior to and during World War II, and even then (as Lawrence A. Hoffman has pointed out) seriously outdated. This limitation was somewhat overcome in the 1950's by a revision of older hymnals, the printing of supplemental materials for religious services, and the publication in 1960 of the *Union Songster* for school and youth groups. All of these brought the movement more abreast of the ethnic, liturgical, and ideological needs of its adherents, as hymns with lyrics by Havelock Ellis and William Cullen Bryant were replaced by the poetry of Ibn Ezra and Bialik, and the music of Haydn and Mozart gave way to that of Binder and Jassinowsky. Along with these alterations favoring the East European mode of worship, many temples reintroduced a cantor, whose services had been dispensed with in the era of Classical Reform, or, in temples as yet unwilling to go that far, a "cantorial soloist."

By 1960, the developments of the new consensus—the East European influx, the Israel-oriented religious school and curriculum, and the partial return to traditional ritual in home and temple—appeared to have provided Reform with the best of all worlds, a satisfying and seemingly impregnable stasis between the socioeconomic fruits of enfranchisement in American society and the gratifications of Jewish particularism. Yet only a half-decade later—by the mid-60's—much of what had been accomplished began to appear irrelevant.

Whatever the reasons advanced by historians and sociologists to explain the fragmentation of American society in the 1960's, American Jewry, and Reform Jewish families in particular, were especially vulnerable to the assault on bourgeois norms and institutions mounted by the New Left and the counterculture in that decade. Adopting the tactics of others in and out of the Jewish community, the Reform movement responded by making an effort to coopt, or even emulate, the counterculture, hoping somehow to ride out the storm before too much damage was done.

The results were visibly and audibly apparent, as teenagers, with the permission of their frightened and trendy parents, brought guitars, the music of Bob Dylan, and the lyrics of Kahlil Gibran—along with dirty jeans—into the sanctuary to replace the stately organs, the music of Sulzer and Lewandowski, and the poetry of Penina Moise and Emma Lazarus. By 1968, temples vied with one another to schedule "creative" services by teenagers—once a month or once a year, depending on the stamina of performers and congregation; further, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, in order to assist its bewildered constituency, published a collection of "creative" confirmation services for those temples whose youngsters were incapable of writing their own or not satisfied with simply interpolating their literary "insights" into an existing liturgical text.

Congregational religious schools did not escape the devastation. Supple and often ignorant teachers and administrators found it expedient to pander to the more unruly elements of the student body, often bringing the level of instruction down to the lowest common denominator. The result was a curriculum in many schools that mirrored the worst elements of the pedagogy then busily destroying the public-school system in the United States in the name of "relevance" and "innovation."

Temple schools were inundated with expensive, and often ineffectual, multimedia devices for the teaching of Hebrew, history, and other subjects, "values-clarification" sessions, "rap" sessions, mini-courses in winemaking, *challah* baking, *tallit* weaving, and *sukkah* building, open classrooms, role-playing, simulation games, individualized learning programs, existential counseling, and field trips to cemeteries and ritual baths. Dress

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codes, attendance requirements, and formal grading systems were either curtailed or dropped entirely. The young began to serve as the source rather than the object of whatever collective wisdom the school possessed.

In the meantime, a sense of malaise had also begun to affect Reform's rabbinical schools. By the late 1960's, under a variety of influences, many seminarians at the Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion began to break out of the Reform mold—both from its Classical form and from the more traditional orientation of the postwar years—and to demand greater freedom in worship services, permission to write "creative" liturgies, and, paradoxically, the right to wear a *tallit* and *yarmulke* at services and to have kosher food in the dormitory. In this show of rebellion, as well as in their support of the Vietnam peace movement and of civil rights, Reform seminarians were paralleling, on a more modest scale, the activities of upper-middle-class college students across the country. More importantly, however, these demands and innovations signaled a breakdown of the consensus established in the two decades after World War II.

For a survey of the damage and for guidance into the future, Reform leaders turned to the social and behavioral scientists. Two surveys were initiated, one by the Union of American Hebrew Congregations—a "pilot project for synagogue change"—and a more intensive study of the rabbinate, the congregation, and the seminary student by the Central Conference of American Rabbis. The UAHC study, published under the title *Reform Is a Verb*, was headed by Leonard Fein and involved several of his colleagues at Brandeis University; the Central Conference study, entitled *Rabbi and Synagogue in Reform Judaism*, was conducted by a social psychologist, Theodore I. Lenn, and his associates. Both studies were published in 1972 and both revealed Reform Judaism in the United States to be in a severe state of crisis.

"It is very possible . . . that without treatment, the *movement may have within it the potential for organic breakdown*," Lenn and his associates concluded. Fein's diagnosis—less rigorous but equally pessimistic—focused on three primary failings: the movement's inability to provide its membership with a sense of community ("people are not disappointed in their temple; the demands and expectations they have of the temple are too minimal for them to experience disappointment, even when they experience alienation"); the lack of an appropriate ideology ("people with very potent Jewish instincts feel that they have no way of supporting these instincts intellectually"); and the failure to create an emotionally satisfying form of religious expression (an " 'atrophy of Jewish idiom,' " with "even the most highly motivated of the participants report[ing] a peculiar inability to match their motives to their lives within the temple").

Lenn's data confirmed and reinforced the conclusions reached by Fein; his study revealed a rabbinate uncertain about its definition of God and a sizable segment skeptical of His "very existence" as defined in the *Sh'ma* prayer; congregants who "do not consider themselves religious" and who remained Jewish "because it is simply the most convenient thing to do"; and seminarians with even fewer religious beliefs than their predecessors now in the rabbinate. Almost half of the seminarians identified themselves as agnostic and a majority offered "do[ing] my thing" as their motive for entering the rabbinate.

A detailed examination of the Lenn study provides no relief from these overall findings. The portrait of the rabbinate was neither flattering to the profession nor encouraging to the movement: while salaries were high, Reform rabbis were dissatisfied with "the *mechanics* of salary arrangements" (sabbaticals, tenure)—indeed, more unhappy on this count than over the shortcomings of their religious schools or the religious indifference of their congregants. As for their sources of satisfaction, these, according to Lenn, were overwhelmingly social ("helping people") and psychological ("opportunity to be creative") rather than religious ("presiding over ritual and worship"). It was the older men in the rabbinate, already in the minority, who tended to believe in God, who were happy in their work, and content to minister to the needs of their congregation. Lenn projected that the "traditionalist" rabbi—i.e., one reared in an Orthodox home and hence familiar with, if not sympathetic to, traditional ritual and able to read and write classical Hebrew—was a vanishing type.

Little solace was to be had from the Lenn study of the Reform laity, either. There were a number of alarming aspects: the failure of the movement to reproduce itself (only a third of current members were brought up in Reform homes) or to recruit successfully from either Conservative or Orthodox congregations; the almost unanimous dissatisfaction of parents with the quality of religious schooling; and their disinclination to join a temple before the children reached the age of religious training or to stay beyond that period. Probing further, Lenn learned that for the vast majority of Reform Jews (92 per cent), Jewish "consciousness" was synonymous with "being an ethical person"; that a bare majority felt that "belief in God" was "very important"; and, surprisingly, that only one in three felt that social action or charity was a significant component of Jewish identity.

The Lenn study provided evidence of strains within Reform that had already begun to alarm the movement's leadership. Other evidence came from conflicts in the movement over a number of touchstone issues that seemed to polarize and antagonize the various fac-

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tions. Three such issues were mixed marriage, the proper role of ritual in Reform, and programs of social action.

The propriety of officiating at mixed marriages had been a source of division among Reform rabbis since the inception of the movement; in 1909 and again in 1947, the Central Conference of American Rabbis held back from a ban on the practice. A number of developments crystallized the issue once more for the Conference in the early 1970's, especially the devastation wrought on Jewish family norms by the counterculture and the disquieting increase in the number of Jewish men and women living together but not married. In 1973, after two years of study and deliberation, an *ad hoc* committee of the Conference brought forth a series of resolutions which would have: (a) put the Conference on record more strongly against mixed marriages; (b) made it more difficult, procedurally, for Conference members to officiate at them; and (c) encouraged the conversion of the non-Jewish spouse and the Jewish education of children of mixed marriages. The debate on these resolutions served to bring to the fore the divisions in the Central Conference between its permissive and traditionalist wings, a schism that, after several harmonious decades, was now reopened.

The discussion at the 1973 Central Conference convention was prolonged and, on occasion, heated. Those who favored a less permissive attitude defended their position largely on grounds of historical precedent, biblical prohibitions and injunctions, and rabbinic law; on the need to preserve the social solidarity of the Jewish people; and on the desirability of strengthening the hand of the rabbi from pressure by either the family or the prospective bride or groom anxious to receive rabbinic blessings for what was patently a violation of Jewish norms. The arguments on the other side tended to focus on the psycho-sociological dynamic of mixed marriages rather than on rabbinic or historical precedents. In a statement for the minority position, Irwin Fishbein explained that the incidence of mixed marriage would rise regardless of the attitudes and the actions of the Central Conference and that the phenomenon should be understood as a consequence of the need by the Jewish partner "to attain a sense of self." By "refusing to officiate [at a mixed marriage]," Fishbein concluded, "we slam a door that may be only slightly ajar."

Despite the depth of feeling on the issue—or perhaps because of it—the Central Conference leadership avoided a confrontation over it and instead took steps to insure the institutional unity of their movement; the membership voted on the resolutions one by one rather than face the duty of voting the entire package up or down. This parliamentary device made it possible for the Conference to accept resolutions (a) and (c) and to vote down (b)—in effect, satisfying the desire of the majority for a stronger statement *in principle* against mixed marriages, without slapping down the substantial minority (perhaps as many as two hundred rabbis) who objected strenuously to the "manual" for implementation. Professional unity was to be prized over ideological purity.

IN ADDITION to the mixed-marriage controversy, Reform has become fragmented in matters of theology and ritual, with one wing now advocating a latter-day version of Classical Reform—antinomian in ritual and lukewarm on Israel—and others seeking a greater degree of ritual and stronger ties to Israel and to the concept of Jewish peoplehood. The antinomians find a champion in the writings of Alvin J. Reines, professor of theology at Hebrew Union College, and ideological—as well as organizational—support in the efforts of Eugene Mihaly, a professor of rabbinic literature and homiletics there. Those favoring some measure of ritual norms find their views best expressed in the essays of Jakob J. Petuchowski, research professor of theology and liturgy at the College, and W. Gunther Plaut, a rabbi/scholar from Toronto.

Reines has formulated a position he calls "polydoxy," which employs the rhetoric of logical positivism to stake out a ritually permissive and psychologically protean theology. Since, according to Reines, all religious notions are "equally valid," we can reject the historical context within which Judaism developed as well as its twin concepts of covenant and revelation and put in their place an open-ended "freedom" for the individual that will encourage religious worship through any response to the conditions of human "finity" and "fallibility" that an individual, at any particular moment in time, finds "authentic." Mihaly, less existential and less explicitly antinomian than Reines, eschews the countercultural influence that pervades his colleague's writings. Mihaly stands more in the tradition of the Classical Reformers of the 19th century; under his leadership, the Association for a Progressive Reform Judaism, a substantial group of Reform rabbis, was founded in the early 70's to check what it considered encroachments by the Central Conference leadership on the prerogatives and autonomy of the individual rabbi. The Association is opposed to any consideration of ritual norms for Reform Jews, any increase of Israel's influence on Reform, and any substitution of an "ethnic-national" definition of Judaism for the purely religious one.

Petuchowski and Plaut, spokesmen for a return to tradition, would lead Reform to a greater acceptance of the concept of Jewish peoplehood and toward the adoption of a more observant regimen. Both would purge the movement of the intellectual atavisms Reform has inherited from its 19th-century origins; for Petuchowski these are represented by the higher biblical criticism and comparative anthropology, for Plaut by the notion of

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America as the new Zion of the Jews, the desire to fashion Judaism in the image of upper-middle-class Protestantism, and the substitution of science for God. Following other traditionalists in the movement, Plaut would have Reform Jews make an effort to observe three levels of religious practices: *mitzvot* ("principles"), *halichot* (as distinguished from *halachot,* and meaning "the compelling nature of common practice made operative by personal consent"), and *minhagim* ("that which Jews 'customarily' do"). A "bridge," Plaut admonishes, must be built for Reform Jews to go from *minhag* to *mitzvah*; "nothing less will do and little more will be required."

FINALLY, there arose by the early 70's a division of opinion in Reform over the ubiquitous program of social action that had come to characterize the movement since the end of World War II. The focus on social action by Reform Jews—known at the turn of the century as social justice—can be traced to the very inception of the movement: the abolitionism of David Einhorn prior to and during the Civil War and the reforms advanced by Felix Adler, Solomon Schindler, and Charles Fleischer in the Gilded Age. The latter three, all of whom abandoned the Jewish fold to one degree or another, provided a precedent and a model for the social activists of the post-World War II era, in no way more strikingly than in their emulation of the reformist rhetoric of Protestant patricians and their concentration on whatever socioeconomic maladies these native Anglo-Saxons labeled as their current concerns. A direct line can be drawn from the social-action universalism of Schindler and Fleischer and of Felix Adler's Ethical Culture movement (which, despite its nondenominational theology, constituted an extension in membership, motive, and program of post-Civil War Reform Judaism—and as Nathan Glazer has noted, "not the most unreasonable one") to the social-action universalism of the post-World War II era, with one difference: the Gilded Age Reformers were spokesmen for German Jews, while their latter-day descendants are largely East European in origin.

The social-action movement in American Reform after 1945 has undergone two distinct phases: a stage of growth, culminating in 1955 in the UAHC Statement of Basic Principles on the need for social action in synagogue affairs,* in the appointment of social-action committees in each of the temples in the country, in the proliferation of professional staff, and in the opening of offices for this purpose in New York and in Washington, D.C.; and a second stage, one of a decline in interest and participation resulting from the growth of "particularism" in the late 60's and 70's.

In retrospect, it is clear that apart from several obvious items of survivalist concern to American Jewry—the admission of Holocaust victims into the United States immediately after World War II and the issue of Soviet Jewry in recent years—the social-action agenda of Reform in the postwar decades has been virtually synonymous with the catalogue developed by American liberals generally: civil rights and opposition to the Vietnam war; opposition to any breaches in the wall separating church and state; support for women's liberation and the rights of migrant workers and the poor; and, more recently, support for ecological concerns, the right of privacy, abortion-on-demand, and the rights of homosexuals. For all these causes, appropriate biblical citations were found and resolutions passed.

Much to the chagrin of the professionals in the social-action area of the UAHC, however, the agenda of American liberalism and the needs of Jewish survivalism began to diverge by 1970; the result has been an increased apathy toward the program on the part of laymen and a state of emotional depression—and an increasing shrillness of tone—on the part of the movement's social-action professionals. Thus, Albert Vorspan, director of Reform's Commission on Social Action, proclaimed in 1973 that "we are in the Dark Ages of religious social action in America." He cited "shrinking social-action budgets . . .; resistance to social action in many congregations; replacement of the social gospel by the individual head trip . . .; . . . silence on the part of religious leaders in the face of repellent immorality in our government . . . [and] dangerous assaults on our constitutional liberties. . . ." By 1977, Vorspan, in a speech to the UAHC, was urging his audience to support the Humphrey-Hawkins bill, the ERA, and black demands for affirmative action. More recently, and in a similar vein, the director of Interreligious Affairs for the UAHC, Balfour Brickner, expressed anguish over American Jewry's "withdrawal from social activism" into such "particularized" concerns as "the survival . . . of the state of Israel, the plight of Soviet Jewry, and the preservation of 'Jewish identity.' "

BY Vorspan's and Brickner's own admission, not many in the Reform movement have been convinced by their views—except for that group of professional social-activists, rabbis, and laymen who began to gather in the 70's around a new publication, pretentiously named *Sh'ma* ("Hear," as in "Hear O Israel"), edited and published by Eugene B. Borowitz, a graduate of HUC-JIR and professor of education and theology in the College's New York school.

Sh'ma, printed in a "small-is-beautiful" format (replete with typographical errors intentionally left uncorrected—somewhat of an anomaly for a publication that purports to believe in the perfec-

* *Where We Stand: Social Action Resolutions*, published by the Union of American Hebrew Congregations for the Commission on Social Action of Reform Judaism, Revised Edition, 1976, contains all of the resolutions passed by the Union from its inception to the present.

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tibility of man) and keyed to the professionals and cognoscenti among laymen in the Jewish community, offers itself as a kind of ongoing ideological "rap-session." In its pages, the universalists put forward their comments on contemporary Jewish and world affairs, often in a tone of superiority toward the community that pays their salary but (in their view) lacks the intelligence, the foresight, or the moral stature to understand or listen to them, particularly when the advice they offer runs counter to the community's deepest instincts as to what is "good for the Jews." (A number of contributors to *Sh'ma* do not share the "New Politics" philosophy of its founder and editor and serve largely as foils for the magazine's basic ideological thrust.) A typical issue of *Sh'ma* might contain excerpts from an Israeli "Black Panthers" Haggadah; an observation by an administrator of the American Civil Liberties Union that "the Jewish state, conceived as the *solution* to the Jewish problem, has become *the* Jewish problem"; interviews by a Reform rabbi and Hillel director with an Egyptian and Israeli in which he discovers the former to be a man of peace and the latter a warmonger; and assorted fusillades against the United Jewish Appeal, the way congregations function, sexism, and, as one contributor summed it up, "the horrific vulgarities of Jewish life."

As for Borowitz himself, when he is not busy running a Yom Kippur write-in contest among *Sh'ma* subscribers for *"the most overlooked sin of the American Jewish community,"* he is demonstrating his self-styled "devotion to the Jewish community, especially its ethics and its spirituality," by attacking the reactionary character of the United States ("the repressiveness lurking behind our society's façade of liberality"); the power-grabbing leadership of the Central Conference of American Rabbis and Hebrew Union College; and assorted other targets—students of the Talmud, Jewish social workers, and teachers—for being concerned with their jobs and livelihoods.

Borowitz's two specialties are moralistic condemnations of the Jewish leadership structure he is an integral part of, and denunciations of Israel that incorporate elements of Classical Reform with 70's New-Left chic. In 1973, a half-year before the Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel on Yom Kippur, Borowitz used the columns of *Sh'ma* to chide American Jews for wanting America to be strong in the face of Russian support for the Arabs. After the war, Borowitz posed a number of questions to American Jewry: "Does the war demonstrate," he asked, while prayers were still being recited over the dead in Israel, "once and for all, Israel's priority in our lives; or does it now lead us to the recognition that there must be limits to what Israel can ask of us. . .?" Taking note of the either/or form of the question, one pained subscriber wrote to *Sh'ma*: "Is this the time to debate whether we love our mothers less or our fathers more?"*

CURIOUSLY, Borowitz's fervently proclaimed hostility to the Reform establishment did not disqualify him from being selected as the chairman of the platform committee of Reform's Central Conference of American Rabbis, to prepare a centennial statement to replace the earlier ones drawn up in Pittsburgh in 1885 and Columbus, Ohio, in 1937. A number of developments motivated the Central Conference to want to write a new platform in 1976: the centenary spirit (perhaps mirroring the bicentennial mood of that year); the need to respond to the debilitating impact of the youth and countercultural revolutions of the late 60's and the fragmentation of the movement that followed in the 70's; a concern among Reform Jews, documented by the Fein and Lenn reports and articulated by Borowitz, that Reform "no longer had a clear sense of direction"; and a desire by Robert I. Kahn, the Central Conference president, to find some resolution of the schisms in the movement. Under Borowitz's chairmanship, the platform committee fashioned a *Centenary Perspective* that gained the support of the vast majority of the Conference membership by carefully papering over differences and avoiding the substantive issues confronting the movement.

The *Centenary Perspective*† of 1976 contrasts with earlier Reform platforms by its substitution of existential doubt on a variety of topics—the nature of God, the Jewish people, Torah, social action, Israel, and the Diaspora—for the certitude, the rationalism, and the optimism of the Central European Jews who had fashioned the "mission-of-Israel" doctrine of the Pittsburgh platform of 1885, and the survivalist-minded corrective formulated by the embattled Zionists who played a major role in drafting the Columbus platform of 1937. The *Centenary Perspective* of 1976 seeks, above all, to chart a program that will once more enable the movement's adherents to enjoy their ethnic particularism as well as their universalist visions of a better world. The document thus takes a middle ground on such divisive issues as the singular character of the Torah, the importance of the Diaspora versus the need for *aliyah*, the pri-

* In late 1976, Borowitz reproduced in *Sh'ma* two lengthy diatribes he had delivered on behalf of "thoughtful Jews" to the Synagogue Council of America and to the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations on the lack of "dissent" within the organized Jewish community in the United States and on what he considered to be Israel's expansionist foreign policy. As Ben Halpern of Brandeis noted, in a letter solicited by Borowitz: "I find it exceedingly odd that speeches you delivered to both the Synagogue Council and the President's Conference should be printed in evidence of the suppression of your freedom of speech by the local Jewish establishment." Halpern also noted that while the New York *Times* consistently failed to print his own views on their Op-Ed page, they gave Borowitz's addresses full coverage.

† The *Centenary Perspective* is published *in toto*, along with essays by the members of the platform committee, in *Central Conference of American Rabbis Journal*, Vol. XXIV (Spring 1977).

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macy of "ethical obligations" over ritual norms, and so forth. Wistfully, it notes the passing of the postwar stasis, when one's "obligation to the Jewish people and to all humanity seemed congruent." Today "these two imperatives appear to conflict," yet Reform Jews are still asked "to confront [both] without abandoning either. . . ."

Much more self-congratulatory in spirit than the somewhat self-effacing text adopted by the Central Conference is a triad of volumes written by Borowitz as an exegesis of the *Centenary Perspective*. The three books—*Reform in the Process of Change, What We Believe,* and *How We Live**—are much less evenhanded than the *Centenary Perspective*. Although Borowitz presumes to speak for the movement as a whole, in fact his position is that of a latter-day exponent of Classical Reform. He is careful to pay his respects to the centrality of Israel in the life and consciousness of committed Jews, but tempers and questions the degree of this commitment by calling for "a declaration of Diaspora independence"; he also approves a permissive attitude toward ritual norms, on the grounds that "we refuse to compromise on personal freedom."

Borowitz tries hard in these three volumes to present Reform as the most reasonable, moral, creative, and responsible movement developed by Jews in the modern era. To do so, considering the movement's state of spiritual health, is no easy task, but the author simply ignores the depth and pervasiveness of the movement's malaise and blithely credits it with bringing to modern Jewry the benefits of "critical scholarship," aesthetic art forms, individual freedom, innovative education, and polyphonic music. Among the issues that go unaddressed by Borowitz are the now-bankrupt ideological assumptions of Classical Reform, including its faith in the inherent rationality and goodness of man, the continued progress of society, and the ever-growing harmony among the nations, the races, and the religions of the world. He similarly passes over the role played by Classical Reform as a halfway house for numerous assimilation-minded Jews on their way to non-Jewish identification or outright apostasy; neither does he confront the unseemly haste with which Reform abrogated ritual, abandoned festivals, and abolished Hebrew a century ago; or the continued permissiveness of some lay and clerical segments of the movement toward mixed marriages; or the superficiality of Reform education for the young and the continued dependence of the movement on the Orthodox immigrant segment of the Jewish community to rear its scholarly and institutional leadership; or, lastly, the hostility of parts of the movement to the Zionist idea. Instead, Borowitz simplistically and inaccurately asserts that this "century's experience [is a] validation of the Reform revolution," without which the fate of Jewry would have been to "exist in the modern world in some anticultural form as do the Amish or Mennonites." Given Reform's current ailments, this bland restatement of the old Classical faith is, to say the least, inadequate.

IN CONTRAST to Borowitz's efforts to breathe life into the dogmas of Classical Reform, the movement, particularly in the areas of prayer and worship, has been taking steps to make its way to a more traditional idiom, a "language of survival," yet within a context of diversity that does not neglect any one segment of its variegated constituency. A number of recent publications—a new Haggadah (1974); a revised prayerbook for the Sabbath, festivals, and holy days (*Gates of Prayer,* 1975); a revised collection of prayers and readings for the home and synagogue (*Gates of the House,* 1977); a revised prayerbook for the High Holidays (*Gates of Repentance,* 1978); and "A Guide to the Jewish Life Cycle" (*Gates of Mitzvah,* 1979)—are all intended to bring the liturgy and ritual of the movement abreast of the religious and cultural hopes of its adherents.

In revising these materials for the first time since the early 40's, the authors and editors—largely pulpit rabbis, in contrast to the Hebrew Union College faculty that was mainly responsible for the earlier editions of the *Union Prayer Book*—have built upon, and then gone beyond, their movement's earlier liturgical developments, and the resulting volumes represent, on the whole, a thoughtful and tasteful blend of the traditional and the modern idiom.

The effort to satisfy the diverse points of view and modes of worship of the movement is easily visible from a perusal of the texts. The Sabbath and festival prayerbook, to cite one example, is available to congregations in two formats—one opening from left to right, as in the older editions of the *Union Prayer Book,* and the other from right to left, as in the traditional *siddur*. Page design facilitates variation as well—either a combination of English and Hebrew or, if desired, one *or* the other. A number of rituals—the lighting of Sabbath candles and several of the rites of the Passover seder—can be observed in varying ways, or omitted.

For Friday evening, a congregation can choose—and alternate—among ten services: two "family" services; one based upon the traditional *siddur;* a service that posits a doctrine of religious naturalism, or that stresses the mystical tradition in Jewish thought, or the theme of social justice; one in the tradition of the *Union Prayer Book;* an "equivocal" service—in the spirit of Reines's "polydoxy"; one based on "covenant" theology, an existential view popular after World War II; a service of "confrontation with estrangement," intended for Jews alienated from the Sabbath and

* Published under the collective title, *Reform Judaism Today,* Behrman House, 1978.

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from tradition, and designed to help them make their way back to both.

These volumes—with their abundance of selections from the Ethics of the Fathers, the Mishnah and the Midrash, excerpts from medieval philosophers, parables by hasidic masters, selections from medieval and modern Hebrew poetry and from American Jewish writers, and a number of pieces from non-Jewish sources—represent an informed labor of love on the part of the editors. While they would hardly appeal to tradition-minded worshippers in either Orthodox or Conservative synagogues, and while the editors may be faulted for an excess of zeal in the myriad of liturgical options they have made available, it should be kept in mind that anything to the "Right" of these prayerbooks, or more rigid in structure, would be useless in a movement founded on the premise of modernity, the autonomy of both the individual and his congregation, and the need for sensitivity to the intellectual, aesthetic, and cultural trends in the larger society.

THE present state of Reform parallels to a marked—and, perhaps, alarming—degree the condition of Reform shortly after the turn of the century. The age of the membership is taking a toll of the vitality the movement acquired just prior to and immediately after World War II. The third, fourth, and soon-to-be fifth generations of the East European migration, which is the bulk of the movement's constituency from now to the end of the 20th century and beyond, no longer share the value system, the beliefs—including the memories, fears, hopes, and commitments—or the ritual norms of their first- and second-generation forebears. A similar generalization could have been drawn about the third- and fourth-generation German Jews seventy years ago, but unlike the situation then, Reform today does not have available to it a resource such as the one that revived the movement from its moribund state after the turn of the century: the millions of East European Jews seeking to experience the benefits of social enfranchisement in America.

Another challenge confronting Reform is the growing strength and changing character of its denominational rivals. As W. Gunther Plaut has observed, Reform Judaism can no longer be purveyed as a status symbol; both Conservative and, more recently, Orthodox segments of American Jewry can boast income levels and educational and professional attainments that rival the demographic profile of the typical Reform temple.

Finally, the virtual disappearance of charismatic figures like the ones who flourished in the Reform rabbinate in the interwar and immediate postwar years—Stephen Wise, Abba Hillel Silver, and others—has also contributed to the decline in Reform's image; from community spokesman, book reviewer, foreign-policy analyst, social reformer and, in some instances, scholar-in-residence, the role of the Reform rabbi has with few exceptions become an increasingly circumscribed one—officiant at family rites of passage, mentor to the young, pastor to the middle-aged, and bedside visitor to the aged. This goes hand in hand with a decline in the role of the synagogue within the structure of the community, and a consequent diminution in the quality of its lay leadership and in the size of their financial contributions.

AFTER more than a century, the core question that hangs over the Reform movement is the same as at the beginning: does Reform Judaism serve primarily as a vehicle of assimilation, or can its efforts to modernize the message and the ritual of an ancient faith serve to retain the loyalty of its adherents to Judaism and to the Jewish people? "Although we have officially left behind the position of 1885," one of the authors of the *Centenary Perspective* reported, "we are still hounded by the low image of Reform as a Judaism of minimalism and convenience. In response to the question 'What is a Reform Jew?,' a confirmation student wrote the following: 'A Reform Jew is someone who doesn't wear a *yarmulke*, who doesn't light candles on Friday night, and who goes to the Temple when he feels like.' " To the degree that this observation is an accurate one, the youngster has put his finger on what ails Reform Judaism and Reform Jews today.

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Solar Energy: A False Hope

Samuel McCracken

SOLAR power is the ideal source of energy for the Me Generation: riskless and cheap. Or so it is claimed. Indeed, at the antinuclear rally held in Washington last May, the sun seemed more than a mere energy source: hearing the multitudes singing a solar anthem entitled "Let It Shine," one felt as though one were in church. A rather different and more primitive sort of church than one was used to, to be sure, but a church all the same, with its rituals and its god. The religious progress of mankind until recently might have been written largely in terms of an increasing understanding of the sun as a natural phenomenon and not a deity. That we appear to be reversing that development is not the least astonishing feature of the New Barbarism.

Barry Commoner has long been a solar advocate —*The Poverty of Power** was largely a eulogy of the sun's potential—and his new book, *The Politics of Energy*,† is already very influential. It makes about as strong and detailed a case for a "solar" economy as can be imagined. Yet it is fatally flawed, not only in its technical argument for solar energy, but in the ideological skeleton that lies just below the technological skin.

Commoner begins with three chapters that are really tangential to his theme; their function is the prophetic one of denouncing the feasts of the Samaritans vehemently enough to convince us that his own very expensive and constraining proposals are an improvement. The chapters take the form of a critique of the present national energy policy, an exercise roughly equivalent to machine-gunning drugged fish in a barrel.** Having demonstrated once again that we cannot rely indefinitely on nonrenewable resources, he sets up the alternative possibilities of an energy system based on the breeder reactor as against one based entirely on solar energy in its widest sense. Since neither system could be set up immediately, he proposes a "bridging fuel" for each. For the breeder system, this bridge is coal, and for the solar system, natural gas.

Not surprisingly, Commoner rejects the breeder-based system, primarily on the conventional grounds of safety and the risks of proliferation. Having essayed a discussion of these arguments twice before in these pages, I shall not deal with them beyond noting their fallaciousness and referring the reader to my earlier articles.†† To the conventional ideas he adds the objection that a breeder-based economy would require a major expansion of the use of coal, which he concedes to be a serious environmental, occupational, and public-health threat.

The solar scheme rests on four major developments. The first of these is the rapid deployment of solar technology for water and space heating. Commoner believes that this technology has already arrived, is now competitive, and need merely be put to work, normally in conjunction with existing systems. Additionally, there would be a rapid development of photovoltaic technology to allow the conversion of sunlight to electricity through individual installations on houses. This technology Commoner believes to be on the verge of success, requiring only mass purchases by the government in order to become economically competitive with central-station electricity. Next, we would build a new alcohol industry capable of producing some 50 billion gallons of liquid fuel a year, displacing about half of our present gasoline supply. Finally, there would be a vast new methane industry, producing that gas from various feedstocks, and shipping it around the country through a major expansion of the present natural gas network.

Commoner's analysis of the prospects for water

SAMUEL MCCRACKEN, Assistant to the President of Boston University, is currently working on a book about nuclear power.

* Knopf, 1975.

† Knopf, 101 pp., $4.95 (paper).

** Even given this undemanding challenge, Commoner can be foolish, as when he notes that "it costs a great deal more to build a nuclear power plant than to drill an oil well with comparable yield." This is gibberish as it stands, for an oil well has *no* usable energy without a conversion device such as a generating plant. Nuclear plants cost more than fossil types, but burn a cheaper fuel, with the result that nuclear electricity is everywhere cheaper than oil-fired electricity. This plain fact is lost on Commoner, who believes that increasing the energy yield per dollar invested would "mean favoring oil wells over nuclear power plants." He ends by telling us that "policy can change the national energy system, but only in harmony with certain objective physical and economic facts." Indeed.

†† "The War Against the Atom," September 1977; "The Harrisburg Syndrome," June 1979.

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and space heat is as rosy as it is because he compares direct solar heating with electric-resistance heating, i.e., the most expensive kind. He himself concedes this fact, but says that such heating is "very common." In reality, it accounts for only 13 per cent of all residential heating installations. One is tempted to suspect that electronic-resistance heating was chosen not because of its bogus commonness but because of its genuine expensiveness.

Commoner admits that direct solar energy will never be practical as a total source of heating. But in discussing the economics of a system that integrates solar with existing sources, he appears to take no account whatever of the effect that the subtraction of the baseload would have on the economics of central electricity supply; that is, it would skim off the cream of the utilities' business —namely, the production of the cheapest part of the total demand—and leave them with the expensive peaks.

THE most attractive promise of direct solar energy is the conversion of sunlight to electricity through photovoltaic cells. The obvious immediate problem in this technology, Commoner notes, is its cost. Currently a cell capable of generating a peak watt of electricity costs in the neighborhood of $10.* To provide electricity for a color television set at high noon in the middle of June would require $1,000 for the cells. The mounting would be extra. So would be additional cells to produce peak output under less than peak conditions and storage devices to allow operation of the set at night. A typical house with a maximum demand of 15 kilowatts would require $150,000 just for the cells. Commoner does not estimate the cost of mounting or of storage, but installation would run at least $2,000, and suitable batteries would cost $5,000 for the typical house, and need to be replaced every five years or so.

Commoner himself estimates the capital cost of all-solar power generation at nearly $160,000 for a house that would incur a capital cost of a mere $7,500 to $15,000 for the central-power generation. (He does not note that in the case of the central plant, the capital is scraped together by the utility and amortized to the customer through his bill, in contrast to the direct solar system which would presumably be financed by the customer himself.) He then proposes a glittering scheme to bring these costs down to more reasonable levels. He recounts the tale of a Federal Energy Agency proposal to require the Department of Defense to purchase, over five years, a total of $440 million worth of solar cells to replace some of the military's small generators. By the end of the five years, according to the FEA study, the cost of photovoltaic cells would have plunged to fifty cents a watt. This, with auxiliaries, would bring the total capital investment for a 15-kilowatt house to over $20,000, still more than central-generating plants, and still supplied by the consumer.

One would be more impressed by this scenario if one knew that the manufacturers who estimated the costs had taken firm orders at their estimates. But Commoner suggests that the estimates are conservative because they exclude the additional civilian uses that would be facilitated by earlier price drops. For example, he says, when the cells cost $1 a peak watt, they would be economical for street lights:

> Such a unit, mounting a 1,000-watt lamp, might include a vertical panel of photovoltaic cells, about 3 feet by 30 feet, facing south. During the day electricity generated by the cells would charge a storage battery housed in the base of the unit; at night the stored power would be fed into the lamp. There is a potential market for about 60 million to 90 million of such lighting units.

Before proceeding to a discussion of the general prospects of photovoltaic generation for residence use, it is worth analyzing the Commoner Patent Streetlight (CPS) for the illumination it sheds on its deviser's technical capabilities and the kind of nonsence that now apparently escapes the sleepless fact-checkers at the *New Yorker*, where his book was serialized, not to say the editors at the distinguished publishing house which brought out the book.†

To begin with, the proposed collector area, approximately 90 square feet, is grossly inadequate. When one figures in additional factors ignored by Commoner—solar radiation less than the maximum, the varying day/night balance, and the inefficient vertical orientation of the collector—it turns out that the true area needed is about 1,000 square feet. At a width of 3 feet this would require a collector about 300 feet high! Even at a collector width of six feet, the CPS light pole would be 15 stories high. Such a device would certainly need substantial guy wires, which would

* A peak watt is a watt generated under the most favorable circumstances: at high noon in midsummer on a clear day with the array oriented due south and tilted at the optimum angle to the sun. If any of these conditions is less than perfect—if it is cloudy, or winter, or dusky, or if the array is mounted unsatisfactorily—a given cell will generate very much less than its peak capacity. Of these conditions, only the orientation can be maintained at optimum; on all other counts, conditions are *usually* well under the optimum.

† It is important to realize the rudimentary nature of most solar projection, and how much is omitted from cost calculations, and sometimes left to chance and later development. The primitivism is usually technical: few solar writers discuss the fact that solar cells produce direct rather than alternating current, a circumstance that either adds the expense of an inverter system to the cost of a residential installation or would require us to replace a substantial proportion of our appliances with new ones designed to run on direct current.

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presumably be anchored in front lawns and in the streets, or, as seems likely, in the basements of houses via living-room floors.

Moreover, no trees could be allowed to cast shade on the collectors; nor could tall buildings, which would limit the use of such units in urban areas. Depending on the orientation of the street, the collectors themselves would sometimes cast shadows upon one another, requiring that streetlights be spaced further apart than customary. Although some people have quaintly argued that solar energy is very flexible, this wider spacing cannot be compensated for by increasing the size of the bulb; that would set up a merciless escalating cycle of bulb size, collector size, and spacing.

The visual quality of the CPS, whatever its economic problems, is hideous, a bizarre and exacerbated regression to the days when utility poles carrying hundreds of lines blotted out the urban skyscape.

Then there are the economics of the CPS. The collector would require cells costing, on Commoner's own price figures, about $7,500. Adequate storage batteries would cost a minimum of another $6,000—every five years—and occupy a great deal of space on the sidewalk. Erecting the pole itself would cost at least $12,500. Thus the total would be about $26,000 to produce a constant kilowatt. On any reasonable assumptions about interest charges, inflation, and the price of electricity, the CPS could never recover its capital cost before needing to be replaced. Storage costs alone would yearly exceed the value of electricity saved. The maximum "market" suggested by Commoner is 90 million streetlights. At $26,000 a shot, that is over $2 *trillion*.

In short, the CPS is a piece of folly from beginning to end. It is not merely that the nuts and bolts do not fit when looked at closely; the CPS is conceptually lunatic, for it matches a demand at its highest—during the long winter nights—to a supply at its lowest—during the short cloudy days. There is thus a certain irony in Commoner's repeated assertion that solar energy allows us to attain an elegant fit between demand and supply. It is hard to take seriously an inventor who fails simultaneously with numbers and imagination.

But if the CPS is a folly, there is no doubt that under certain conditions one is now able, or will be able in the future, to provide a proportion of residential energy through solar collectors mounted on the roof. It is therefore worthwhile to consider the problems raised by this sort of solar energy even if it were economically plausible: the problems, as it were, of solar success.

Some of these are in the broad sense technical: they deal with measurable effects that are relevant to other forms of energy. For example, contrary to popular belief, direct solar power generates waste, not in the production of power, but in the production of its materials. Thus, as Petr Beckmann has noted, the production of the steel and glass and aluminum in solar plants uses substantial amounts of energy, almost all of it derived from fossil fuels, and all of it generating wastes, some of them radioactive. Moreover, the industrial processes involved here would generate their own wastes. Commoner, along with many other direct-solar enthusiasts, decries large central solar plants; if 1000 megawatts were to be generated by many small residential units, the waste, Beckmann points out, would be even greater.

Solar power also raises serious problems of efficiency. Photovoltaic generators are, from the point of view of capital investment, much the least efficient means to generate electricity. They are not available after sundown, and so have an "availability factor"—the proportion of time a generator can work—much lower than any thermal plant. Moreover, the weather and the time of day insure that a solar generator, even in daytime, almost always produces much less than its rated capacity. Its "capacity factor" is, accordingly, very much lower than that of a thermal power plant. Even in sun-drenched areas, the capacity factor will be about 20 per cent, about a third of that for the average large nuclear or fossil plant. If we were to analyze such a solar generator in the terms customarily applied to plants of the latter kind, we would discover a massive capital investment lying unutilized or half-utilized much of the time. We would have to conclude that underutilization is inherent in the technology, never to be improved by technological breakthrough short of a photovoltaic device generating electricity in darkness, a breakthrough literally impossible.

But the technical problems of solar energy are substantially less interesting than its social ones. Lying just below the surface in most discussions of alternative energy are proposals for reshaping how we live by controlling the type and amount of energy available to us, as well as the way it is supplied to us. These are especially notable with direct solar energy.

There are serious constraints implicit in decentralized direct solar energy. One of these affects architecture: at minimum, each house would have to be oriented with its major roof area facing south. It would not matter what is dictated by the lay of the land, because these considerations would be subordinated to the simple problem of getting energy. And so, ultimately, with construction on neighboring lots: the sun comes into North America at a fairly low angle, and if the right of one householder to an all-solar home were to be preserved, his neighbors to the south would not be able to build very high next to him, and indeed their access to trees might be sharply limited whether they wished to go solar or not.

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Photovoltaic is far more constraining than water and space heating not only because it requires more roof area, but because no part of a photovoltaic collector's area should fall into the shade during any part of the day.* Thus, in a photovoltaic economy, trees shading houses would be only a remembered luxury.

Nor would such constraints, which would fall on householders unequally as a function of their taste in architecture, be the only ones. Solar collectors need to be kept clean. In the southwest, this might mean no more than sweeping the dust off several times a year. In the northeast, it might mean shoveling snow off the collector six times a winter—no mean task, and a likely cause of increases in death by heart attack and falling.

In short, proposals for a major conversion to direct solar energy are at best proposals to reverse thousands of years of development by which man, through the division of labor, has made the acquisition of energy increasingly the province of fewer and fewer increasingly well-paid specialists. This is what the Commoners are decrying when they call for the decentralization of energy sources. A century ago, the American used substantially less energy than he does now, but provided much more of it through his own efforts. Now that anyone can have access to as much energy as he can pay for by pushing the right button, it was probably predictable that surfeited intellectuals would want to play at chopping wood and shoveling snow off their solar collectors. Yet it is typical of the great majority of the modern pastoralists that they seem to want to get back to nature in the most complicated and expensive way possible. Few if any mean to retire to the equivalent of an 18th-century farmstead. Rather, one is to live with the assistance of extremely costly gadgetry that will provide all the complexities of modern civilization, but with the inefficiency of time and resource that is the hallmark of the "natural" way. Unfortunately, only the few will be able to afford such "handmade" energy; the rest, one supposes, will just have to emulate 18th-century farmers.

THE difficulty with direct use of the sun is that it is very expensive and requires us to adjust our way of life to fit an inferior energy source. But much of Commoner's book is concerned with indirect methods of converting solar energy—that is, with processes that store solar energy on an interim basis in devices as various as the winds, the tides, the rains, and vegetation, then "harvest" the energy thus stored by an equally various set of technologies. Such methods are hardly new—we have been burning wood for a very long time, and whether learning to call it "biomass" represents real progress one cannot say—but they have the advantage of being somewhat more adaptable to our present energy use than direct conversion of sunlight. Even so, on the scale proposed by Commoner they would require very great dislocations of the economy.

Of these, "gasohol" epitomizes alternative energy sources: even when practical in small doses (often only with substantial tax subsidies), they cannot be scaled up to provide a major source of energy. There is no reason why a farmer cannot use spoiled grain as a stock from which to distill alcohol. Mixed with gasoline, it may well be a competitive fuel—but only if sold at the bogus price that would result if the state decided to forgive the fuel tax on it.

It is often pointed out in support of gasohol that all gasoline in Brazil contains 10 per-cent alcohol, a fraction scheduled to rise to 20 per cent by next year. This policy is often cited as one for the United States to emulate. The easy answer is that we cannot emulate Brazil's low population density (half of this country's, which is itself among the lowest in the developed world), or Brazil's negative balance of trade in food. In the United States, gasohol competes with food for land, a fact that would be reflected in bread and meat prices just as soon as gasohol became popular enough.

The most serious problem with gasohol has traditionally been believed to be its negative energy balance. That is, the total energy needed to produce a gallon of alcohol is greater than the energy contained in it. Commoner has an answer to this. He proposes a major rearrangement of agriculture which he has devised in company with four colleagues at Washington University's Center for the Biology of Natural Systems:

> A recent investigation. . . has produced what looks like a conjurer's trick: the same acreage that yields grain and hay with a total energy content of 7 quads per year, which is now totally converted into livestock, can instead be made to produce the same amount of livestock *plus* 8 quads of solar fuel. . . . [T]he present acreage . . . expanded by 15 per cent to include idle land, would be used to plant a rotation of corn, sugar beets, and hay. Most of the corn would be fermented to provide alcohol, and the residue fed to the livestock, together with some hay . . . . This arrangement would yield 5 quads of alcohol . . . the livestock manure and part of the hay would be used to produce methane, yielding about 3 quads. . . .

This scheme has more than the *appearance* of a conjurer's trick, for it begins by coolly equating "the same acreage" with the same acreage plus 15 per cent. Nor is this the only difficulty. Commoner is superficially persuasive in demonstrating that there is enough land to produce the energy yields

* A portion of the cells in every array is wired in series, and if some members of the series are deprived of light, their internal resistance will rise sharply and they will constitute a serious drain on the efficiency of the rest.

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he cites by the methods he uses. Although he does not offer any evidence for his estimate that the total capital investment would be on the order of $70 billion, he demonstrates, again fairly persuasively, that the ethanol and methane produced would displace imported oil and gas with a value adequate to pay off that investment fairly quickly. He also adduces evidence that gasohol is an adequate automobile fuel.

But his evidence that alcohol represents a net energy gain is far from persuasive. It may well be that previous studies, by using data from beverage alcohol distillation, have overestimated the energy needed to produce fuel-grade alcohol. It may also be that the industry can produce more efficient stills. But a large part of Commoner's energy gain is achieved by something for which "conjurer's trick" is a polite term. A gallon of ethanol contains about 80,000 BTU's. Commoner, however, credits it with a much higher figure, derived from the amount of gasoline it would displace were it burned *in pure form* in a special high-compression engine designed for the purpose. (Commoner seems unaware that the conversion of an existing engine to a higher compression ratio is major surgery costing hundreds of dollars.) Commoner cites a number of studies as to the virtues of 10/90 gasohol as fuel, but none whatever as to pure alcohol. Moreover, although we know that one can run a specially designed auto engine on ethanol, there is no long-term evidence as to the reliability and emissions of such engines.

A full 30 per cent of the energy "gain" Commoner attributes to alcohol is derived through this sleight-of-hand. Without it, the proportion of the energy content of ethanol that is used to produce it ranges, on Commoner's own optimistic assumptions, between 46 per cent and 57 per cent. Even on Commoner's ingenious figures, the loss is between 32 per cent and 43 per cent. This should be compared with the figure for gasoline: well under 1 per cent.

These are the operating costs of producing ethanol. As for the capital costs—the costs of producing equipment for the ethanol distilleries and the methane digesters—Commoner simply ignores them. His examples of the fledgling alcohol industry are often based on the use of surplus machinery: one of his distillers adapted a tank from a closed gas station. He also appears to believe that closed gas stations will be a significant source of pot stills: he notes that "since Texaco is selling its dealerships, numerous underground tanks in this size range are presently available." Even if Commoner were correct in his bizarre assumption that every station sold off by an oil company ceases to operate, cast-off materials could supply only a fraction of the machinery needed for his purpose.

Moreover, his scheme—like most grand solar schemes—requires the premature replacement of a substantial proportion of American refining capacity. One cannot do this sort of thing and get away scot-free: someone is going to pay for it, and it is likely to be the taxpayers.

Commoner also ignores the problem of distribution networks, which would have to be relocated and expanded to accommodate a decentralized alcohol industry. And even if the alcohol production envisioned in the proposal were carried on at fewer centralized distilleries, it would be necessary to move the raw materials from farm to distillery by a new and expanded transportation system based on trucks which use oil.

It is clear that the scheme omits major categories of fiscal and energy expenditure necessary to make it work. But the variable most spectacularly missing from Commoner's calculation is just the one we might expect him to be careful about: people. For there is no calculation of the labor needed to operate Commoner's solar proposals.

First of all, the rotation of crops needed to produce the feedstocks would obviously require farmers to work a substantially longer part of the year. And all those alcohol distilleries and methane digesters would not be self-operating. Farmers busy growing extra crops would have little spare time to be factory workers. (The pilot projects mentioned by Commoner typically involve 10 per cent of the production his proposal would exact from the average farm.) There would no doubt be unemployed refinery workers who might be persuaded to move to the farm and retrain as distillers. But Commoner's proposal remains, in employment terms, a chancy one that depends on reversing this century's trends in farm employment.*

The proposal is not made sounder by Commoner's use of the term "competitive." He and his associates claim that various tax subsidies (actual state and prospective federal) make gasohol competitive with this or that grade of gasoline. Gasohol could of course by made *free* by a federal tax credit equaling the price paid for it. Commoner's writings suggest strongly that despite his own frequent admonitions to the contrary, he is among those who think there *ought* to be a free lunch: on his principle, any device, no matter how inefficient, no matter how noncompetitive, could be made competitive merely by a government decision to yield up part of the tribute normally exacted for its use.

THE other half of Commoner's fossil-fuel replacement program is methane, which is to be generated in immense quantities—20 quads, approximately the current production of natural gas—by a wide variety of feedstocks and piped through the land in an expanded

* There is substantial historical evidence that labor migrations of the sort proposed by Commoner, e.g., the clearing of the Scottish Highlands, are most likely to be accomplished at the end of a rifle.

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version of the present-day natural-gas distribution system.

Commoner proposes to exploit methane largely through the use of a device called the cogenerator. This buzzword describes a good idea done to death. Cogeneration is a process that is made practical by a simple fact about heat engines. They must always waste as heat a large proportion —typically between 60 and 70 per cent—of the energy potential in their fuel. This is why cars have radiators. A cogenerator is a device that uses the inevitable waste heat from an engine for some other purpose. Typically, industrial cogenerators use the waste heat for chemical and physical processes; residential cogenerators use it for heating houses ("district heating"). This latter arrangement is found in Europe and is especially widespread in Sweden.

Commoner suggests that cogeneration be brought down to the level of the individual house, and cites a small cogenerator devised by FIAT, based on its standard four-cylinder automobile engine, that would cost $6,000 and, while running on methane, generate 15 kilowatts of electricity for an average home, while providing it with an unspecified proportion of its heat, assuming that it were already equipped with suitable hot-water radiators.

This device would no doubt be useful in the colder parts of the undeveloped world, where a noisy source of electricity and heat, subject to fairly frequent down times for scheduled major maintenance and unscheduled repair, would certainly be better than no electricity or no heat at all. But it must be understood that for us, the future Commoner holds out is one in which our heat and electricity supply would be no more reliable than our car engines.

Commoner proposes that the production of methane from solar sources be gradually increased and mixed in the pipelines with natural gas from wells. He also suggests that certain industries, like canneries, could be net producers of methane at some times in the year (the height of the canning season) and net consumers the rest. And he says that hydrogen produced by solar means, as from photovoltaic electricity, could be mixed with the methane in substantial quantities and shipped through the same pipeline.

The most obvious operating difficulty of this scheme is the need for careful separation of the hydrogen from the methane at the distributing end of the pipeline, and for constant adjustment of burners to deal with the fluctuating methane/natural gas mix, a problem that would continue until—by Commoner's schedule—well into the next century, when the production of natural gas would finally be phased out.

But these are trivial problems compared to the capital costs implicit in building a massive new energy industry to replace existing natural gas wells. Of any calculation of these costs Commoner's book is innocent. And these costs, by the way, would come on top of those implicit in another Commoner requirement, the near doubling of present-day natural gas production. By Commoner's own calculations, existing supplies of "conventional"—a euphemism for "easily and cheaply exploited"—natural gas will not be adequate to see us through the solar transition. We must, accordingly, turn to "unconventional"—a complementary euphemism for "hard-to-get and expensive"—sources of natural gas. And we must expect that the gas industry would be willing to gear up to produce unconventional natural gas on the clear understanding that just as soon as we could produce enough methane to replace it, bang! would go the market.

One suspects that Commoner does not really think capitalists are as dumb as all that, but hopes that the taxpayers will be. He ends his book by surveying the political problems inhering in the grand transition. One could summarize his argument by saying that solar energy will be good for the Peepul and less good for the bosses, except those who run energy-intensive businesses. The argument takes leave of technology and shows quite clearly the trend and quality of Commoner's ideology.

He begins with one of those breathtaking examples of naiveté and self-contradiction that freight his work. We have been told (he tells us) that we are running out of oil and natural gas. No such thing, he says, for Mexico's newly discovered reserves exceed those of Saudi Arabia and we have immense amounts of "unconventional" natural gas.

Well, let us assume that the natural gas could be recovered at economic rates. Oil, whatever its source, is just the sort of fuel that Commoner has told us we can no longer afford. There is no reason why Mexico should sell oil to the United States except at the world price and no prospect that it will. To propose that we rely on Mexican oil is to propose something Commoner elsewhere treats as intolerable, and, back in the real world, to guarantee an exacerbation of the sort of problems we now have with OPEC. If Mexican oil is more useful to us than Saudi oil, it can only be on assumptions that are sometimes called "imperialist."

Commoner's main concern is how to dispose of the present energy-supply companies once we have erected their replacements. For the electric companies the solution is simple: competition from photovoltaic electricity would drive them into the ground financially, and we would nationalize them in order to pick up the still useful distribution systems they control. There is no estimate of the total cost—to taxpayers and shareholders—who together would have to pay it.

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The oil companies, for unspecified reasons, he is unwilling to nationalize. They would be offered the opportunity to become public utilities like the natural-gas pipeline people. As for the coal companies, they would suffer the cruellest fate of all, for Commoner simply ignores them. Presumably they would be bankrupted without even the benefits of nationalization. And their workers? Let them distill alcohol in Iowa.

Most of the problems inherent in the grand transition Commoner would solve by something called "social governance." It is not clear what this is a euphemism for, although Commoner does reassure us that, having survived Joe McCarthy and Watergate, we can probably survive it too. There is nothing vague, however, about another key phrase. In his last sentence Commoner calls for us to adopt as a major national goal something he terms "economic democracy." Although he does not define this term here, he did so in his earlier book, *The Poverty of Power*, where "economic democracy" is explicitly and quaintly defined as the economic system of such states as China, Cuba, and the USSR—places, as is well known, in which all economic decisions are made by individuals and popularly elected assemblies.

COMMONER has recently been active in the formation of a new political organization, the Citizens' Party, and it is as a political manifesto that *The Politics of Energy* makes the most sense, just as Commoner himself makes sense best not as a scientist but as an ideologue. Indeed, the whole solar movement is interesting primarily as an ideological one. Its technical slovenliness cries out to be exposed, but there is nothing new in such slovenliness on the part of enthusiasts. What is comparatively new in a democratic society is the use of technological arguments, however incompetently made, to support a call for a new vision of human life.

The energy crusade as preached by a Commoner and followed by many thousands of nostalgic activists is little more than a continuation of the political wars of a decade ago by other means. Having despaired of convincing Americans that their society is the most oppressive and brutal in the world, they now tell Americans that it is the most dangerous in the world. Where salvation was once to be gotten from the Revolution, now it will come from everyone's best friend, that great and simplistic cure of all energy ills, the sun. Where it was once fashionable to argue that we had to smash the state before we could decide what to erect in its place, now the Commoners feel obliged to sketch out a rosy "scientific" account of what will ensue after the destruction of the older order. This progression is not really progress: in reality the very machinery of the state is being skillfully utilized to destroy the existing energy order long before its replacement can be prepared.

Of the late 5th-century Romans, it could at least be said that whatever their other faults, they did not *mean* to be followed by the Dark Ages.

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Observations

Israelis in Exile

Drora Kass and Seymour Martin Lipset

For a country like Israel, founded and built on the premise of continuing immigration, the rising rate of emigration in recent years has become a matter of serious concern. There are no reliable recent figures for the total number of Israelis living abroad, but published estimates vary between 300,000 and 500,000. Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics indicates that 308,100 Israeli Jews who left the country between 1948 and 1977 did not return.* According to one U.S. government official, as of two years ago there were 300,000 in the U.S. alone (many, perhaps most, illegal immigrants), and there are probably well over 100,000 living in Canada, South Africa, Australia, and Western Europe. In other words, more than one out of ten Israelis—the equivalent of 21.5 million Americans—is currently living abroad. Over half are Sabras—native-born Israelis—between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-five.

These figures seem less drastic when compared with emigration rates for other settler societies like the United States, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand. In all these countries, the initial massive influx of settlers was followed by a subsequent departure. (In the United States during the years of mass immigration between 1908 and 1924, 34 people left for every 100 who came.) Moreover, the movement out of Israel does not really diverge all that much from the "brain-drain" pattern of developing countries whereby the better-trained and better-educated tend to emigrate to countries more economically advanced.

Such reassuring comparisons do not, however, alter the fact that Israel is a tiny state of only 3-and-a-half-million people, for which every citizen counts, whether well-educated or not. Under constant threat for many years from hostile neighbors, it has regarded each and every resident as a potential soldier in the struggle for a secure and peaceful existence. Then, too, there are the special characteristics of Israeli existence which make this "normal" emigration rate more than normally painful: people who have devoted their lives to striking roots in the Jewish homeland have found it difficult to accept the emigration of a son or daughter in whom so many hopes have been invested by a closely-knit society. To some extent, every departure from Israel has seemed to threaten the foundation of the whole Zionist enterprise. This is reflected in the emotionally charged terms, biblical in origin, that are used to describe both immigrants and emigrants: the immigrant to Israel is called in Hebrew an *oleh*, meaning "one who goes up," thereby fulfilling the ultimate Zionist injunction; the Israeli citizen who emigrates is called a *yored* (plural, *yordim*), meaning "one who goes down," and by implication a deserter.

The problem of emigration from the Jewish homeland is not a new one, and predates the establishment of the state. At various times in the past, owing to a variety of factors, many, including dedicated Zionists, left. (Joseph Trumpeldor, who later became a national hero after he died in a battle against Arab insurgents in the Galilee, was one of these; he left Palestine in 1914 for a time because he could not bear to live in a country formally at war with Russia.)

But striking individual cases aside, the general pattern of immigration to and emigration from Palestine/Israel has conformed to fluctuations in the local political and economic situation and to conditions in the Diaspora countries. The largest flow out of pre-state Israel occurred during the years of the Fourth Aliyah (1924-29), which also saw a net immigration of only 30 per cent. The Hebron massacre (1928) occurred during this period; economic conditions in Palestine were unusually bad; and there was little overt anti-Semitism in Europe.

During the first few years of independence, mass immigration was coupled with very little emigration. Only in 1952 did the reverse movement assume significant proportions. About 80 per cent of those who left then were persons who had arrived after May 1948 in the aftermath of World War II. Some of these refugees were using Israel merely as a transit point on their way to more affluent countries; under the 1950 Law of Return, any Jew who wished to do so could go to Israel to acquire an Israeli passport—a procedure of one or two weeks—and then settle elsewhere.†

Up to the late 50's, with the exception of Turkish Jews, the tendency to leave Israel was strongest among immigrants of European origin. Between 1948 and 1957, for example, Ashkenazi Jews made up three-fifths of those departing, while constituting less than half the number of new arrivals in Israel. There are various explanations for this. First of all, Jews of Afro-Asian (largely Arabic) origin could not really return "home" even if they

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* The number of Israelis who live permanently abroad is likely to be much higher, as Israelis who live abroad and come home for a visit are considered, statistically, to be emigrants who have returned.

† To curb this abuse of Israeli nationality, the Knesset amended the law in August 1966 to require a year's residence before citizenship is granted.

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chose to, while many of the Europeans could. Secondly, the European Jews were generally less willing to put up with material discomfort than were their counterparts from the underdeveloped Middle East and Maghreb countries. Thirdly, European Jews were likely to have relatives and friends living in the West who often encouraged and facilitated their departure from Israel. Finally, many European Jews received reparations from the German government (paid in foreign currency) which gave them both greater freedom of movement and an incentive to depart.

In the years preceding the Six-Day War, most of those deciding to emigrate were responding less to the allure of other countries than to the difficulties of life in Israel. They were not being pulled out of the country so much as pushed, and the major "push" factor during this period was the economic situation, whose gradual worsening coincided closely with sizable increases in the departure rate. In 1965 and 1966 there was a severe recession in Israel, and a bitter joke went the rounds about a sign at Lod Airport: "Will the last one out, please turn off the lights."

It was not until the period following the Six-Day War that hardship factors became secondary in determining emigration. By this time—two decades after the founding of the state—the first generation of Israeli-born Sabras, or those who had arrived in Israel as very young children, had reached college and post-graduate age and were eager to take advantage of educational and professional opportunities in other countries. For the first time, "pull" factors overrode "push" factors in the decision to emigrate. Ironically enough, this was the moment when Israel was in an exalted, happy mood and the economy at long last appeared to be recovering. But this very optimism was undoubtedly a factor in facilitating emigration. The country appeared to be more secure militarily and politically than it had for a long time, and leaving it no longer seemed synonymous with desertion. Released from the security and defense obligations that had governed their lives, thousands of young Israelis felt free to depart for the larger, more cosmopolitan world; Israel's increasing prosperity made it easier for them to do so.

As the barriers to migration fell, the limitations inherent in living in a small, relatively undeveloped country, far from scientific, intellectual, and industrial centers, became more apparent and more frustrating. Israel has always had more people aspiring to professional status in areas like medicine, the academy, and engineering than it can use. Though the original Zionist settlers envisioned a Jewish state which would include not only intellectuals and professionals but also taxi drivers, laborers, and cargo handlers, and though the socialist intellectuals who founded the *kibbutzim* glorified physical labor, these influences have not been sufficient in the long run to invert the hierarchy of values characteristic of all complex societies, wherein occupations linked to learning and/or making money are esteemed over others. Jews everywhere in the Western Diaspora, including Eastern Europe, have been disproportionately successful in such pursuits, and—unfortunately perhaps for Israel—most of those who moved to the Jewish homeland retained high professional aspirations. (In 1948, the Jewish population of the new state had a higher proportion of university graduates than any other country, including the United States.) Moreover, the dominant European Ashkenazi population who formed the basic culture of Israeli society succeeded strikingly in transmitting the high value they placed on educational achievement to many who had come from the Middle Eastern countries. Just how successfully, is apparent in the growing number of Israeli-born Sephardim among the emigrants to America.

Ironically enough, the opportunities for upward mobility are necessarily far more limited for Jews in Israel than for their brethren in the Americas, Europe, or Australia, where the small minority of Jews can realistically hope to gain entry into the privileged sector of their societies. In the United States, for example, close to 90 per cent of all Jews attend college; 3 per cent of Jewish males are professors; 29 per cent are in professional employment; and the average income of American Jews is among the highest of any ethnic or religious group. The pattern is similar in other Western countries.

Obviously Israel cannot compete with such statistics. A recent comparative study of siblings from Moroccan Jewish families, for example, found that those who went to live in France did much better educationally and economically than their brothers who went to Israel. And the situation is not likely to improve in the near future. The sociologist Paul Ritterband points out: "As the proportion of the Israeli population with secondary and university education increases, we should expect the demand for educated persons to decline." This can only result in increased numbers of educated Israelis remaining abroad.

The changing social situation in Israel is another factor leading to increased emigration. Israel's present stage of development parallels that of other new immigrant societies where the ideology of the original founders has begun to lose its force. The Jewish state appears to be in a period of transition similar to the one experienced by the Puritans of Massachusetts. America's first settlers were seeking to create a better society than the one they had left behind, and their daily lives were inspired by a sense of vocation which justified all their efforts and sacrifices. But this kind of ideological intensity seldom outlives the founding generation. As the historian Bernard Bailyn has shown, Puritan ideology became gradually diluted so that by the end of the 17th century, it readapted to the values of English society.

Similarly, Israel is a society in transition from an ideological to a territorial democracy. Its early settlers placed a premium on fidelity to Zionist doctrine, but the younger generation, like the scions of the Puritans, feel they are simply living there by right and custom. The once closely-knit, quasi-collectivist community has become much more individualistic and competitive. Israel's political and ideological organizations, once total institu-

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tions with a major role in providing both public and private services like education and health care, have come more and more to resemble the impersonal machinery characteristic of most Western societies. The growth of cities (close to 90 per cent of Israel's Jewish population is urban) has furthered this process of depersonalization. Finally, the coming to light of several instances of corruption among the country's upper echelons has served to undercut the commitment of ordinary Israelis to the ideal of social selflessness.

When ideology was more central to people's lives, they were less bothered by the material shortcomings of Israeli society. With the decline of ideology, it has become permissible for Israelis both to question the necessity of continuous belt-tightening and to acknowledge a more self-centered concern with such things as advancing their careers, bettering their standard of living, providing for their families, and so forth. Once these concerns are acknowledged—and legitimated—the decision to go elsewhere in search of greener pastures becomes no more than logical.

The propensity of Israelis to travel should also not be overlooked. For many, life in a tiny Middle Eastern state is claustrophobic, and neither ideology nor the satisfaction of living in a Jewish society has eliminated the urge to move around or out. Jews in general have shown a greater readiness than any other people to move in search of a better life, or simply for new experiences, and Israeli Jews are no exception. (Israeli academics, for example, attend proportionately more international meetings and take more sabbaticals, research leaves, and visiting lectureships than the professoriate of any other nation.)

YET the unease which leaving seems to generate among the emigrants themselves is most striking. The decision to emigrate from any country is a difficult one for most people, but for the Israeli it seems to border on the traumatic. Having fought or lived through at least one war, and often as many as four, and frequently having lost relatives, friends, and colleagues in these battles, the Israeli feels his links to "home" in a deeper and more emotional way than would a person reared in a long-established and stable society, whose existence has never been called into question.

In the past, whenever Israelis left the country, they tended to justify their trips abroad in terms of national needs. Today, there seems to be less inclination to do so, and perhaps fewer inhibitions in describing the negative features of Israeli society which have contributed to the decision to emigrate: corruption in public life, loss of credibility in government, discrimination against lower-status ethnic groups, lack of civility in social relations, and the importance of connections (*protektzia*) rather than merit in getting ahead. Paul Ritterband's study of 3,000 Israeli students in America found that "many Israelis tend to see an inordinately significant role played by political and familial ties, particularly as compared with the United States." His study showed:

> Only 50 per cent of these students felt that ability is very important in advancing one's career in Israel as compared with 74 per cent who felt that ability was very important in the United States; 20 per cent thought that family connections were very important in Israel, as compared with only 6 per cent who believed this about the United States; 28 per cent felt that political connections were very important in Israel as compared with 3 per cent who felt they were important in the United States.

But even while they cite these reasons for leaving, it seems to be very important to the great majority of migrating Israelis to believe that they are only departing temporarily; that once they have secured the requisite education, training, or experience, or have earned some money, they will return home. Whether or not they do so seems to depend upon how long they stay in the United States—for obvious reasons. The longer they stay, the greater the difficulties they may anticipate in readjusting to life in Israel. A study of returning Israelis by the social scientist Nina Toren has shown that of those who remain here for five years or more, only relatively few return. The first months and years are the hardest, as with most immigrants, but once the initial difficulties have been overcome, it becomes easier to stay than to go back. One Israeli who has been in this country for nine years recalls that his first two years were a "horror":

> I couldn't wait to get back to where I was more secure. . . . But once I finally started working here, . . . I felt more comfortable. Every time I went back to Israel for a visit, things were financially much worse. So I said to myself, I might as well stay here for the time being. I still have my friends there, but there's no longer the same tie between us. Also, when I left, I didn't have anything. Now, if I went back, I'd have to start from scratch.

Still, the large majority of respondents in a study conducted by Dov Elizur said they intended to return to Israel, although only one-quarter had any clear plan for doing so in the foreseeable future. The desire to return to Israel is associated mainly with emotional factors. Feelings of national allegiance and a wish to rejoin families left behind are among the motives most frequently cited, along with such concerns as protecting one's children from the drug culture and other perils of American adolescence, as well as staving off the likelihood of intermarriage. Pulling in the other direction, however, are the material considerations which brought Israelis here in the first place—a higher standard of living, better employment and housing, and greater opportunities for professional advancement than they believe exist in Israel.

The result is often an uneasy compromise whereby many middle-aged Israelis who have been here for ten or twenty years, and hold American citizenship, still contemplate returning when their children have grown. By then, they hope to have accumulated enough capital to buy into a business, acquire property, or find other ways to provide a decent income in Israel. Some who—unconsciously, perhaps—would like to avoid military service for their children, talk of going back permanently when the children have completed their

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college education. But there seems to be a large dose of wishful thinking in such talk. Though 70 per cent of Elizur's respondents reported strong and continuing emotional ties with Israel, their spouses and children—many of whom are American-born—were less disposed to feel this way and their reluctance is often decisive in determining attitudes toward returning. If a non-Israeli wife or husband wishes to remain, or the children object to going back to what has become for them a foreign land, there is little likelihood of re-emigration. Most of the *yordim* polled (81 per cent) felt more Israeli than American, but this attitude held for only about half of their husbands or wives, a third of whom had never lived in Israel, while a majority (61 per cent) of their children identified more with America than with Israel.

WHEN one studies the statistics, relatively sparse though they are, of the current Israeli emigration, it is not hard to understand why there are so many Israelis in America. Most of those interviewed reported that their living conditions were better than they had been in Israel. An overwhelming majority (88 per cent) in Elizur's survey indicated that their income was sufficient for most of their needs, while only about one-third reported the same about their income before they left Israel. Many expressed greater satisfaction with their present work than with their last employment in Israel (89 per cent as compared to 59 per cent), and their occupational profile tends to bear this out. Fully 38 per cent of employed Israelis naturalized in 1974 were professionals and technicians, while another 15 per cent were in business or managerial pursuits. Less than 4 per cent held blue-collar jobs. All in all, these Israeli Americans have attained a strikingly higher socioeconomic status than new citizens from other nations.

Such dissatisfactions as they report are mainly in the social sphere. Many Israelis claim life in America lacks the camaraderie of Israeli society. As one emigrant put it, "You spend a hell of a lot of time working hard and you forget that there's supposed to be something else to life." Feelings of social isolation are further aggravated by the general chilliness with which Israeli officialdom, as represented by government and diplomatic offices in this country, has tended to view expatriate citizens. While wanting to maintain close contact with the children of the *yordim* whom they view as potential returnees, Israeli officials believe that by extending more than minimal help to the émigrés they may be encouraging or facilitating their stay abroad. Up until now, resident Israelis have rarely been invited to share the burden of their government's information campaign in this country, for example, and efforts to raise money among them have deliberately been discouraged. As one former Israeli consul in New York explained: "We don't want them to feel they can give $50 and have a clear conscience."

But this policy of non-recognition seems gradually to be changing. Israeli officials seem aware now that in refusing to acknowledge these citizens residing abroad they are ignoring a sizable potential population source, one which already knows the country and its language and which—in spite of expatriation—has never really severed its ties. The overwhelming majority (85 per cent) of those questioned by Elizur had visited their homeland at least once since leaving, while more than half (59 per cent) had been back a number of times. Over three-quarters (79 per cent) corresponded regularly with friends and relatives back home; virtually all (85 per cent) read Israeli newspapers with some kind of frequency; close to three-fifths (58 per cent) listened to Hebrew broadcasts, and half reported speaking Hebrew at home. These survey results are reinforced by the 1970 U.S. census which reported that 100,000 persons declared Hebrew to be their major language at home.

Thus far, Israeli government policies aimed at encouraging return have focused primarily on material assistance. Programs have been set up offering special benefits to returnees similar to the ones granted to new immigrants. But there is little evidence that these inducements have played a significant role in affecting the decision to stay in America. Indeed, according to Elizur and Toren, who attempted to evaluate these programs, the provision of "immigrant rights" for Israelis living abroad may actually serve to delay their return, since it is necessary to be out of the country for no less than three years and nine months (and no more than four years and five months) in order to take advantage of the current program, and some might stay abroad longer than they had originally intended to in order to qualify. Furthermore, these incentives for returnees have aroused considerable controversy in Israel. Many Israelis are understandably hostile to the provision of immigration benefits to people who have left the country, and do not see why those who have remained behind and shouldered defense and tax obligations should be asked to pay for the return of their fellow citizens.

BUT it is not only the Israelis who have been giving the émigrés the cold shoulder. Until recently, the American Jewish community, too, has been reluctant to acknowledge their presence, and relations between the two groups have been at best ambivalent. Though living in America themselves, many *yordim* maintain the condescending view held by many Israelis of American Jews as people who express their Zionism by giving money in lieu of going to live in Israel. Culturally, too, there is considerable distance between the two communities. It begins in such trivial matters as differences in cuisine, but extends to larger questions of Jewish identity. The Israelis have grown up in a country in which their identity as Jews is taken for granted, and the American Jewish concern with the issue strikes them as obsessive.

The American Jew for his part tends to be no less scornful of the *yored*, whose very presence is a threat to his own idealized view of the Jewish homeland. So long as the Israeli is a temporary visitor, he receives a warm welcome and may even be accorded minor celebrity status within a particular community. But if he appears to be an immigrant, he is often asked to justify his decision to settle in America as

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no other immigrant has been asked to do in America's history. This reaction to the *yordim* may be contrasted with the attitude toward Russian émigrés who opt for the West. American Jews have extended a warm welcome to the latter and have defended their right to settle here even if they left the Soviet Union with Israeli visas or came here after residence in Israel.

For the most part, however, American Jews seldom have much personal contact with *yordim*. They may encounter them as taxi drivers, storekeepers, or teachers in Jewish schools, but rarely as participants in Jewish communal life. Most Israelis here do not attend synagogues, since they are drawn largely from the non-observant sector of Israeli society, and they tend to have little idea of the other, purely communal, functions of the synagogue. With few exceptions, they seldom contribute to fund drives, in part because of the feeling that as Israelis they belong to the receiving rather than the giving sector of Jewry and in part because of their general isolation from Jewish communal life. This isolation is further intensified by the fact that few of the Israelis here are American citizens. Since—as non-voters—they add little to the political strength of the Jewish community, the community in turn tends to ignore them.

The end result is a stand-off: the lack of involvement of *yordim* in the American Jewish community reinforces the hostility to them as deserters from Israel but at the same time the community has failed to make any sort of gesture that might involve them. As one Jewish educator has written: "Although it is disturbing to note the flow of Israelis to these shores, it is equally frustrating to find Israelis . . . keeping aloof from the mainstream of Jewish life. On the other hand, the newcomers are neglected by Jewish communal leaders, and left to themselves with no guidance or counseling."

Recently, there have been signs that the treatment of the Israelis as non-persons within the Jewish community is beginning to change. In Los Angeles, an effort is now under way to organize and raise funds among the estimated 70-100,000 Israelis in the region. A study conducted last year for the New York Federation of Jewish Philanthropies concluded that: "There is a strong feeling . . . that the rights of these [Israeli] individuals are no less than the rights of all people to choose where they shall live. . . . The American Jewish community, concerned with demographic decline, cannot 'write off' a significant number of Jews. . . . It is our responsibility to reach out to them. . . ."

Following up on this study, the Federation has set up a committee that includes representatives from various Israeli groups in New York to look into ways of involving *yordim* in Jewish communal life and with Federation agencies. It is estimated that in the New York area alone there are 30,000 children of *yordim* who attend public schools and do not receive any formal Jewish education; by finding means of retaining them and their families as active Jews, the American Jewish community would increase its human and cultural reservoir while Israel would have access to a source of potential *aliyah*.

BY SHEER weight of numbers, the Israelis in America appear finally to be breaking down the barriers to acceptance by their fellow Jews in America and to recognition by Israeli authorities as an asset to their mother country. One hopes that this will spell an end to their curious status—looked down upon by their co-religionists here and frowned on by their fellow citizens at home, uncertain and a bit shamefaced about their personal future and that of their children. Such a change in status should enable the Israeli immigrants to build an ethnic community in America without apologies, as other immigrants have done, and to cease living suspended between two worlds.

Music

Glenn Gould's Dissent

Samuel Lipman

FROM the standpoint of originality and imagination, musical performance today is a pretty dull affair. Influenced by the widespread diffusion of music and the easy availability of recordings, recent performers of the most diverse intellectual and cultural backgrounds strive mightily to approach a common standard of accuracy, textual fidelity, and unobjectionable musicality. And it must be said that they succeed. Wherever one attends concerts, whichever records one buys, the result is the same: an international, received style of music-making. Laudable though this is, it is only in rare cases exciting, provocative, or even capable of inspiring rejection.

But there is one consistent exception. Of the current generation, Glenn Gould has been without doubt the most interesting—in every meaning of that valuable

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word—pianist the public has heard. From his eruption into fame with an unheralded 1955 concert at the Phillips Gallery in Washington, D.C. to the present day, when he lives reclusively in Toronto, this Canadian has stimulated and offended musical taste in North America and Europe, and through his continuing stream of recordings he bids fair to remain for some time to come the magisterial bad boy of serious music.

How can one man's piano-playing stand out so definitively from that of his colleagues? How can one man have escaped the becalming influences to which everyone else has succumbed? The answer to the first question flows in a reasonably straightforward way from a consideration of Gould as a pianist; the answer to the second involves issues of talent, psychology, and nurture that are rather less accessible to the ordinary procedures of criticism.

Any discussion of Gould's playing must begin by acknowledging the sheer quantity of musical evidence. In the past twenty-five years he has made over sixty separate records, almost never recording a work more than once. All of these discs have been made for Columbia Records, which had the good sense to begin a long-term exclusive contractual relationship with him only days after his Washington debut. And, what is remarkable in this period of short-term marketing, more than two-thirds of Gould's records remain in print to this day.

The pianist's vast recorded repertory ranges in time from the Elizabethan to the contemporary, and in scope from the most famous masterpieces to unknown Canadian music composed between 1948 and 1964. Nor is it confined to music originally written for the keyboard; in recent years Gould has busied himself with the playing of orchestral transcriptions, including the Liszt arrangement of the Fifth Symphony of Beethoven and the pianist's own reworking of the Prelude to Wagner's *Die Meistersinger*.

Not only has he chosen widely, but in the case of several of the greatest composers he has chosen in depth: among the works of Bach he has recorded are six of the seven harpsichord concertos, all the Partitas, the English and French Suites, the Inventions, and the 48 Preludes and Fugues of *The Well-Tempered Clavier*. He has recorded all the solo keyboard sonatas of Mozart, and of Beethoven all the concertos and fourteen piano sonatas as well. And in a praiseworthy service to the music of his own time, he has over a period of years recorded almost all the piano music of Schoenberg, including the keyboard parts of his songs and chamber music, and the still knotty Piano Concerto (1942).

Out of all this music it would seem that the pianist's own favorite remains what it has been since the beginning of his career, the compositions of J. S. Bach. And happily, it is Bach who has occasioned Gould's greatest successes and most favorable critical responses. His Washington debut recital, repeated nine days later in New York's Town Hall, included the G-major Partita; the critics were rapturous. Still more importantly, his first recording for Columbia, made just five months later, was nothing less than the monumental Goldberg Variations, then widely known only in the classic 1945 harpsichord recording by Wanda Landowska (an earlier one had been made in 1933). It is a tribute to Gould's early mastery—he was twenty-two at the time—that his Goldberg record has remained with Landowska's the yardstick against which all others must be measured.

In that recording, now released again in a version satisfactorily rechanneled for stereo, may be found all the most attractive qualities of Gould as pianist and musician. The listener's immediate impression is of a lightness of touch and quickness of movement, as if the piano keys were being played on an upward rather than a downward stroke. All the notes seem distinct and yet connected by phrasing and pulse, the result of the pianist's emphasis upon perfect articulation and a legato produced by the fingers rather than the damper pedal. Out of this remarkable technical virtuosity emerges a performance freed both from the authentic twang of the harpsichord so palpable in Landowska's version and from our notion of the piano as a heaven-storming vehicle for romantically plunging hands playing richly crashing chords.

Elsewhere among Gould's Bach recordings, the riches, though numerous, seem hardly as fresh. The very act of executing so many integral performances has unavoidably involved him in playing on each disc at least some works which do not engage his full sympathy. Although he never gives less than full concentration to anything he plays, sometimes in his traversals of Bach love seems to have been replaced by duty, with a resultant monotony of texture and a mannered repetition of phrasing. Yet such cavils cannot be applied to those important works with which he identifies completely; his recording of the D-minor Concerto, made with Leonard Bernstein in 1957, remains to this day gorgeous in its simplicity and, as always with Gould, remarkable in its technical finish.

At the other end of the repertory, Gould's playing has been equally distinguished, though hardly so successful with the public. His first venture into the music of the Second Viennese School began with a 1958 recording of Schoenberg's Three Piano Pieces opus 11 (1909). The same year, he recorded Alban Berg's Sonata opus 1 (1908), written while Berg was a student of Schoenberg. Ironically, while the teacher's work seems today mostly of historical interest, the student's has become a staple of the repertory. It is a mark of a profound performer that he plays better music better than he plays inferior music, and Gould's performance of the Berg Sonata, which fully plumbs that work's luxuriant Viennese hothouse atmosphere, is now a standard; by contrast, the Schoenberg performance seems gray and stale. His other performances of Schoenberg, despite the loving care he has lavished on them, give the impression of sharing the same unhappy fate. Only in the accompaniments to Schoenberg's early songs is Gould's playing marked by the same sparkle and vivacity which informs his best Bach playing.

But in Bach and Schoenberg, Gould is hardly performing works central to the piano; Bach's music was not written for the piano at all, and Schoenberg was almost to-

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tally unconcerned with the sound quality and technical characteristics of the piano as an instrument. The music that most pianists spend their time on was written from the last quarter of the 18th century to World War II, and to be a pianist in the public mind is to take a musical position on how these works should be played. It is Glenn Gould's position on these central works that has made his playing a matter of supreme interest in terms of its originality, freedom, and imagination.

If the word interesting can be defined to mean different, none of Gould's playing is more interesting than his Mozart. As if to counter the notion of Mozart as the epitome of grace, delicacy, and gentle charm, Gould exaggerates the contrasts suggested in the music, employs a dynamic scale unknown in Mozart's time, and plays fast movements at the limits of speed but at the same time heavily. One's impression can only be that Gould dislikes the music, an impression confirmed by his remark in an interview with Jonathan Cott that he does not "really . . . like Mozart as a composer." Whatever his reasons for playing the music, the intended rebuke to a sainted figure is plain. Yet perhaps it is just because of Gould's distortion of the "proper" view of the composer that his Mozart emerges as a figure of bones and guts, driven by ambition to challenge later, larger-scaled composers on their own terrain.

The gentleness so lacking in Gould's Mozart is surprisingly present in his recorded Brahms. Ten *Intermezzi*, recorded in 1960, show the pianist to be a master of the miniature and fully at home in Brahms's rich but bittersweet harmonic progressions. The result is extraordinary, and the best Brahms playing to be heard today. The reasons for Gould's triumph in these gems surely have to do precisely with the absence in them of fustian rhetoric and structural pretension; it would seem that Gould is perfectly willing to be restrained so long as the composer matches that restraint.

SUCH self-limitation cannot be said to operate in the case of Beethoven, a composer to whom Gould has paid almost as much attention as to Bach. His recordings of the five concertos were made between 1957 and 1966; in addition to his sonata performances, he has more recently recorded three sets of Variations and two sets of Bagatelles. Gould has made no secret of his admiration for Artur Schnabel, who recorded all Beethoven's piano music almost two generations ago; it is likely that before he is through, Gould will accomplish the same task.

The Beethoven recordings Gould has made so far have been the most controversial of his career. The initial storm broke with his recording of Beethoven's last three sonatas—opus 109, 110, and 111—made in 1956 as his second disc for Columbia. This album has long been out of print, and by now has attained something of the status of a camp classic. Notwithstanding Gould's positive feeling about Schnabel, the recording bears little resemblance to the elder pianist's playing. The chief difference is Gould's inability —or more likely, his unwillingness —to play naturally, to avoid harshness, extreme contrasts, and awkward transitions. It was in giving an impression of flow that Schnabel was a master; the easy *gemütlichkeit* of his conceptions has long seemed the way a sophisticated musician went about being profound. But in Gould's conceptions what stands out is a frequent brusqueness verging on flippancy. Tempos are often terribly fast—in the slow movement of opus 109, for example, sometimes startlingly so. It is not that Gould takes more liberties with the pulse or always plays faster than Schnabel; it is rather that the liberties he does take intrude themselves on the listener by their unexpectedness.

If Gould's attitude toward these last three sonatas is apparently one of devil-may-care—in the program notes which accompany the recording he writes deflatingly that the sonatas "perhaps do not yield the apocalyptic disclosures that have been so graphically ascribed to them"—toward some earlier sonatas he has felt free to express outright hostility. In describing the famous *Grave* opening of the opus 13 ("Pathétique"), for example, he writes in disparagement of "the somewhat stage-struck character of its doom-foretelling double-dotted rhythm." And of the opus 57 ("Appassionata") he writes:

> . . . [T]here is about the Appassionata an egoistic pomposity, a defiant "let's just see if I can't get away with using that once more attitude. . . ."

What kind of performance can come out of such a conception of the music? The answer is simple: where Gould finds bluster, he adds rodomontade; where he finds structural weakness, he chooses particularly slow tempos—the snail's pace at which he plays the entire first movement of the "Appassionata" is surely unparalleled for audacity in the entire history of recorded piano music. It is all done without sympathy and yet with a peculiar kind of intimate understanding which conveys at every moment a real, if hardly attractive, picture of the music.

Gould gives more comfortable performances of other Beethoven sonatas, in inverse proportion to their fame and the scope of their ambition. The same can be said of his playing of the Bagatelles. One set of these miniatures, opus 126, which is not only Beethoven's last major solo piano music but is also widely regarded as his most simply wise, he plays heavily and humorlessly, but the altogether less demanding and less highly regarded set, opus 33, receives from him a bright and lively treatment. Nor is the story different with the Variations, for despite many individual felicities in his performances of the massive "Eroica" and the smaller C-minor set, it is only in the relatively unknown F-major Variations that Gould allows listeners to feel relaxed and protected from the surprises he regularly administers elsewhere.

Paradoxically, but in a manner consistent with his general line of development, Gould's finest Beethoven is not a piano piece at all, but rather the Fifth Symphony. Though Gould has always eschewed the music of Franz Liszt, he nonetheless chose to record the Beethoven Fifth in Liszt's monumental transcription. As a transcriber, Liszt often felt free to "improve" compositions by the less

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great, but here he is remarkably faithful to Beethoven in notes and spirit, and so is Gould: in this work he seems fully in his element, playing brilliantly, directly, and powerfully—perhaps because, in this Beethoven at least, he feels an emotional effect produced by content, not rhetoric. Musically his conception of the work bears comparison with the performances of the greatest conductors, and pianistically only Horowitz has brought equally impressive command (but in musically less demanding material) to the playing of compositions already famous in their original form.

ANOTHER of Gould's ventures into transcriptions has turned out less happily. Something of a Wagnerian, he himself, in 1973, transcribed some of the best-known of the composer's works: the *Siegfried Idyll*, the Dawn and Siegfried's Rhine Journey from *Götterdämmerung*, and the Prelude from *Die Meistersinger*. (Considering the many notes Gould added, adapted is perhaps a better word than transcribed.) But whereas the Beethoven Fifth Symphony is "pure" music in that it is not bound to the specific timbres produced by the instruments for which it is written, Wagner's operas are a different matter; their musical and emotional effects are closely linked to the individual sounds and capabilities of the exact instruments Wagner had in mind. Thus, the inevitable outcome of playing Wagner on the neutral and in any case different-sounding piano is that the *Siegfried Idyll*, for example, sounds (in Gould's performance) like static musing rather than the ecstatic serenade Wagner wrote to celebrate the birthday of his wife Cosima who had six months earlier given birth to the son of his old age. And toward the end of the *Meistersinger* Prelude, after having been required at the opening to replace orchestral majesty by pianistic clatter, Gould is forced to resort to the practice of overdubbing (the combination of two separate "takes") to make possible the simultaneous performance of the three main themes as set forth by the composer. And yet, regardless of these shortcomings, who but Gould in the contemporary musical world would have made such an attempt?

GLENN GOULD today is solely a recording artist, his playing confined to those discs he wishes to make and have issued. This indeed has been the case ever since his retirement from the concert stage in 1964, at the age of thirty-one. Yet fortunately more survives than the memory of concertgoers to make clear just what Gould was as a live rather than a record performer. One document in particular fittingly preserves the last time he appeared with an orchestra in New York City, which was also one of the most significant performances of his entire career: his playing of the Brahms D-minor Concerto with Leonard Bernstein and the New York Philharmonic.

Simply put, this performance (in existence today because the concert was broadcast and preserved on tape by collectors) was a scandal. It began with a disclaimer from the conductor, who spoke to the audience of irreconcilable differences with the soloist. Bernstein then wondered aloud why he did not get another soloist, or an assistant to conduct in his place. He answered his own question by explaining that Gould's performance was a chance for a new look at a familiar piece, that sometimes in Gould's playing the music emerged with force and clarity, and that everyone could learn from an artist of Gould's caliber. These noble sentiments were somewhat vitiated by the final reason he gave, to the accompaniment of occasional muted laughter from the hall, for going ahead with the concert: there was a "sportive" element in music and it had been an adventure collaborating for one week with Gould.

Judging now from the tape, one can see why Bernstein was concerned. The familiar opening movement (marked *Maestoso* though customarily played in a much faster *Allegro*) is begun by the orchestra—plainly at the soloist's desire—in a strong six beats to the bar instead of the customary two. So unused is the orchestra to the initial tempo that the players have difficulty at first keeping together. Although by the time the piano enters the pace has been firmly established for several minutes, the first solo bars are still a shock. Then, at least for some, the shock wears off, to be succeeded by an appreciation of Gould's courage in approaching the music as a symphony rather than a pianist's vehicle, as if what counts are the notes and not the brilliance with which they are gotten through. All in all, the performance—including Gould's beautifully serious playing of the slow movement, and despite Bernstein's heavy-handed conducting—remains a moving as well as a spectacularly individual execution of the work.

But for those who, at the time, had in their ears the ruling memory of countless traditional performances, the whole thing was too much to bear. One of the enraged was Harold Schonberg of the New York *Times*, whose sarcastic review took the form of a report to an imaginary piano fan named Ossip, and was written in a dialect approaching that of the Lower East Side. Throughout, Schonberg refers to the pianist as "the Gould boy." About his choice of tempos, the critic writes that "The reason he plays it so slow is maybe his technique is not so good." Some difficult passages Schonberg "couldn't hear so good, but the inner voices . . . he played good and clear. He should be proud, Ossip. He invented them." Schonberg ends the review by complimenting the assistant who had conducted a Nielsen overture at the concert; he calls him "very good. I mean, Ossip, he's a professional. Not like some pianists I could name."

While the tone of the *Times* review may disqualify it as a reasoned statement about a musical event, Schonberg's response was no doubt reflective of a large section of sophisticated musical opinion, and can hardly have been without effect on the artist who thus found himself held up to derision and obloquy. Only Glenn Gould himself knows what the reception accorded his Brahms Concerto did to his own attitude toward his career and his future. He had often talked of giving up the concert stage some day, but the actual chronology is suggestive: his decision to stop playing at the end of the 1963-64 season must have been made, given

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the customary lead time in booking and contract-signing, about the spring of 1962, the same time as the Brahms incident. But whatever the real state of affairs may have been, there can be little doubt that that incident surrounded Gould's retirement from concert life with an aura of failure rather than triumph.

NEVERTHELESS, by any standards wider than those of the concert business, Glenn Gould has triumphed. And unlike those who have made great careers by pandering to their audience, Gould has had his success on his own terms. To an even greater extent than the publicly touchy Vladimir Horowitz, Gould plays the music he wants to play in the often deeply unsettling way he chooses to play it. Given the pressures to conform in the musical world, one wonders how he has found the resources to be different and to survive in that difference, and what accounts for his unique public acceptance.

Material to answer the first question—only supplementing, of course, Gould's playing itself—lies primarily in his large and windy mass of written and spoken words. The spoken words are most easily available on a Columbia bonus LP (1968) entitled *Glenn Gould, Concert Dropout,* and his written words are frequently on the jackets of his records. Excerpts from all of this, along with copious analyses and philosophical speculations, have been assembled in a recent book by the Canadian musician and academic Geoffrey Payzant, *Glenn Gould, Music and Mind.** This wealth of explanatory material provides a rare opportunity to understand a performing artist's work from the human and intellectual as well as the musical standpoint.

Before the sources and significance of Gould's dissent can be discussed, though, a subsidiary (and perhaps ultimately misleading and irrelevant) matter must be disposed of. Much has been made, by Gould himself as well as by his admirers and detractors, of his choice of recording over concerts. The pianist has not been bashful in urging recorded music as the wave of the future, replacing the old-fashioned and moribund concert atmosphere with a medium in which music can find continued and new life. In addition, of all artists he has been the most frank in discussing the manipulative and transforming procedures used in making recordings. These procedures can only be described as unprecedented in the degree to which they disregard the old ideal of a recording as a copy of a continuous, real-time musical performance. To Gould, splicing is king, for it permits, without any audible evidence of the fact, the linking at will of elements of any length from any number of different "takes."

The purpose of this splicing is not just to remedy errors, though Gould does use the technique to produce a note-perfect result. More importantly, multiple "takes" enable him to approach a recording session with no fixed conception of a work; at the session he can try out a variety of conceptions and afterward, during the editing process, select what seems to him to have worked well. He is thus fully free, after the physical act of playing is over, to yoke passages from radically opposed views of the music and forge them into one final performance. It is an article of faith with him that the listener is not only unaware of all this chicanery —Gould calls it being "creatively dishonest"—but is actually the beneficiary of a more integrated, because more consciously put together, performance.

Still, Gould's preference for recording and its technology aside, it cannot be said that there is any fundamental discontinuity between what is remembered of his concert playing—and confirmed by the Brahms Concerto tape—and the present evidence of his records. If one ignores inconsequential finger-slips, Gould's playing in both formats is identical in its characteristic features of freedom, discipline, and originality, and also in its ability to charm the receptive listener and infuriate the non-receptive. All in all, it is likely that Gould's love affair with recording turns on personal factors; there seem to be no overriding musical reasons for the choice.

ANY attempt to analyze the real wellsprings of Gould's special position in music must begin by recognizing the imponderables of a musical talent verging in many respects on genius. At the foundation of his great abilities lie almost unrivaled digital skills. Exemplary among these are effortless clarity and evenness in running passages, and seemingly total control over the touch and dynamic level of separate thematic lines being played simultaneously. In particular it is this technical control over melodic material which makes for the most notable feature—at least to non-musicians—of Gould's playing: his delight and sometimes trancelike absorption in pure melody.

On a more self-conscious level, Gould is a calculating thinker whose decisions, though arising out of fundamental musicality, are informed by a streak of healthy perversity. In this connection it is relevant to cite his recorded answer to the question of why his tempos are always different from those of other pianists: "If there's any excuse at all for making a recording it's to do [the composition] differently . . . as if it's never been heard before." In some cases—such as the recordings of Mozart and Beethoven discussed earlier—his playing is instantly recognizable for its audacious idiosyncrasy. And even where the differences from tradition are not so blatant or where, as in the case of the Brahms Concerto, they are respectfully based on the composer's own directions, Gould's individuality remains unmistakable.

Perhaps too little attention has been paid to the way in which Gould's characteristic orientation to performance tradition has been shaped by the fact that he is a Canadian. What discussion there has been of nationality as a musical influence on his development has too often been restricted to a stereotyped view of Canadians as moody loners given to introspection and misanthropy. It would seem more pertinent to link Gould's freedom from the crushing weight of musical convention to the relative lack of sophistication a generation ago

* Van Nostrand Reinhold, 192 pp., $14.95. Payzant's book includes a thorough listing of Gould's writings and a complete and informative catalogue of the pianist's records.

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of Canadian musical life, and its resultant powerlessness to exert a conforming influence on this extravagantly talented man. It was precisely the provincialism—so amply documented in Payzant's book—of the world in which Gould grew up which allowed him not only the freedom to develop in his own way but also the ability to retain a primitive and childlike faith in his own rightness vis-à-vis his contemporaries.

ALL these factors are, however, no more than necessary preconditions for survival; Gould has now been showing for a full quarter-century that he has the staying power to remain at the top in a fiercely competitive world. How has he managed this victory so completely on his own terms? Basically, by his willingness, which sometimes seems to verge on compulsion, to go beyond the piano to express his talents. It may well be this internal compulsion which explains his notorious habit of singing as he plays, a habit which has required the use of special recording techniques to minimize the resultant intrusive noise and which is still the continuing cause of much negative critical comment. Many explanations, fancy and homely, have been advanced to account for this mannerism, which the pianist himself would like to conquer. Most pianists sing because their fingers won't obey them; it would seem that Gould sings because the piano is inadequate to express his musical vision, and his voice serves him in fantasy as a fulfilling instrument.

More constructively, Gould has gone beyond the piano and its traditions by spending a considerable part of his energies in exploring the wider musical repertory. Besides unfamiliar piano music, he has played more of the Bach harpsichord literature than any other famous virtuoso pianist in memory. In addition, he has recorded part of Bach's *The Art of the Fugue* on the organ and some Handel Suites on the harpsichord. In this connection one can understand the importance for Gould of his performance of the Beethoven Fifth Symphony in Liszt's transcription and Wagner's works in his own. Indeed, should he wish to continue along this line of development and become a conductor—even if only on records—his qualifications would be high.

In considering Gould's ability to transcend the piano, it must not be forgotten that he is also that rarity among today's performing musicians, a composer. Unfortunately, only a single major work of his can now be heard, the String Quartet opus 1 (1953-55). One large work is hardly enough to make a serious reputation as a composer; still, this unfairly neglected quartet, obviously derived from romantic early Schoenberg but no less beautiful because of that derivation, is sufficient to demonstrate that Gould's compositional talent is major. And as in the case of such gifted predecessors as Schnabel and Wilhelm Furtwängler, there can be little doubt that thinking as a composer has provided Gould the performer with a range of musical choices hardly available to artists whose mental horizons are limited to the more or less accurate recreation of the works of others.

Moreover, as a creative artist, Gould has gone entirely beyond music itself. Since his retirement from the concert stage, much of his time has been spent on non-musical activities. As one of Canada's favorite cultural sons he has had easy access to the state-run broadcasting system. For the CBC he has made innovative radio programs about the Canadian heritage, using montage techniques derived from his own recording experiences, and for both the CBC and the French ORTF he has produced television films on music and related subject.

Despite all these activities Gould is still best known as a pianist, and the clearest sign of his public acceptance is his commercial success as a recording artist. Such success requires an enthusiastic public of a size possessed by few serious artists today. Yet it is strange, given the size of his public, and given the present concentration of performers on audience response, that Gould's following among music lovers should not be matched by a commensurate favor with those for whom music is a profession. It is not simply that the reviews, after the early years of his concert career, have so often been mixed and grudging. It is rather that Gould's playing has been largely without influence on colleagues and the countless piano students of his generation. Even where he might be thought at first glance to have had such an influence—in the tendency toward drier and clearer performances of Bach—the trend was present and gaining strength long before him and stemmed more from general musicological and technological considerations than from the work of any one person. Where Gould's playing has been totally and startlingly original—the Brahms Concerto may serve as the supreme if not the only example—his contribution has been ignored by musicians where it has not been reviled. The reasons for this rejection—often, lack of imagination or courage—hardly do credit to today's musical world.

MANY theories have been advanced to explain Gould's success with the wider musical public: his personal eccentricity, the memory of his tortured platform demeanor, and the general fascination of the contemporary audience with stage figures who can be viewed as being in some kind of emotional trouble. But another possibility must be considered—namely, that relatively unsophisticated listeners are capable of responding strongly and enthusiastically to what they can perceive as musical power, commitment, and skill. That the untutored should, on occasion, reach sounder judgments than professionals should not be all that surprising. Indeed, colleagues, critics, and students are not the only judges of music, for the very conformity to tradition which makes them indispensable as conservers can function both to rob their own work of interest and to disable them as judges of a single, enormously rare, enormously gifted individual.

Still, to hail Gould's achievement is not to suggest that its particular substance should be imitated. For what Gould has done is not to give definitive performances, but to prove again that old pieces, no matter how great and how familiar, can be seen as new and heard as if for the first time. For this he deserves the gratitude of all who still cherish a vision of musical performance as an independent art.

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Books in Review

The System

WHO GETS AHEAD? THE DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC SUCCESS IN AMERICA. By CHRISTOPHER JENCKS & OTHERS. *Basic Books. 397 pp. $17.50.*

Reviewed by CHESTER E. FINN, JR.

SEVEN years ago, Christopher Jencks and a team of collaborators published a much-noted and widely discussed book entitled *Inequality,* which sought to show that equalizing educational opportunity would not do much to equalize the distribution of incomes in American society, since the impact of formal schooling on economic success is slight compared with the effects of family background and what Jencks termed "luck." Although the analysis was taken by some to justify reduced expenditures for education, the authors meant it, to the contrary, as an argument for radical income redistribution. "As long as egalitarians assume that public policy cannot contribute to economic equality directly," they wrote, "but must proceed by ingenious manipulations of marginal institutions like the schools, progress will remain glacial. If we want to move beyond this tradition, we will have to establish political control over the economic institutions that shape our society. This is what other countries call socialism."

A considerable distance lies between that conclusion and the present volume, and the differences between them are emblematic of some of the changes that the 70's have wrought both in American society and in egalitarian criticism of it. *Who Gets Ahead?* is not an indictment of "the system" for its failure to produce uniform results, but rather an effort to explain and measure the factors that cause some people to do better than others. As Jencks bluntly states in the preface, the book "is primarily concerned with the determinants of individual success within the existing economic system, not with the determinants of the level of inequality in that system." It is also not a clarion call for fundamental change.

For what it is, a social scientist's tour of the peaks and valleys of personal attainment in the United States, the book is immensely informative, not least because its primary findings are compatible with common sense and everyday assumptions. We learn, for example, that in the early 1970's "the family background as a whole explained about 48 per cent of the variance in occupational status and 15 to 35 per cent of the variance in earnings among men aged 25 to 64. . . . The estimates imply that those who do well economically typically owe almost half of their occupational advantage and 55 to 85 per cent of their earnings advantage to family background."

The emphasis on the power of family background—shrewdly measured without ever having to define it by comparing the careers and earnings of brothers—is consistent with Jencks's previous work. What differentiates the present volume from *Inequality,* apart from its much less ideological tone, is the conclusion that education does, after all, seem to matter too. In fact, it matters a great deal, especially for those who manage to get through college. Possession of a bachelor's degree was associated with incomes 40 per cent greater than those of high-school graduates and with very substantial gains in occupational status. "The best readily observable predictor of a young man's eventual status or earnings," Jencks concludes, "is the amount of schooling he has had."

Statistical analyses such as these do not permit any confident explanation of what it is about formal education that confers advantage on its recipients. It "could be because schooling is an arbitrary rationing device for allocating scarce jobs; or because schooling imparts skills, knowledge, or attitudes that employers value; or because schooling alters men's aspirations." The numbers do not say. But they do enable the authors to dismiss the notion that education is just society's way of sorting out the able from the inept. Although a man's measurable cognitive ability is usually associated with the amount of schooling he receives and with his subsequent job status and earnings, "men who fail to convert their ability advantage into additional schooling do not have much of an occupational advantage over men with lower scores."

As for race, there is considerable evidence that, although the occupational levels and earnings of blacks are generally lower than those of whites, when the amount of education is the same these gaps narrow and sometimes disappear. This is especially vivid when a college degree is obtained. In fact, one of the national surveys on which the book is based indicated that by 1971 the earnings of whites with BA's and non-whites with BA's were almost equal. Hence, even if nothing else —such as unequal pay for blacks and whites with similar training— were to change, a blend of public policies and private decisions that led to the uniform distribution of educational attainment would eliminate 25 to 30 per cent of the present difference in earnings between whites and non-whites. And insuring equal pay for similar education and experience would wipe out almost 70 per cent of the earnings gap, even if current patterns of black-white schooling persisted.

IT IS significant that the authors here dwell on the salutary effects of purposeful changes in public policy and private decisions, for the absorbing aspect of this book—for black and white alike—is its faith in the power of ordinary institutions to determine "who gets

CHESTER E. FINN, JR. *is the author of several books on education, the most recent of which is* Scholars, Dollars & Bureaucrats *(Brookings).*

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ahead," and in the ability of those who guide such institutions to act in ways that can alter individual economic destinations. To appreciate this perhaps obvious point, one must again recall the heavy emphasis given to uncontrollable forces in Jencks's previous work, especially the bald statement in *Inequality* that "Economic success seems to depend on varieties of luck and on-the-job competence that are only moderately related to family background, schooling, or scores on standardized tests." Now it turns out that the amount of schooling received explains half the variation in occupational status and earnings, and Jencks, a conscientious scholar, finds that he can neither attribute this to "luck" (except insofar as luck may influence one's being born into an upper-middle-class family that is apt to encourage one to obtain a lot of schooling) nor ignore the clear possibility that social policies affecting the amount of education people receive are likely to influence their economic prospects as well.

This is an admirable book, not least because it does not flinch from its own analysis even when, as sometimes seems to be the case, the authors may have wished the figures came out differently. Although its preparation was intricate—Jencks's eleven associates did various portions of the underlying analysis and actual writing—and the profusion of tables, equations, and statistical terminology makes portions of it inaccessible to the layman, the only serious shortcoming, as the authors recognize, is its omission of the female half of the population from the analysis. That is a shame, especially because many of the most interesting changes in American society in recent years are related to the entry of women into the workforce and their progress there. One hopes that Jencks and company make their next project the measurement and illumination of that development.

A Vision of Judaism

GERSHOM SCHOLEM: KABBALAH AND COUNTER-HISTORY. By DAVID BIALE. *Harvard University Press. 279 pp. $15.00.*

Reviewed by HYAM MACCOBY

MANY books could be written about the life and works of Gershom Scholem, who is perhaps the greatest Jewish scholar of the century, but David Biale's book happens to be the first devoted to this extraordinary and important figure. Within his self-imposed limits, Biale has given us an excellent and deeply interesting study. He is not primarily concerned with Scholem's vast contribution to scholarship; nor does he attempt a biography or psychological analysis of

HYAM MACCOBY *teaches at the Leo Baeck College in London and is the author of* Revolution in Judea: Jesus and the Jewish Resistance.

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

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Scholem the man. Biale asks the question, "What does Scholem tell us about Judaism?" He traces Scholem's elusive standpoint and his relation to other figures in the history of modern Jewish thought and scholarship, and establishes that Scholem does indeed have an individual philosophy of Judaism which he has followed with remarkable consistency and tenacity throughout his career. At the same time, Biale places Scholem firmly, and perhaps to some people disconcertingly, within another context as well—the context of German philosophical historiography.

Biale defines Scholem's position as that of a "religious anarchist" (Scholem's own term) and contrasts him, on the one hand, with such figures of the early scientific study of Judaism (*Wissenschaft des Judentums*) as Moritz Steinschneider and Leopold Zunz, and, on the other hand, with rebels against that movement like Martin Buber and M.Y. Berdichevsky. The aim of the *Wissenschaft* movement in scholarship was to be objective by being all-inclusive; all phenomena of Jewish history were to be given equal weight in a presentation of the total Jewish *Volksgeist*. In practice, however, a certain defensiveness appeared. Only those aspects of Jewish history and thought that could be regarded as rational, and therefore presentable to the German bourgeoisie, were given importance; the whole mystical tradition was minimized and disparaged. Scholem opposed this from his standpoint as a radical Zionist, for whom Jews could never become Germans. While accepting the *Wissenschaft* aim of objectivity and all-inclusiveness, he stated the paradox that such objectivity could be achieved only through the unambiguous assertion of Jewish identity. As long as Jews compromised their identity, they were condemned to a shifty selectiveness.

But Scholem also opposed those Jewish thinkers who sought to build up a "counter-history" of Judaism, stressing only those elements which denied rationality and institutionalism. This too, for him, was selective and derivative, being an offshoot of German romanticism that ignored the balance and "dialectical" character of Jewish culture. Although he himself decided to specialize in the irrational side of the Jewish tradition, Scholem did not regard himself as engaged in unearthing the "true" Judaism (as did Buber and Berdichevsky), but as redressing a balance. Scholem in fact has a great respect for the Jewish rationalist and moralistic tradition, and is well aware of the grave dangers inherent in Jewish mysticism. These dangers erupted in the 17th-century Sabbatian movement, which Scholem (despite his insistence on its positive and creative aspects) still regards as a major disaster and a warning for the future.

Scholem's sinuous line of argument, avoiding all simplified positions, may be illustrated from his famous researches on the Zohar, the central document of the Kabbalah. The 19th-century historian Heinrich Graetz had denounced the Zohar as a medieval forgery; its defenders accordingly considered it their task to prove its antiquity. Scholem, by contrast, after patient philological research, supported Graetz's dating and definitively showed that the Zohar was composed by Moses de Leon in the 13th century. But he detached the question of dating from that of worth, analyzing sympathetically the psychology of pseudepigraphy and establishing the Zohar as a masterpiece, if a medieval one. Again, however, this did not lead him to deny the existence of a continuous tradition of Jewish mysticism, stretching back much earlier than the medieval period. As opposed to Buber, who pursued an ahistorical and often fanciful method (seeing mysticism as a series of disconnected moments achieving coherence in an eternal Now), Scholem showed that there was indeed a historical tradition without which the Zohar could not have been composed, and on which de Leon built his individual insights. Balancing Scholem's demonstration of the late composition of the Zohar are his equally convincing demonstrations of the early composition of such kabbalistic tracts as the *Sefer Yetzirah*, which he dated as early as the Tannaitic age (1st and 2nd century C.E.).

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

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

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

Scholem thus arrives at a picture of two valid and interacting traditions within Judaism, each with a historical development that requires study. And he sees both traditions as sustaining each other. Without the controlling power of rationalism, the mystical tradition would collapse into psychosis and nihilism; without the dynamism and daring of mysticism, the rationalist tradition would petrify. Indeed, as David Biale points out, Scholem considers his work to be an effort to answer the question, "What is the source of the energy that has given Jewish rationalism its extraordinary and continued vitality?" He finds the answer in the mystical tradition, which has continually reinterpreted rationalist thought, both talmudic and philosophical, in a way consonant with deep irrational needs.

BIALE has given a correct account, I believe, of the way Scholem sees the interacting traditions. The question arises, however, as to how far Scholem's conception, subtle as it is, is adequate to the full reality of Judaism. Biale points out that Scholem has a leaning toward Jungianism, having been influenced by Erich Neumann and the Eranos circle. It may be that both the strength and the weakness of Scholem's position derive from the Jungian influence. Jung, in his individual psychology, saw the conscious and unconscious forces of the mind as "compensating" for each other: when rationality increases to the degree that it endangers the vitality of the psyche, a compensatory development of irrational myth takes place in the unconscious.

This somewhat mechanical conception is very similar (as Biale says) to Scholem's idea of the relation between Talmudism and Kabbalah in Judaism. And for Scholem, the idea of a balance between the rationalism of the Talmud and the irrationalism of the Kabbalah is combined—as it is in Jung—with an awareness of possible disaster when "overcompensation" leads to an exaggerated swing to irrationality. Scholem thus sees mysticism as a kind of fuel powering the Jewish people, but always operating close to explosion point, so that a delicate balance must be achieved by use of the rationalist cooling system. This explains Scholem's own cautious and suspicious attitude toward the messianic strands in Zionism.

Scholem's model implies that the substratum of the Jewish religion, in its past and future development, is the Jewish national organism. He is, after all, a member of the *Volksgeist* school, though in a more comprehensive way than Buber or the other "romantics." Scholem sees the Jewish spirit as an entity developing in time, with its own unique character and principles of growth, which can be grasped only by close historical and textual study, without subjective constructions or arbitrary selection. But it is outside Scholem's frame of reference to see the Jewish people as a vehicle for a truth greater than and beyond their national existence. Judaism is merely the historically individual working-out of elements that exist in every culture. Hence in Scholem's thought the rational and irrational forces remain balanced against each other without achieving any significant unity. The aim is equilibrium rather than truth: the machine is powered and cooled and achieves locomotion, but its destination does not matter. To ask what it is *for* is irrelevant, just as it would be irrelevant to ask what some species of animal is for. It is there in order to be. This is the real meaning of Scholem's "anarchism."

Yet the Jewish concept of unity goes beyond the system of checks and balances envisaged by Scholem to a real synthesis of opposites. Rationalism, in Judaism, is not simply a matter of restraint and inhibitions, but is itself a dynamic and revolutionary power (even a form of mysticism). At the same time, unconscious and mystical modes of apprehension are not beyond the reach of conscious configurations but are (especially over a long period of cultural time) affected by them; so that we would expect to find, and do find, a specifically Jewish mythology, as different from pagan mythology as the fantasy life of adults is from that of children. Scholem does, to be sure, outline

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

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

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

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

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the specific traits of Jewish mysticism, but he does so only in an external way; Buber, who disagreed with Scholem over the applicability to Judaism of a term like "gnosticism," shows the keener insight here, despite Scholem's general superiority in scholarship.

IN EXPLORING the specifically Jewish character of the Kabbalah, the psychoanalytical approach is relevant. Scholem, however, has avoided it, considering it reductive. There is, of course, a reductive kind of psychologism (for example, explaining Sabbatianism solely in terms of Sabbatai Zevi's psychopathology). But there should be no objection, particularly from a kabbalist, to the study of mysticism in terms of normal psychology, for it is in the depths of human reality that the God of the Kabbalah is to be found, as man—i.e., the totality of male and female humanity—is made "in the image of God." Scholem has given remarkably little attention, as it happens, to the sexual symbolism of the Kabbalah, which may turn out to be its most profound contribution to the perplexed modern world.

We should nevertheless be grateful to Scholem for his opposition to reductivism, especially in its Marxist and pseudo-Freudian forms. It is the realm of the spirit, after all, that is important for Scholem, and he refuses to explain away spiritual realities in terms of economic forces or psychological compulsions. He has also combated nobly another kind of reductivism, this one in the field of scholarly methodology: the indiscriminate collection of "facts" in the hope that some unifying theory may emerge. Scholem calls this "rubbish collecting." He himself favors bold theorizing, checked by careful tests. At a time when Jewish studies in the universities are coming under the spell of a crude "inductivism" (riddled, of course, with unacknowledged hypotheses), the example of Gershom Scholem is most salutary. Biale's intelligent and helpful book displays Scholem not as a dry-as-dust scholar, but as a thinker and even a poet whose vision of Judaism contains a split or "abyss" that is only precariously healed.

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The Senator & the Liberals

PAT: A BIOGRAPHY OF DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN. By DOUGLAS SCHOEN. *Harper & Row. 322 pp. $12.95.*

Reviewed by
JAMES A. NUECHTERLEIN

THROUGH most of this century, the American Left has refused, often with good reason, to take conservatives or their ideas seriously. For a variety of reasons, however, liberals have recently found themselves on the political and intellectual defensive, threatened by a resurgent conservatism which they can no longer ignore or dismiss out of hand. The New Right (Richard Viguerie, *et al.*) presents an undoubted political threat, while "neoconservatism" has raised troubling and sophisticated questions concerning the fundamental principles and practices of contemporary liberalism. The unavoidable need not, however, be taken with good grace, and the frustration liberals currently feel over their situation has manifested itself in the almost apoplectic anger they direct at their critics, particularly the neoconservatives, whose criticism, it is clear, has often hit home.

Of the leading neoconservatives, none has attracted more outraged liberal attention than Daniel Patrick Moynihan—intellectual, political aide, college professor, subcabinet officer, presidential adviser, Ambassador to India and to the United Nations, and currently Senator from New York. What particularly infuriates liberals about Moynihan is his self-identification as one of them; Moynihan still thinks of himself as a liberal, though most liberals reserve for him the special hatred the faithful feel toward the apostate. Moynihan's remarkably tempestuous career has been marked by a series of controversies involving his habit of dissent from accepted liberal pieties. Analysis of that career reveals much about the vicissitudes of modern liberalism and about the emergence of the neoconservatism that has developed largely as a heretical variant of it.

Douglas Schoen's brief, sympathetic biography lacks the fullness of detail and breadth of range necessary to place Moynihan solidly in the context of his times. It does, however, provide a useful outline of Moynihan's career and a concise introduction to his thought. Much of the book is too sketchy to give us a real feel for its subject, but a thoughtful and suggestive concluding chapter redeems a good deal that precedes it.

Schoen portrays Moynihan essentially as an outsider, one who has seldom felt entirely at home in the variety of environments in which he has found himself. The theme of outsider can be traced to the conditions of Moynihan's troubled childhood: a talented but unstable father, whose heavy drinking and general irresponsibility created emotional turmoil in his family be-

JAMES A. NUECHTERLEIN *teaches history at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario.*

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
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

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fore he walked out for good in 1937 when Moynihan was ten; a spirited, intelligent, but high-strung mother who understandably found it difficult to cope with the financial and psychological pressures of raising three children on her own. The defining characteristic of Moynihan's youth was its instability. Some of Moynihan's critics have generated a silly (and mean-spirited) dispute as to whether his childhood was as poverty-stricken as he has sometimes indicated. Schoen shows clearly that while the family's economic situation fluctuated erratically between extreme privation and relative prosperity—leaving Moynihan in a kind of no-man's-land in terms of class identification—things were always uncertain and unfixed, both financially and emotionally. The family was constantly on the move, and Moynihan experienced a bewildering variety of economic and geographic circumstances. It was Moynihan's childhood that taught him what he came to suspect most liberal intellectuals never really learn—that out in the real world, "awful things do happen."

As AN adult, Schoen suggests, Moynihan has continued characteristically to move in but never entirely to be of his various worlds, a man always on the margins, never an insider. In New York Democratic politics (he served on Governor Averell Harriman's staff during the mid-50's), he was drawn naturally to the reform wing of the party, but was disturbed by the reformers' attitude of moral and intellectual superiority toward party regulars. During his stint in the Labor Department with the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, Moynihan participated eagerly in the early stages of the War on Poverty, but became increasingly skeptical of the program's emphasis on community activism—directed, of course, by middle-class organizers—rather than on jobs and income. Civil-rights leaders and guilty liberals then managed willfully to misread his 1965 report on the instability of black families as placing the blame for the pathologies in the black community on blacks themselves.

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When, having returned to the academic community, Moynihan championed the Coleman report on educational opportunity—which questioned the received wisdom that higher levels of funding must produce improved educational achievement—and argued that liberals ought not to condone black riots and should in fact strike alliances with conservatives committed to peaceful change, he became a suspect figure within orthodox liberal circles. He further damaged his liberal credentials by coupling his opposition to the Vietnam war with strongly expressed disapproval of anti-war and student radicalism and anti-Americanism.

All this, of course, was only preparatory to the cries of dismay which greeted his acceptance of a major position in the Nixon administration. While in the White House, he found himself not fully trusted by either liberals or conservatives. Enemies within the administration leaked his "benign neglect" memo, which recommended to the President not the neglect of blacks that its critics alleged it did, but simply the dampening, on all sides, of divisive racial rhetoric. (Moynihan has always felt that socioeconomic reform should be pursued along class, not racial, lines.) His tour in India was relatively uneventful, but in the UN his unapologetic anti-Communism and his challenges to the reflexive anti-Americanism and selective moral outrage of the Third World offended diplomatic traditionalists and left-wing apologists.

This has added up for Moynihan to an ambiguous political position. Still a liberal on many traditional policy questions, he has acquired his neoconservative label by his preoccupation with stability both in family structure and in the political order generally, his rejection of abstract moralism and utopianism, and his increasing sense that social planners lack the requisite knowledge or wisdom to shape and implement the Good Society. In foreign policy, he worries, like other neoconservatives, about a liberal failure of nerve and wants America to speak out strongly in international forums as the leader of the party of liberty.

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All of which leaves Moynihan at once in tune with many contemporary political currents and yet out of step with some of the most influential—certainly the most vocal—elements in his party and in the intellectual community of which he has long been a part. Political observers often include his name among dark-horse candidates for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1980 or beyond, and his comfortable majority in the 1976 New York senatorial race suggests that he enjoys substantial popularity with the party rank and file. Yet it is abundantly clear that a Moynihan candidacy would evoke howls of anguish among the upper-middle-class liberals and intellectuals who modestly imagine themselves as the collective brains and conscience of the American Left. One can specify the nature of Moynihan's political opposition by noting that it would be easier to elect him President of the United States than, say, president of Harvard.

IT IS in a way ironic that Moynihan, one of the few genuine intellectuals to enter national politics in recent years, should arouse such insensate rage in certain intellectual circles. (Those who require confirmation on this point need only consult recent issues of the *New York Review of Books* or the *Nation*, both of which have mounted attacks on Moynihan whose ferocity is by any rational measure disproportionate to any conceivable ideological disagreement.) The problem, of course, is not so much in his politics as such; it is rather that, from the perspective of the intellectual and moral gatekeepers of the liberal Left, Moynihan, of all people, ought to know better.

Since he is both a former Harvard professor and a former officer of Americans for Democratic Action, his rejection of what nowadays passes for liberalism cannot simply be dismissed as ignorance or stupidity. Moynihan is hated because he has committed the unforgivable sin: having been granted the revelation of the Truth, he has chosen willfully to reject it, and to do so, moreover, with an intelligence and verve that might, unless checked, induce backsliding among the rest of the faithful. The church can find absolution, or at least compassion, for those in the grip of invincible ignorance, but not for those who pridefully harden their hearts and encourage, all too winsomely, others to do so as well.

What this suggests in political terms is that an announcement of Moynihan-for-President would, as would the candidacy of no one else, force the Democratic party to define in action the nature of its liberalism. Perhaps in such a confrontation the "constituency of conscience" would emerge with Moynihan's scalp; but perhaps also the American people might, by supporting Moynihan, take the opportunity to expose the pretensions of these who have, for so long now, presumed to instruct the rest of us in the ways of political truth and morality.

Apostle to the Church

THE LITERARY LEGACY OF C. S. LEWIS. By CHAD WALSH. *Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 269 pp. $10.95.*

Reviewed by TERRY EASTLAND

IN 1933 an obscure thirty-five-year-old Oxford don, whose only works at the time were two books of little noticed poetry, published *The Pilgrim's Regress.* The book, modeled after John Bunyan and subtitled "an allegorical apology for Christianity," enjoyed only moderate success, but it marked the beginning of the prolific literary career of its author, Clive Stapes Lewis.

In 1936 Lewis, a classicist by training, a scholar of medieval and Renaissance literature, and one of few men ever to receive three first-class degrees at Oxford University, published *The Allegory of Love*, a study of the development of courtly love and the genre in which it was expressed, allegory. In 1938 Lewis wrote *Out of the Silent Planet*, a science-fiction fantasy in which a Cambridge University philologist

TERRY EASTLAND *is the editor of the editorial page of the Greensboro (North Carolina)* Record.

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is kidnapped and whisked off to Malacandra (Mars). *Out of the Silent Planet* was the first of three books comprising Lewis's space trilogy; *Perelandra* would come in 1943 and *That Hideous Strength* in 1945. But from the time Lewis began the trilogy until the end of the 1940's he was busy composing many other books.

In 1939 came *The Personal Heresy,* in which Lewis debated with E.M.W. Tillyard of Cambridge University the question of whether or not poetry is the expression of a poet's personality (Lewis said it was not, that the poet rather is a "man who says 'look at that' and points"). In 1940 Lewis wrote his first straightforward religious apologetic, on suffering (*The Problem of Pain*). He followed that in 1942 with *The Screwtape Letters,* his best-known work but the one he least liked. The book is a series of letters from the Undersecretary of the Infernal Lowerarchy—Screwtape—to his nephew, Wormwood, on how Wormwood might bring about the damnation of a young man. Also in 1942, Lewis published *A Preface to Paradise Lost,* in which he took issue with the Satan-as-hero theory that had dominated criticism of Milton since Blake. From 1941 through 1944 Lewis appeared regularly on the BBC in a series of broadcast talks that later would comprise *Mere Christianity,* an intellectual defense of Christian belief and ethics. In 1945 Lewis returned to allegory, publishing *The Great Divorce,* a dream vision of Heaven and Hell inspired by Dante's *Divine Comedy*; in 1946 he argued in *The Abolition of Man* that value judgments are not subjective statements but rooted in an objective moral law; and in 1947 Lewis wrote his last full-length apologetic, defending the possibility of miracles.

The 1950's saw Lewis completing volume three of the *Oxford History of English Literature,* entitled *English Literature in the Sixteenth Century* (1954). Most critics agree that this ranks with *The Allegory of Love* as Lewis's best work of scholarship, but Lewis got more pleasure from writing, in this decade, his seven volumes of children's fairy tales. These are known as *The Narnia Chronicles*; in them, Lewis created the fairyland of Narnia, sung into existence by the kingly lion Aslan. The only way the children of these stories may enter Narnia is by "magic," and the stories are full of Christian symbolism.

In 1955 Lewis wrote *Surprised by Joy,* in which he told of his early childhood longing for the "unknown," and of how his search led him from the nominal Christianity of his early youth to the atheism of his service and college years and then, by stages, to the Christianity in which he came to believe in 1929 (Lewis was an Anglican). Lewis married the American poet Joy Davidman in 1956, and his literary production from that time until his death on November 22, 1963 (the same day on which John F. Kennedy and Aldous Huxley

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

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

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

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died) was quite varied: *Till We Have Faces* (1957), a psychodrama; *The Four Loves* (1960), a study of the nature of affection, friendship, eros, and charity; *Studies in Words* (1960), an inquiry into the evolution of eleven families of words like "sad," "wit," and "free"; *An Experiment in Criticism* (1962), a study of what it means to say of a book that it is "good" or "bad"; *They Asked for a Paper* (1962), a collection including "*De Descriptione Temporum*," his inaugural lecture delivered after leaving Oxford in 1954 to fill the newly created chair of Medieval and Renaissance literature at Cambridge University.

Since Lewis's death, an extraordinary number of books and essays and other written documents of his have been made available. These include, among others, *Letters to Malcolm, Chiefly on Prayer* (1964); *The Discarded Image* (1964), a study of the hierarchical image medieval man had of his world; *Poems* (1965); *The Letters of C.S. Lewis* (1966), edited by his one brother, W.H. Lewis; and several collections of essays, literary, theological, and ethical.

The Lewis corpus is thus a vast outpouring of literary criticism, cultural history, popular theology, allegory, science-fiction, children's fantasies, poetry, philosophy, and ethics. Soon after Lewis died, Chad Walsh predicted that readership of Lewis's works would decline and then undergo a mild revival. But Walsh, as he notes in the preface to *The Literary Legacy of C.S. Lewis*, was a poor prophet. Since Lewis's death, sales of his books have increased sixfold. Today sales are going "through the roof," according to one of Lewis's American editors, with some titles selling as many as one million copies a year in as many as twenty languages.

WHAT accounts for Lewis's evident appeal as a writer? Walsh's book is an effort to answer this question. He claims to be the first to evaluate Lewis "not as a religious writer but as a writer—one whose work is well worth reading and studying simply as literature." Walsh does not discuss the origins of the books but instead considers the "finished prod-

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ucts," and, having done this, produces an "inventory" of Lewis's assets as a writer.

A first asset, Walsh writes, is Lewis's "intelligence," as seen in his rigorous analytical powers and his "solid erudition." A second asset is Lewis's "vivid imagination," which can "transport the mind" to other worlds. A third asset is Lewis's style, which Walsh describes as "straight to the point, lean, free of inflated language and the technical jargon of the professions," while also skilled in metaphor. A fourth and final asset is what Walsh calls Lewis's "conviction," meaning his religious belief. Lewis's "adult Christianity," says Walsh, was not "an optional frame of reference" but the "core of his being," and thus was reflected in everything he wrote.

Almost everyone who reads Lewis would indeed agree that Lewis had a powerful, logical mind, that he was extremely learned (the theologian Austin Farrer once said of Lewis that he was the "best read man any of us ever is likely to meet"), that he was blessed with an extraordinary imagination, and that he wrote with a spare but poetic style. Almost everyone would agree, too, that Lewis's Christian conviction was a literary asset, but—and here is the failing of *The Literary Legacy of C.S. Lewis*—Walsh neglects to give details about the Christianity that was the "core" of Lewis's being.

Thus, Walsh fails to point out that Lewis's Christianity was not of the sectarian variety. It was a "mere" Christianity, in that Lewis wished to have men and women consider entering the "hall" of faith (as he called it), not any one of the particular rooms (such as Congregationalism or Greek Orthodoxy) branching off that hall. Lewis almost certainly would not have the following he has today had he written from or in favor of a particular denomination.

Walsh also neglects to observe that Lewis considered himself a "converted pagan." This is an important fact about Lewis's Christian conviction. He was not jumpy about the world. He referred casually and favorably in his works to cigars and bottled spirits and

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

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

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other so-called "worldly" items that cultural and religious puritans might scorn. He was thus able to attract readers put off by conventional religious moralizers.

Walsh's failure to go into these details about Lewis's Christian conviction may be chalked up to the purpose of his book. Walsh never explains precisely his distinction between Lewis the writer and Lewis the religious writer. At one point he does say that the aim of his book is to set forth Lewis the writer, "not to evaluate the truth or falsehood of the particular doctrines he advanced." Yet even without such an evaluation, Walsh could have discussed Lewis's nonsectarian approach and his "Christian paganism"; and, most importantly, he could have adduced the doctrinal particulars of Lewis's Christianity.

Walsh identifies the "content" of Lewis's conviction as "traditional Christianity," yet nowhere spells out what this means. It is, however, important to see about Lewis that he did believe in *precisely* this kind of Christianity; he accepted such traditional doctrines as Creation, Original Sin, and the Second Coming: he believed that God could perform miracles; he believed that all individuals are moving to one of two destinations, Heaven or Hell. It is important to note this because Lewis's "traditional Christianity" is to be distinguished from much of the Christianity preached, if that is the right word, in the past quarter century by many, if not most, of the leaders of the organized Christian religions.

This latter Christianity, as Edward Norman of Cambridge University has written in his new book, *Christianity and the World Order*, "eschews traditional doctrinal priorities" and is "preoccupied with the pursuit of a more just society and with the material problems of humanity." Lewis's Christianity, by contrast, was not some species of political sociology. Lewis had his own political beliefs (while his instincts were Tory, Lewis thought that if there could be such a thing, a Christian society would be socialist), but rarely in his books did he address or even touch on political problems. Lewis thought, as he wrote in *Mere Christianity*, that those Christians "who did the most for the present world were just those who thought most of the next." The Apostles and other Christians such as the English Evangelicals who abolished the slave trade, said Lewis, "left their mark on Earth precisely because their minds were occupied with Heaven." As though commenting on the World Council of Churches, Lewis wrote that "it is since Christians have largely ceased to think of the other world that they have become so ineffective in this."

If the leaders of the modern Christian church continue to reduce religion to politics and sociology, and if the modern church continues to resemble the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in its purposes, Lewis is assured of having a large and probably increasing following. Much of his appeal as a writer must be ascribed to the fact that he fills a void not just in contemporary religious literature, but in the Christian church itself. C.S. Lewis has been called an apostle to the skeptics, but as well—and perhaps more importantly—he is an apostle to the Christian church.

America-Israel

THE RABIN MEMOIRS. By YITZHAK RABIN. *Little, Brown. 344 pp. $12.95.*

Reviewed by JOSEPH SHATTAN

BECAUSE its defense is of such crucial importance to the state of Israel, a Defense Minister wields an enormous amount of power in that country, more than any other member of the cabinet apart from the Prime Minister. And since an Israeli Prime Minister is also vitally concerned with defense policy, the two are natural rivals: it is hence not surprising that relations between the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister are frequently less than cordial. David Ben-Gurion served as his

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own Defense Minister, but his successors have not been as lucky. Thus, Moshe Sharett's political career came to grief over the activities of his Defense Minister, Pinchas Lavon; Levi Eshkol was easily overshadowed by Defense Minister Moshe Dayan; Golda Meir was hard-pressed in *her* dealings with the charismatic Dayan; Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres were virtually at war with each other; and Menachem Begin's frequent clashes with Ezer Weizman are a matter of record. These institutionalized cabinet rivalries contribute mightily to what Walter Laqueur has aptly called "the special virulence of Israeli political life."

Yitzhak Rabin's long-awaited political memoirs are hardly calculated to dampen that virulence. On the contrary, Rabin's embittered criticism of Shimon Peres, currenty head of the Labor opposition, is a substantial addition to the general turmoil of Israeli politics. According to Rabin, who served as Prime Minister from 1974 to 1977 and is currently a member of the Knesset's prestigious Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, his former Defense Minister is a thorough scoundrel who constantly "schemed and plotted" and resorted to a variety of dishonorable ruses to advance his career. "Peres decided that he and the office of Prime Minister were made for each other," Rabin writes, "and that all he need do was kick me out of the way. . . . He not only tried to undermine me but the entire government, trusting in the old Bolshevik maxim that, 'the worse the situation, the better for Peres.' " (This excerpt appeared in the Jerusalem *Post*, which cited it from the Hebrew edition of the memoirs; in the English edition, Rabin's tone is not quite so strident.)

Predictably, Rabin's charges have provoked indignant denials and vigorous countercharges from Peres's supporters, and it would be premature to pass judgment on the controversy. It should be pointed out, though, that when Rabin was elected Prime Minister in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, he lacked a political base of his own in the Labor party. Essentially, he was nominated by the party's "Old

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LESS THAN SLAVES

Benjamin B. Ferencz

Foreword by Telford Taylor

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Guard" to check the growing power of the "Young Turks" led by Shimon Peres. As Nadav Safran has pointed out, Rabin's strength within the Labor party was "borrowed," while Peres's was his own. During his tenure as Prime Minister, moreover, Rabin imprudently ignored Labor forums, thus further diminishing his status in the party. In short, Rabin's political difficulties were considerable, and *any* Defense Minister would have tried to exploit them. In domestic as in foreign politics, weakness invites attack.

WHILE Rabin's denunciations of Peres have captured the headlines in the Israeli press, his book is far more than a belated settling-of-accounts with an arch-rival. Rabin's description of the evolution of American-Israeli relations between 1968 and 1973, when he was Israel's Ambassador to Washington, is especially valuable. Arriving during the tail-end of the Johnson administration, Rabin devoted his first few months in the country mainly to mastering the complexities of American politics. In a sense, therefore, his effective tour of duty coincided with the onset of the Nixon administration.

When he came into office, Richard Nixon decided to concentrate his foreign-policy efforts exclusively on the Vietnam war and Soviet-American relations. Middle Eastern affairs were delegated to the new Secretary of State, William Rogers. State Department "Arabists" had long been unhappy with what they regarded as the pro-Israel tilt of the Johnson administration, and under Rogers they began to press—successfully, it turned out—for a more "evenhanded" policy. In 1969, Rogers precipitated a major crisis in Israeli-American relations by publicly broaching an American diplomatic initiative, the "Rogers Plan," which endorsed a complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories in advance of direct Arab-Israeli negotiations. Rabin became the key protagonist in the Israeli effort to have the Rogers Plan overridden by the White House.

In his campaign against the Rogers Plan, Rabin found an important ally in Nixon's National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger. Kissinger believed that the State Department persistently underestimated the gravity of Soviet designs in the Middle East; besides, he was not at all averse to having Israel attack *his* rival, Rogers. But he desperately sought to dissuade the Israelis from criticizing Nixon. As Rabin tells it, Kissinger pleaded with him, "Under no circumstances, I beg you, under no circumstances should you attack the President! . . . What you say to Rogers, or against him, is for you to decide. But I advise you again: don't attack the President!"

Kissinger's admonition did not go unheeded. While rallying their supporters in Congress and the media against the State Department, the Israelis scrupulously avoided attacking Nixon. Instead, they sought to convince the President that a strong Israel served the American interest, and that their reading of Soviet intentions was more astute than the State Department's.

Israeli-American cooperation during the Syrian invasion of Jordan in September 1970 was a watershed in Nixon's attitude to Israel. Hussein had requested Israeli aid in repelling the Syrians, and Israel's willingness to comply impressed Nixon profoundly. Upon the successful termination of the crisis, Kissinger asked Rabin, on Nixon's behalf, to convey a message to Mrs. Meir: "The President will never forget Israel's role in preventing the deterioration in Jordan and blocking the attempt to overturn the regime there. He said that the U.S. is fortunate in having an ally like Israel in the Middle East. These events will be taken into account in all future developments." Rabin notes that this was probably "the most far-reaching statement ever made by a President of the U.S. on the mutuality of the alliance between the two countries."

As Nixon's opinion of Israel rose, his opinion of the State Department declined. Soon, the Israelis were able to circumvent the State Department altogether and deal directly with the White House via the National Security Adviser. President Sadat's proposal, early in

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1971, to reopen the Suez Canal in exchange for a substantial Israeli pullback from the Bar-Lev line provided Israel with an unexpected opportunity to scuttle the Rogers Plan completely.

The initial Israeli reply to Sadat's proposal was that Israel would agree to a pullback only in exchange for an Egyptian declaration of nonbelligerency. When Kissinger impressed Rabin with the unlikelihood of Sadat's ever making such a declaration, Rabin came up with a proposal of his own: Israel would "trade off" its demand for nonbelligerency in return for an American commitment to drop the Rogers Plan. Although Prime Minister Meir's initial reaction to Rabin's proposal was unfavorable, she eventually came around to his point of view, and by the end of 1971 she and Kissinger worked out an agreement to the effect that if Israel withdrew from the Canal and permitted the Egyptians to establish themselves on its eastern bank, it would not be bound by the Rogers Plan "in any way whatsoever." Unfortunately, both the Soviets and the Egyptians had by then lost interest in achieving an interim agreement, and eventually the whole initiative was dropped.

Rabin's ambassadorship ended in March 1973. When the Yom Kippur War broke out in October, he had not yet returned to active political life in Israel. Untainted by any association with the war, Rabin became Prime Minister after Mrs. Meir resigned. The principal achievement of the Rabin government in foreign affairs was, of course, the "Sinai II" disengagement accord with Egypt. Rabin's account of that complicated episode—the breakdown of the initial round of "shuttle diplomacy," the subsequent American "reassessment" of relations with Israel, the resumption of Kissinger's mission culminating in an interim Egyptian-Israeli agreement—is not particularly revealing.

Rabin is clearly aggrieved by the fact that Kissinger chose to blame Israel for the breakdown of the talks, but he nevertheless makes a point of praising the former Secretary of State for his "wise, skillful, and patient" diplomacy. It is interesting to note, however, that the Sinai II negotiations were strikingly similar to the course of the 1971 negotiations over an Israeli pullback from the Suez Canal. In both cases, Rabin initially proposed that in return for an Israeli pullback, the Egyptians should issue a declaration of nonbelligerency. In both cases, Kissinger argued that Sadat could never agree to nonbelligerency. In both cases, Rabin then proposed trading-off nonbelligerency for American concessions to Israel. In 1971, the American concession was an abrogation of the Rogers Plan; in 1975 the concessions included promises of substantial financial and military aid to Israel and an American pledge not to negotiate with or recognize the PLO. In return, Israel withdrew from the Abu Rodeis oilfields and the Gidi and Mitla passes in the Sinai. Sadat's concessions were minimal—which led many Israelis to believe that Kissinger had been serving in the negotiations less as a mediator than as an Egyptian advocate.

The Lebanese civil war in 1976 brought shuttle diplomacy to an abrupt end. By the time the war was over, the Carter administration was installed in Washington and the era of "open diplomacy" had begun. When Rabin met with President-elect Carter in March 1977, their conversation soon took what Rabin calls an "ominous turn." The President urged Israel to open negotiations with the PLO and to drop its opposition to the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. If Israel persisted in its refusal to deal with the PLO under any circumstances, Carter foresaw a "sharp reaction" on the part of the American people. Following on the heels of the Carter-Rabin confrontation, the dramatic shift in U.S. Middle East policy was made public when, at a press conference, Carter spoke of the need for a "Palestinian homeland." Rabin believes that the failure of his talks with Carter played an important role in Labor's defeat at the polls soon afterward.

WHEN Rabin was Prime Minister, he elaborated what became known

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as the "Egypt-first" doctrine. In a remarkably candid interview in the Israeli newspaper, *Ha'aretz*, on December 3, 1974, he argued that Israel should be prepared to pay a high price for an interim accord with Egypt, since such an agreement would split Egypt from Syria and weaken Soviet influence in the region. During the negotiations with Egypt, Rabin even offered to return the entire Sinai to Egypt in exchange for a separate Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement. Sadat turned down the suggestion at the time, but Rabin believes—perhaps not unjustifiably—that his determined pursuit of an "Egypt-first" negotiating posture paved the way for Sadat's 1977 visit to Jerusalem.

There was, however, another aspect to Rabin's strategy. After the conclusion of the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement in 1974, Kissinger informed the newly-installed Rabin government that he favored opening negotiations with Jordan for a disengagement agreement on the West Bank. Rabin successfully parried Kissinger's Jordanian initiative, arguing that it was far more important to conclude a second agreement with Egypt. Critics of Rabin, such as former Foreign Minister Abba Eban, have charged that Rabin's failure to deal with Hussein when the opportunity presented itself left a vacuum which was quickly filled by the PLO. Regrettably, Rabin's memoirs contain no mention of the abortive Jordanian negotiations. While the achievements of the Rabin government in regard to Egyptian-Israeli and American-Israeli relations were indeed considerable, to the extent that Eban's criticisms are near the mark, that government must also bear part of the responsibility for some of the quandaries facing Israel today.

Harry Elson
1909-1979

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

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

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